

HINDU-MUSLIM RELATIONS IN BENGAL, 1905-1947

HINDU-MUSLIM RELATIONS IN BENGAL, 1905-1947

Study in Cultural Confrontation

HOSSAINUR RAHMAN

SECOND EDITION



NACHIKETA PUBLICATIONS LIMITED
5, Kasturi Buildings, J. Tata Road, Bombay 400 020

1947 *by* HOSSAINUR RAHMAN

PRINTED IN INDIA BY G. G. PATHARE AT THE POPULAR
PRESS (BOM.) PRIVATE LTD., 35 C, TARDEO ROAD, BOMBAY
400 034, AND PUBLISHED BY N. A. UDWADIA FOR NACHIKETA
PUBLICATIONS LIMITED, 5, KASTURI BUILDINGS, J. TATA
ROAD, BOMBAY 400 020.

FOREWORD

SEVERAL IMPORTANT books have been written since the Partition of India on the Hindu-Muslim question. Historians have tried to describe what the relations between Hindus and Muslims were over the centuries, and have tried to justify how separation between the two communities eventually became an inevitable historical necessity. And yet after partition a very large population of Muslims has remained in India, so that the question of its social and political relationship has survived as a living problem in our country. The need for a further critical study is thus not yet exhausted.

Dr Hossainur Rahman's study is an original and significant contribution in that direction. He has limited the scope of his enquiry to Bengal between the years 1905 and 1947 but in order to understand the situation he has also extended the scope of his enquiry to other parts of India as well as to a substantial portion of the nineteenth century. That enquiry was naturally not of an exhaustive nature, but was intended to furnish materials for the background of what was happening in the area of his choice. In the appendices to his thesis, Dr Rahman has presented a large amount of information which will be of great utility to those who want to carry on further enquiries on the subject in other parts of India.

I am glad to recommend the book not only to historians but also to everyone who is interested in the welfare of our country and also in establishing right relationships between the two major religious brotherhoods who inhabit this vast land. It is only when we understand properly the nature of a problem that we can also hope to direct it in a required direction provided of course we have the skill and imagination to shape things in the proper way.

NIRMAL KUMAR BOSE

PREFACE

THE PRESENT volume seeks to investigate the relations between Hindus and Muslims on a social and political plane. Most of the historical studies in this field relate to political forces, and very scant attention has so far been paid to the socio-cultural base of these relations regarding which we find two diametrically opposite views. One school, primarily conservative, believes that the two communities differentiated by opposing religions and cultures have nothing in common, and consequently have remained separate, with very little intermingling of culture. The other school argues that for a long period the Hindus and Muslims have lived together as a happy family with considerable cultural interpenetration, giving rise to a new culture distinctively Indian. Accordingly the conflict and bickering between the two communities today is attributed to the results of British rule. Both views, it would seem, are rationalisations not based on scientific objectivity. One can easily discover the preoccupations and bias of the authors concerned. Very few scholars have made any first-hand socio-political studies of the important problem of Hindu-Muslim relationships.

I have tried to show that the political relationship between the two communities was affected by their social relationship with increasing divergencies leading to a split between the two cultures. For this purpose I have studied the Home Political files of the Government of India, down to 1940 and the records of the Reforms Office between 1929 and 1947, as well as the material in the newly started Archives of the Aligarh Muslim University. In Calcutta, I have used material in the West Bengal State Archives, West Bengal Secretariat Library, Legislative Assembly Library, British Indian Association, Bangiya Sahitya Parishad and the National Library.

Based on primary source material, I have endeavoured to 'reconstruct' the history of Hindu-Muslim relations. Taking

count of the historical background and the genesis of Bengal Muslims, their education, religion and politics, I maintain that they remained a distinctly separate socio-cultural unit as late as the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Politically the Muslims of Bengal retained a separate attitude as late as 1885-1919 as demonstrated by the facts adduced. In the twentieth century, it has been observed that the political stage of Bengal was set free for Hindu enterprise through the anti-partition agitation, immediately followed by the Swadeshi Movement (1905-1908). It has also been shown that from now on the two communities became progressively estranged. The increasing differences between them subsided for a while (1919-1921) and the inter-communal advances made by the political leaders of both communities somewhat healed the wounds, and helped to strengthen the Non-co-operation and Khilafat movements in the twenties. But history shows that this attempt at reconciliation, so far as fundamental social cleavages are concerned did not prove fruitful. Even Gandhi failed to change the 'separatist' tendencies of the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League. Gandhi also failed to translate his political ideas into reality through the Congress. This period may be presumed to show how insidiously elements of communalism and obscurantism on both sides persisted in the country. Much more conscious and sustained effort was needed, for Gandhi felt most of the time that he was a lone fighter against this virus in the country. With the collapse of the Non-co-operation and the end of Khilafat movements, Gandhi had to take refuge in 'constructive work' for social uplift of the masses, leaving the political scene to be dominated by political leaders of limited understanding. During the thirties and the forties of the present century Hindus and Muslims became sharply divided into opposing groups striving for political and economic gains. The result of the 1937 elections, especially in Bengal and the Punjab, furthered this antipathy. The 1937 elections helped to undermine the whole of the imposing ideological edifice the Congress had tried to build until then. In fact the Congress failed in foresight and it was cheated in the bargain. The Congress made no positive protest against the communal thesis of the League. The whole period became one of general confusion. Through this, the League as a whole laid a stronger foundation since Jinnah's sole aim was to

reassert the League's authority after a period of dissonance and strain. The Congress unknowingly backed him to the hilt. The image of Pakistan subsequently took on substance. By 1939, it was amply demonstrated that Hindus and Muslims who had tried to console themselves with the pious wish that they were a single nation lacked the necessary ideological convictions. Such unity as existed was an instrument with which to fight the third party, namely, the British. The leaders of both communities never really wanted that cultural synthesis based on long-term co-existence which could only emerge when the communities concerned allow themselves to be fused into a new society living by a new culture.

It must, however, be admitted that in the preparation of this book many points have been left out. It is hoped that this study with all its limitations will help scholars in understanding the mental attitudes and the social characteristics of the Muslims of Bengal during the post-independent era in relation to their Hindu neighbours on questions covered by the present writer.

This book grew out of a doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of Calcutta. Professor Nirmal Kumar Bose, then Director of Anthropological Survey of India, obtained for me from the Government of India a senior research fellowship between 1962 and 1965. The Historical Research Unit of the Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta, where I worked from 1965 to 1968 as a senior research scholar, materially assisted me. To all concerned I offer my warmest thanks.

My thanks are also due to the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Law Ministry of the Union Government for having permitted me to consult confidential files beyond the stipulated time. Words fail me in expressing my sincere and deep respect for Professor Bose for his encouragement and guidance given at every stage in the preparation of this book. I have to thank Professor Jack Gallagher of Balliol College, Oxford, for a number of substantial comments and suggestions. My thanks are also due to Professor Robert Crane of Syracuse University, USA. Also to Mr Sourin Roy, who generously assisted me in obtaining access to valuable source materials specific to my line of enquiry. Gratitude must be expressed to the custodians and staff of the National Archives, the National Library, Aligarh Muslim University, Jamia Milia University and the Bangiya Sahitya Parishad.

Lastly I am grateful to Professor A. B. Shah through whose kind initiative the final arrangements for publication have been made.

HOSSAINUR RAHMAN

CONTENTS

| | |
|---|------------|
| Foreword by Nirmal Kumar Bose | v |
| Preface | vii |
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| 1. THE ANTI-PARTITION AND SWADESHI MOVEMENTS | 16 |
| 2. THE WIDENING GULF | 35 |
| 3. THE NON-CO-OPERATION MOVEMENT | 56 |
| 4. POLITICAL FORCES IN BENGAL UPTO 1937 | 65 |
| 5. BACKGROUND TO PAKISTAN | 73 |
| 6. CONCLUSION | 95 |
| Appendices | 113 |
| Bibliography | 221 |
| Index | 235 |

INTRODUCTION

Historical Background

BEFORE considering the vexed question of Hindu-Muslim relations in Bengal it would be worthwhile to consider the population-wise break up of the two communities in this highly sensitive part of India.

Except in the 14th century there is hardly any evidence of large-scale forcible conversion of Hindus and there is no such evidence to show that there was any significant migration of Muslims from the Upper Gangetic Plain. In fact the study of early history of Bengal only makes it very certain that before the eighteenth century the Hindus far exceeded the number of Muslims in Bengal.

The 1830 Census of Dacca City gives us the population figures as 32,238 Muslims and 31,429 Hindus;¹ the revenue survey of 1868 arrives at the conclusion that the population of the district consisted of more or less equal number of Hindus and Muslims.

There was, however, one way by which Muslims might have increased in numbers, and it is through slavery. The local inhabitants, due to incursions of the hill tribes and beset by famines, pestilence and civil wars gave away their children to Muslims as slaves. The Muslims treated the slaves humanely, in fact the slaves were allowed to marry and bring up families.

Proselytization however played a prominent part in the increase of Muslims and here the observation of Sir Thomas Arnold is noteworthy:

“It is in Bengal, however, that the Muhammedan missionaries in India have achieved their greatest success as far as numbers are concerned. A Muhammedan kingdom was first founded here at the end of the twelfth century by Muhammad Bakhtiyar Khilji, who conquered Bihar and Bengal and made Gaur the capital of the latter province. The long continuance of the Muhammedan rule would naturally assist the spread of Islam,

¹ *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. 17, p. 566.

and though the Hindu rule was restored for ten years under the tolerant Raja Kans, whose rule is said to have been popular with his Muhammedan subjects, his son, Jatnall, renounced the Hindu religion and became a Musalman".²

However, despite the increase in numbers there was hardly any progress made in social life by the Muslims. By and large a Muslim boy learnt the Koran and Islamic theology and neglected commercial subjects like mathematics and the official language, English, as well as his own tongue, Bengali. The third Report on the State of Education in Bengal has observed as follows:

"It is a remarkable feature in the constitution of Muhammedan society in these provinces (Bengal), and I infer throughout India, that the vernacular language of that class is never employed in the schools as the medium or instrument of written instruction. Bengali school-books are employed by the Hindus of Bengal and Hindi school-books by the Hindus of Behar but, although Urdu is more copious and expressive, more cultivated and refined than either, and possesses a richer and more comprehensive literature, Urdu school-books are wholly unknown. It is the language of conversation in the daily intercourse of life and in the business of the world, and it is the language also of oral instruction for the explanation of Persian and Arabic, but it is never taught or learnt for its own sake or for what it contains. It is acquired in a written form only indirectly and at second hand through the Persian whose character it has adopted and from which it has derived almost all its vocables, and it is employed as a written language chiefly in popular poetry and tales . . . It may explain in some measure the greater degradation and ignorance of the lower classes of Mussalmans when compared with the corresponding classes of the Hindu population, and the first step to their improvement must be to supply this defect."³

With regard to teachers and scholars the following table will give us a brief idea.

² Thomas Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*, Shirkat-I-Qulam, P.O. Box 170, Lahore, p. 277.

³ William Adams' observation in the *Third Report on the State of Education in Bengal*, 1838.

| | TEACHERS | | SCHOLARS | |
|--------------|----------|---------|----------|---------|
| | Hindus | Muslims | Hindus | Muslims |
| Moorshedabad | — | 19 | 62 | 47 |
| Beerbhoom | 5 | 68 | 245 | 245 |
| Burdwan | 7 | 101 | 452 | 519 |
| South Behar | 1 | 290 | 867 | 619 |
| Tirhoot | 1 | 237 | 470 | 128 |
| | 14 | 715 | 2096 | 1558 |

Adams further observes:

“This is a consequence of the nature of the instruction communicated, the languages, the literature and learning taught being strictly Muslim. The relative number of Hindu and Muslim scholars is very different, there being 2,096 of the former to 1,558 of the latter, which is a very remarkable contrast with the number of teachers belonging to the two classes of population”.

This in a sense, possibly explains the intellectual underdevelopment of the Bengali Muslims. In fact even during the present century a progressive Muslim newspaper commented as follows:

“The vernacular of the Mussalmans of Bengal is Bengali. The exception is insignificant. Under the rules of the University the students have to answer a vernacular paper in all examinations up to the B.A. The Mussalman students, whatever their second language may be—Arabic or Persian or any other thing—take Bengali as their vernacular and of course they do so quite naturally. But unfortunately the text-books selected for the examination are generally so sanskritised that they are difficult for Moslem students and comparatively easy for Hindu students who take up Sanskrit as their second language. There are many Bengali books of the required standards—books from the pen of distinguished writers—which can be easily understood without throwing in even a bit of Sanskrit and if these be selected there can be no complaint from any quarter. But unfortunately the University cannot be made to understand the difficulties of Moslem students.”⁴

⁴ *The Musalman*, 14 December 1917.

Another point which could be cited as a case for the under-development of the Muslims was the attitude of the Muhammedans as to whether they were Indians first and Mohammedans later or *vice versa* and consequently remaining aloof from the mainstream. Even though the Mohammedan Literature Society (established in 1863) played a very important role in trying to adapt Muslims to modern ways of education, there is hardly any evidence to show that it met with any significant success.

That the Muslim mentality was very archaic is evidenced by the following example. Dr Sahidulla, a wellknown philologist, started a Bengali Monthly *Al Islam* (the old issues are available with the Bangiya Sahitya Parishad). A careful investigation shows that even this renowned scholar has not written anything except some eulogies of the Prophet and the Koran.

On the other hand orthodox Hindu society awakened with the introduction of the printing press at Calcutta at the end of the eighteenth century. A Hindu college was opened in 1817 and the Calcutta School Book Society was founded in 1818 to circulate vernacular text-books. Thus within a short period education reached the larger portion of the Hindu society resulting in a rising urban middle class.

This period also shows a steady growth of nationalism among the educated Hindus. Side by side of Hindu revivalism, secularism and freedom also flowed. Unlike the Muslims the Hindus developed a strong faith or sometimes a negation of religion but the zeal for reform was evident in both cases. The Brahmo Samaj can be cited as an evidence here. By advocating theistic reforms among the Hindus in Bengal it played a prominent role among the community.

Islamic Revivalism—the Wahabis and the Mujahidins

Wahabism owes its origin to one Muhammad, son of Abdul Wahab, in Arabia during the 17th century. The basic doctrine of this sect was their belief in the oneness of God and implicit faith in the Koran and Hadith. In India the sect arose due to the efforts of Said Ahmed of Rai Bareilly, in Uttar Pradesh. Said Ahmed unsuccessfully waged wars against the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh and later against the British.⁵

⁵ J. O. Kineally, "Wahabis in India", *Calcutta Review*, Feb.-May 1894.

While the history of Wahabism is not relevant here it would be noteworthy to know that the Mujahidins (as the Wahabis later became known) found themselves in prominence at the outbreak of the First World War in Turkey. Though the Khilafat Movement in India is an expression of Muslim disaffection with the British rule in India, it would not be out of place to state that the Wahabis were forerunners of this Movement.

Bengal especially Eastern Bengal played an important role in the Wahabi movement. There were a number of residential schools which acted as centres of the Wahabi movement. Many of the Mujahidins were residents of Bengal.

Muslim Education in Bengal

The Government of India's despatch of June 1873 observes *inter alia*:

"That the Muhammadans nowhere appear in satisfactory strength upon the lists of our higher schools, colleges or universities, while on the other hand those institutions which have purposely preserved the ancient exclusively Muhammadan type, and which have been restricted to instruction in the languages and sciences which belong peculiarly to Muhammadanism, have also been found to be falling gradually, but steadily into neglect."⁶

The causes of this deterioration can be traced to factors like general apathy towards studies, hostility towards English and commercial subjects, tendency to utilize the children in industry rather than put them through an 'unprofitable' education etc.

An interesting and dispassionate observation has been made by Babu Dina Nath Sen, the Headmaster of Dacca Normal School:

"The entire absence of Muhammadan boys from the Normal School is a noticeable fact, considering that the majority of the population of the district as well as of the city of Dacca, is understood to be of that persuasion. There is no division or caste among the Muhammadans corresponding to the Brahmins, Baidyas and Kayesthas among Hindus, who regard themselves

⁶ *General Report on Public Instruction in Bengal, 1872-73, Appendix 'A', p. 401.*

HINDU-MUSLIM RELATIONS IN BENGAL

as the literate classes, and consider it beneath their position in society to engage in any occupation which does not require a knowledge of reading and writing, and to whom therefore such knowledge is an absolute necessity. That community seems to have only two divisions. The higher class, very small in number, consists of the descendants of the ancient aristocracy, still retaining a portion of their ancestral property, or of families who managed to acquire property at the time of first settlement made under the English Government. The lower class consists of all other Muhammadans who possess no such property, and have to depend entirely on their industry for livelihood."

He goes on to say:

"The former class have no strong incentive to acquire other knowledge than what their religion requires, and what they chiefly and easily obtain at home. They live on their old associations and have not yet recovered as it were from the shock of the revolution that suddenly deprived them of all political influence a little more than a hundred years ago. They have not in fact fallen in with the present order of things, in the way the Hindus have done. It is only the lower class therefore, who may be expected to take advantage of the facilities for the acquirement of knowledge offered by the Education Department. But that class, particularly in the city of Dacca are a vigorous and energetic set of men and have betaken themselves with great zeal to certain occupations which they have completely monopolized such as carrying on the inter-provincial trade between Eastern Bengal and the Upper Provinces, and the trade in certain kinds of country produce, petty shop-keeping in the city and the marts of the district, husking rice, making bamboo frames for the roof of *kutchas* houses, and working as masons, tailors, coachmen etc. The adult population being thus industriously engaged, the boys are naturally taken to help them in those occupations. It must therefore be a very strong inducement indeed that can make them withdraw their boys from those industries and send them to schools to acquire what they consider as very unprofitable accomplishments considered with reference to those occupations. Just so much of reading, writing and arithmetic as may

enable them to keep accounts is no doubt valued, but this they pick up in the *pathasalas*. Some boys of this class attend the model school and other vernacular schools in this city.”⁷

The D.P.I. in his report on schools in Calcutta and the Presidency division has summarised the position of teachers⁸ as follows:

| Schools in | Hindus | Mussal- mans | Chris- tians | Total |
|----------------|--------|-----------------|-----------------|-------|
| 24 Parganas | 56 | — | — | 56 |
| Nuddea (Nadia) | 60 | — | — | 60 |
| Jessore | 18 | — | — | 18 |
| Total | 134 | — | — | 134 |
| Calcutta | 135 | 8 | 26 | 169 |
| Grand total | 269 | 8 | 26 | 303 |

The same lacuna was seen in respect of teachers and instructors also.

Another report given by the Inspector of Schools may be significant in this connection:⁹

| Caste | 1st divn. | 2nd divn. | 3rd divn. | Total |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------|
| Brahmin | 9 | 33 | 64 | 106 |
| Khetri | — | — | 1 | 1 |
| Baidya | — | — | 4 | 4 |
| Kayastha | 1 | 20 | 35 | 56 |
| Navashaka | 2 | 5 | 12 | 19 |
| Other castes | 1 | 5 | 20 | 26 |
| Mussalman | — | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | 13 | 64 | 138 | 215 |

There are so many such reports to indicate that the Muslims never bothered to send their children to regular schools, except to the ill-equipped and badly taught Maktab-Madrasah, for studies.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 402.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 411.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 472.

On the other hand the Hindus took to the educational endeavours of the British seriously and with enthusiasm, thus reaping the harvest of the advantages while the Muslims groped in darkness, feeling disillusioned and disappointed.

The British, to be fair, made several attempts to rectify this anomaly. An Education Commission was appointed by the Government of India in 1882, to enquire into the working of the existing system of public instruction. In its report the Commission devoted a complete chapter to Muslim education (Chapter XV). It noted that the Government's endeavours to impart a high order of education to the Muslims had met with little success and that the Muslims were not even competing with the Hindus for Government employment.

It also noted that while English had been introduced into India as early as 1782 and fifty years later (in 1832) though a considerable proportion of Muslims were learning English yet higher English education was not being cultivated. Diagnosing the deterioration, the report stated:

"A candid Mohammadan would probably admit that the most powerful factors are to be found in pride of race, a memory of by-gone superiority, religious fears and a not unnatural attachment to the learning of Islam."

The Government of India had made the following suggestions to the local Governments in 1871:

1. That further encouragement should be given to the classical and vernacular languages to the Mohammadans in all Government Schools and Colleges.

2. That in avowedly English Schools established in Mohamman districts the appointment of qualified Mohammedan English Teachers might, with advantage, be encouraged.

3. That as in vernacular Schools, so in avowedly English Schools assistance might justly be given to Mohammedans by grants-in-aid to create schools of their own.

4. That greater encouragement should also be given to the creation of vernacular literature for the Mohammadans.

This resulted in an increase, though not substantial, in the education of Muslims. By 1880-81, "The special schools maintained by the Government were 11 in number, 7 of them being Anglo-Vernacular, Middle Schools and 4 Anglo-Primary Schools.

Nine Anglo-Vernacular Schools, or Vernacular were maintained by Municipalities and of aided schools with a special provision for Mohammadan pupils there were 4 Anglo-Vernacular and 210 Vernacular. Other inducements had also been held out to Mussalman students. They were admitted in all schools upon payment of half the usual fees, seven scholarships were specially reserved for Mussalman candidates at the University Examinations. A special Deputy Inspector of Mussalman Schools had been appointed . . . the combined results of these measures, were eminently satisfactory. In place of the 5,531 Muhamadans at Schools in 1870-71, the returns for 1880-81 give 22,075 or 6.7 per cent of the total number under instruction, while the percentage of Mohammedans to the population of Presidency is only 6 per cent." (*Report of the Indian Education Commission, 1882, chapt. XV, p. 483.*)

However while the Muslims formed 32.3 per cent of the population, their proportion in schools known to the department was only 14.4 per cent. The Director of Public Instruction, in his report for 1871-72 has made the following observations: "that the Education of Mussalmans demands still the inducements held out forty years ago to the whole community, but of which the Hindus only availed themselves. Such, however, has been progress of education and the influence of grant-in-aid system in prompting 'self-help' that the encouragement which was then considered just and right would now be called downright bribery still unless the strong inducement 'of seeing them drawn to our schools'."¹⁰

In the words of the Inspector of Schools for 1883-84 the Muslim position is summarised as follows:

"It is seen that in the Colleges Mahomedans form barely 5 per cent of the total population of the pupils, in the high schools barely 10 per cent, while in the lower primary they form more than 30 per cent of the total pupils. The number of wealthy Mahomedans is few. In the lower classes there is no race difference in Bengal between the Mahomedans and the Hindus, and the difference in religion is not absolute. The Mahomedans are converts often from no remote period, and retain sometimes remnants of Hinduism. It is both on

¹⁰ *D.P.I Report for 1871-72, p. 63.*

economic and political grounds desirable to have as few separate schools for Mahomedans as possible.”¹¹

In regard to university results the results were more appalling. Out of 3499 candidates who passed the entrance examination only 132 were Muslims, while out of the 900 passed for the first Arts 11 were Muslims and out of the 429 passed for the B.A. examination there were only 5 Muslims. The British Government had in fact a real trepidation as to the striking ignorance of the Muslim community. Among the general causes attributed were general apathy, pride, religious exclusiveness and strange enough that education ought to be a gift. Among the particular causes listed were the late entry of Muslim boys into schools, the choice of subjects, etc.

The British offered many inducements to encourage the growth of education:

1. The special encouragement of Mohammadan education should be regarded as a legitimate charge on local, municipal and provincial funds;

2. Indigenous Mohammadan schools should be liberally encouraged to add purely secular subjects to their course of instruction.

3. As the standards in the Mohammadan primary schools differed considerably from the rest of the primary schools, special standards be prescribed for the former;

4. Hindusthani be made the principal medium of instruction in Mohammadan schools except in localities where they desire that some other language be adopted; and that Hindusthani be added as a voluntary subject in the latter case.

5. Arithmetic and accounts be made additional subjects;

6. In localities where Mohammadans form a fair proportion of the population provision should be made in Government schools for imparting instruction in Hindusthani and Persian;

7. A graduated system of special scholarships to be awarded in schools and colleges.

8. A certain proportion of free studentships be specially reserved for Mohammadans;

9. Wherever endowments for benefit of Mohammadans exist,

¹¹ *D.P.I.'s Report for 1883-84*, p 145.

the funds should be used for exclusively Mohammadan education;

10. Inducements by way of liberal grants-in-aid should be offered to these endowments to establish English-teaching schools or colleges;

11. Schools for training Muslim teachers should be established, and wherever the instruction is through Hindusthani, it should be done through Muslim teachers.

12. Inspecting officers be largely drawn from the Muslims for inspection of Mohammadan Primary Schools and Societies like the Anjuman-i-Islam be given necessary recognition and encouragement.

The Political Background

The establishment of the Anglo-Oriental College through the efforts of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan,¹² at Aligarh in 1874 was a notable effort towards the furtherance of Muslim interests. The National Mohammedan Association founded in 1883 drew the attention of the authorities to the position of Muslims in public services; two years later the government passed a resolution for a more adequate representation of Muslims in government service.

In 1885 the Indian National Congress¹³ was founded but the Muslims did not join it as they felt that their interests would not

¹² The only available biography of Sir Syed Ahmad is by Maj. Gen. F. Graham: *Life and Work of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan*, 1909, pp. 174-89.

¹³ For the early period of the Congress *A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement* by Sir Verney Lovett, is a useful book, pp. 31-95 (John Murray: London, 1920). During the formative phase leading to the inception of the Congress, *The Aligarh Institute Gazette* played a very important role in order to dissociate the Muslims of India from the Congress. One important editorial, among many, was published on 17 July 1888 as 'A Congress Joke'. Another such editorial was: 'The National Congress and the Government' published over the signature of S. Ahmad on September 11, 1888. S. Ahmad's 'Notice' appeared on the AIG on 25 August 1888 over his signature exhorting both the Hindus and Muslims of Upper India not to be induced by the Congress is an important point to show that at the earlier stage S. Ahmad had tried to win both the upper class Hindus and Muslims of Upper India through the Indian Patriotic Association which he established in 1888 (AIG, Vol. 23, 28 August 1888, pp. 970-972—wherein he outlined the Rules of IPA).

be adequately served by it. Further Sir Syed, the leader of the Community, felt that Muslims should concentrate on educational progress more than anything else.

A decade later the Morley-Minto Reforms were announced, and this marks the beginning of the political awakening of the Muslims, when under the leadership of the Aga Khan they demanded the following:

1. Muslims should have a fixed number of seats in Councils and Local Bodies and that such seats should be excess in proportion to their number;

2. Muslims should have a proportionate number in subordinate and ministerial services.

These demands were made in the form of an appeal to the Viceroy, Lord Minto, on October 1, 1906.¹⁴

Lord Minto's reply to this was as follows:

"You point out that in many cases electoral bodies, as now constituted, cannot be expected to return a Muhammadan candidate, and that if by chance they did so, it could only be at the sacrifice of such candidate's views to those of a majority opposed to his own community, whom he would in no way represent, and you justly claim that your position should be estimated not merely in your numerical strength, but in respect to the political importance of your community and the service it has rendered to the Empire. I am entirely with you. In the meantime I can only say to you that their political rights and interests as a community will be safeguarded in any administrative reorganization with which I am concerned, and that you and the people of India may rely upon the British Raj to respect, as it has been its pride to do, the religious beliefs and the national traditions of the myriads composing the population of H.M.'s Indian Empire."

The deputationists did not disband after their mission was over but converted themselves into an association called the Muslim League. Branches of this League were organised all over India; there was one even in London.

¹⁴ For 'Emergence of Moslem Politics' see a detailed study in M. N. Das, *India under Morley and Minto*, Chapter VI, p. 279.

The appeal was published in *The Times of India* 6 October, 1906.

The then Secretary of State for India, Lord Morley, speaking in the House of Lords said on 23 February:

"The Muhammadan demands of election of their own representatives to the Councils in all stages, and the grant of number of seats in excess of their actual numerical proportion of the population, would be met to the full."

This pledge was reiterated on his behalf by Mr Buchanan, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary. The London branch of the Muslim League waited upon Lord Morley to pressurise him into carrying out his promise.

In 1910 the partition of Bengal was rescinded and though this rankled the Muslim mind it had not enough time to formulate a new policy due to the outbreak of the First World War.

In the meanwhile progressive sections among the Muslims and Hindus attempted to bring the communities closer and at a meeting of the Congress and the Muslim League in 1916 the following terms were agreed upon:

1. Adequate provision should be made for the representation of important minorities by election, and the Muhammadans should be represented through separate electorates on the Provincial Legislative Councils in the following proportion:

| | | |
|-------------------|---------|------------------------|
| Punjab | 50 p.c. | elected Indian members |
| United Provinces | 30 p.c. | „ |
| Bengal | 40 p.c. | „ |
| Bihar & Orissa | 25 p.c. | „ |
| Central Provinces | 15 p.c. | „ |
| Madras | 15 p.c. | „ |
| Bombay | 33 p.c. | „ |

2. Provided further that no bill or any clause thereof nor a resolution introduced by a non-official Member affecting one or the other community shall be proceeded with if three-quarters of the Members of that Community oppose the Bill or any clause thereof or the resolution.

3. In the Imperial Legislative Council one-third of the Indian elected Members should be Muhammadans elected by separate Muhammadan electorates in the several provinces.

Mr Montague and his colleagues visited India in 1917 to ascertain the wishes of the people of India. This was at a time when the separate identity of the Muslim League had ceased to exist and the Mussalmans loudly declared that their influence was not felt to the extent of the importance of community deserved.

The Muslim League, however, assembled again in June 1924, after several years of oblivion, but its reorganization had not yet been completed. The League emphasized the safeguarding of Muslim interests as a fundamental basis in any scheme which may ultimately be agreed upon. The sentiment was expressed more explicitly and in greater detail in various meetings held in northern India. The gist of the resolutions is that the Muhammadans of India were ready to co-operate with every section of the Indian community and the British Government to obtain Swaraj within the British Empire, as promised by Mr Montague on 20 August 1917. They considered that Swaraj should be obtained by constitutional methods, by the process of evolution and not by the process of revolution. The support of the Mussalmans to any form of constitutional advance was subject to the condition that the interests of the Mussalmans would be adequately safeguarded in the following manner and a guarantee should be given that they will continue to be safeguarded till the Mussalmans consider them to be unnecessary.

1. The mode of representation in the Legislative and in all other elected bodies shall guarantee adequate and effective representation to minorities in every province, subject, however, to the essential proviso that no majority shall be reduced to a minority or even to an equality. (The latter part is a modification of the Muslim League and Congress Compact of 1916.)

2. The idea of joint electorates with a specified number of seats is unacceptable to Indian Muslims, on the ground of its being a fruitful source of discord and disunion, and also of being wholly inadequate to achieve the object of effective representation of various communal groups. The representation of the latter shall continue to be by means of separate electorates.

3. No Bill or resolution or any part thereof can be effective in Legislature or in any other elected body, if three-fourths of the members of that community in that particular body oppose such bill or resolution or part thereof. (This is in the Congress and

Muslim League Compact, but it is not included in the Government of India Act).

4. The proportion of the Mussalmans in all public services and in all departments, including the posts recruited by competitive examinations, should be fixed. The proportion of the Mussalmans in the Public Services being lower than the proportion fixed for the representation in provincial and central legislatures, it should be increased in every grade of service, without impeding its efficiency. This argument is prolonged to the following height however: "The Mussalmans desired that the principle may further be extended. One third of the appointments reserved for Indians should be set apart for the Muhammadans, provided they attained a minimum qualification." Justification was this that this method of recruitment was working satisfactorily in the United Provinces in India for recruitment to the provincial services, to which the Government, Hindus and Muhammadans had given their united assent.

5. Special facilities should be provided in education. Various education commissions and conferences repeatedly drew the attention of the Indian and Provincial Governments to the importance of providing special facilities for Mussalmans in education. In 1913, the Government of India invited the attention of the local governments to the backwardness of the Mussalmans in education, and asked them to recommend special measures. Committees were appointed in each province, which submitted reports to the local governments; but on account of the financial stringency that followed the war these recommendations could not be carried into effect.

It admits of no doubt that the structure of Hindu-Muslim unity largely rested on these various safeguards. They might be regarded as a transitional phase on the way to the attainment of political autonomy in India.¹⁵

¹⁵ V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power*, pp. 14-26.

CHAPTER 1

THE ANTI-PARTITION AND SWADESHI MOVEMENTS

ON DECEMBER 3, 1903, H. H. Risley, Home Secretary, Government of India first made the historic proposal to partition Bengal.

The letter, addressed to the Chief Secretary, Government of Bengal made the following salient points:¹

2. As long ago as 1868, Sir Stafford Northcote drew attention to the greatly augmented demands that the outlying portions of Bengal appeared to make on the time and labour of those concerned in the Government of the province. He referred to the famine of 1866 as furnishing evidence of the defects of the existing system of government when exposed to the ordeal of a serious emergency; and among other methods of relieving the overtasked administration, he suggested the separation from Bengal proper of Assam and possibly of Orissa. In the discussion that followed the question was very thoroughly examined by a number of high authorities, and eventually it was decided that Orissa should remain attached to Bengal, but that Assam proper and certain other districts on the north-eastern frontier of Bengal should be formed into a separate Chief Commissionership directly under the Government of India. At the time when this discussion was arrived at, the population of Bengal as then constituted was believed to be between 40 and 50 millions. The census of 1872 showed it to be nearly 67 millions. With these figures before him Sir G. Campbell said, as Sir William Grey had said five years before, that the territories under the Lt. Governor of Bengal were more than one man unaided could properly govern. Since then the population of Bengal, as it now stands, has risen to 78½ millions and the increase has been accompanied by a considerable development of the material resources of the country, and a great extension of railways and other means of communication, while the

¹ *All About Partition*, R. Mukherji, Calcutta, 1906.

spread of English education and the wider diffusion of the native press tend to increase litigation, to demand more precise methods of administration, to give greater publicity to the conduct of officials, and in every way to place a heavier strain upon the head of the Government and upon all ranks of his subordinates. In the opinion of the Government of India, the time has come when the relief of the Bengal Government must be regarded as an administrative necessity of the first order . . .

3. The Government of India believe it to be beyond dispute that this is too heavy a burden for any one man, and that it cannot be adequately discharged save at the expense of efficiency. . . .

4. The curtailment can be effected only in two directions. The neighbouring provinces to Bengal are the United Provinces on the North West, the Central Provinces on the West and South-West, Madras on the South, and Assam on the North-East and East. Proposals to take away Behar and add to the area now known as the United Provinces have been put forward in former days, but are not now likely to be revived. Moreover, the Government of the United Provinces with 112,000 sq. miles (107,000 British territory) and 48,493,000 people (47,691,000 in British territory) to administer, has already in respect of both area and population a sufficiently heavy charge. Nor would the Government of India propose (apart from special reasons connected with circumstances of the border districts) to add to the area or responsibilities of Madras. The Government is fully occupied with 151,000 sq. miles (141,000 British territory) and 42,397,000 people (38,209,000 in British territory).

5. There remain the Central Provinces and Assam. Both are young and growing administrations, capable of sustaining a heavier charge. Both will profit rather than lose by an increase of responsibilities.

7. The arguments in favour of the transfer may be briefly summarised as follows:

(i) In character and state of developments the people of Chutia (Chota) Nagpur correspond much more closely with those in the Central Provinces than with the population of Bengal;

(ii) The Bengal form of administration is too highly develop-

ed, too legalised, and too impersonal for backward tracts and primitive hill tribes. This view is borne out by the experience of a series of out-breaks in recent years and by the difficulties met with in dealing effectively with the land tenures of this part of the province.

8. The considerations on the opposite side may be stated thus:

(i) It will probably be represented that Chutia (Chota) Nagpur is one of the few attractive Divisions in Bengal. . . .

28. In conclusion, I am to state the figures for Bengal and Assam as they will stand, if the proposals of the Government of India are carried into execution. It will be observed that they relieve Bengal to the extent of 11 millions of people, and that they place Assam almost exactly upon the same level with the Central Provinces, namely 17 millions:

| | | | |
|----------------------------|----|----|------------|
| Bengal: Present population | .. | .. | 78,498,410 |
|----------------------------|----|----|------------|

Gains:

| | | |
|---|----|-----------|
| Sambalpur (from Central Provinces) | .. | 659,971 |
| Feudatory States (From Central Provinces) | .. | 948,420 |
| Ganjam District (from Madras) | .. | 1,689,142 |
| Ganjam & Vizagapatam Agency Tracts | .. | 1,172,102 |
| | | <hr/> |
| | | 4,469,635 |

| | | | |
|--------------------|----|----|------------|
| Net loss to Bengal | .. | .. | 10,992,926 |
|--------------------|----|----|------------|

Losses:

| | |
|---|--------------|
| Chittagong Division & Hill Tippera (to Assam) | 4,911,056 |
| Dacca & Mymensingh (to Assam) | .. 6,564,590 |
| Chutia Nagpur (to Central Provinces) | .. 3,986,915 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 15,462,561 |

| | | | | |
|-------------------|----|----|----|------------|
| Future population | .. | .. | .. | 67,500,484 |
| | | | | <hr/> |

| | | | |
|---------------------------|----|----|-----------|
| Assam: Present population | .. | .. | 6,126,343 |
|---------------------------|----|----|-----------|

Gains:

| | | | |
|----------------------------------|----|----|------------|
| Chittagong (from Bengal) | .. | .. | 4,911,056 |
| Dacca & Mymensingh (from Bengal) | . | | 6,564,590 |
| Net gain to Assam | .. | .. | 11,475,646 |
| Future population | .. | .. | 17,601,989 |

I am to ask that the Government of India may be favoured with a full expression of the views of the Lt. Governor on the reconstruction of Bengal that is proposed in this letter and the effect of which is summarised in the foregoing statement.

Risley's letter was published on December 12, 1903. It led to the agitation against the proposed partition of Bengal. Public criticism, which followed the publication of the proposal, suggested that the scheme had certain defects.²

The Viceroy then, Lord Curzon, visited East Bengal³ in February 1904 and indicated that the Government contemplated a major scheme which would remove the principal point of criticism by giving the new province its own Lieutenant Governor, a Legislative Council, and a Board of Revenue. In spite of the Viceroy's attempt to remove the objections to the proposed partition with several revisions, the agitation continued. A meeting to protest against the revised proposals was held in Calcutta in March 1904.

It has been said that the Viceroy's proposal was a useful arrangement from the administrative point of view.⁴ It promised to open up and develop the rich resources of the populous districts of East Bengal, full of waterways but difficult of access. However, it split the original province of Bengal into two and gave the Muslims a majority in East Bengal. The Bengali Hindus strongly opposed the proposal. However, Muslim organizations did not

² This portion largely draws on the confidential report sent by the offg. Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal (R. W. Carlyle) to the Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, dated Calcutta, 25 January 1906—Proceedings Home—Public, June 1906, Nos. 169-186.

³ For a detailed description see S. N. Bannerjea, *A Nation in the Making*, Chapter XVIII, p. 184.

⁴ For a detailed description see R. C. Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement*, Volume II, pp. 4-28, for the Partition Movement; for the Swadeshi Movement, pp. 29-174.

oppose the proposed partition. Nor did *individuals* of either community in both the Bengals oppose it. (See Appendix 'A' to this chapter.) The Hindu view of the proposal was that it was intended as an affront to the nationalism of all Bengalis and that it would wipe out the personality of Bengal. The Bengali intelligentsia took the proposal as an insult from high bureaucracy and its resentment soon turned into conspicuous restlessness, when the partition became a reality. It is obvious that the partition of any politically distinct territory would offend considerable vested interests even under the most favourable circumstances. The partition of Bengal was proposed at a time when Bengali Hindu nationalism was rapidly rising. Therefore, the plan inflicted a deep injury on Bengali Hindu nationalists. For a long period, Bengal had continuously enjoyed a common language and culture regardless of communal identities; and, during the nineteenth century, a vigorous national life had begun to flourish in Bengal. Bengali Hindus had shown a good deal of initiative in patriotic undertakings. Bengali culture and literature had registered a higher water-mark than the other provincial and linguistic cultures in India at that time. Bengal had, by then, already a powerful middle-class motivated by democratic ideals and nationalistic aspirations. Bengali Hindu national consciousness had already manifested its dynamism through a brilliant literary and cultural renaissance. In this atmosphere, Lord Curzon's decision came as a sinister shock to most educated Bengali Hindus. The administration had proved its utter lack of political foresight in not anticipating the fierce and widespread agitation which predictably greeted the proposal to partition Bengal. Popular susceptibilities were severely injured by the decision as could have been expected. Lord Curzon, however, refused to budge and the partition was carried through in 1905. It remained in force for the next five years and its scheme was modified when the capital of British India was shifted from Calcutta to Delhi.

A detailed discussion of the multiple causes of the agitation against British rule cannot be easily offered in the short space of a chapter. Among the outside influences were the spread of Western civilization and thought, the rapid rise of Japan as a power and the political awakening of other Oriental countries. The internal causes were of growing spirit of nationalism stimulated by the spread of English education and accompanied by a

Hindu religious revival which harked back to India's legendary traditional greatness.

This period was also marked by the activities of the Arya Samaj, a body occupied with the reformation of the Hindu religion, but which, by its very nature of operation and organization, was to become a considerable political force, particularly in Northern India. This revivalist spirit found expression also in the *gaurakshini* (cow-protection) movement which was a prolific source of communal trouble and in the growth of Hindu-Muslim antagonism. During the same period the Sikhs found a new voice of their own: and Indian youth, due to a strange combination of religious fanaticism and anarchic tendencies, were driven to violence. Economic causes equally contributed to the growing unrest: the expansion of communication raised the prices of staples throughout India, and while this increased the gross national product the middle-classes (designated as the "*bhadra-lok*" by British Officials) whose earnings were fixed were adversely affected by it.

The agitators found willing hosts in the minds disturbed by these many causes. Indian revolutionaries based in England and other parts of Europe, styling themselves as *Free India Society*, lost no time in seizing the opportunity to turn this latent discontent into violent agitation. Their first leader was Swami Krishnavarma of India House in Highgate. This group not only openly preached sedition and flooded parts of India with highly inflammatory literature but it also smuggled arms into India which were eventually used for the purpose of political assassinations. An account of the main events of the period is therefore significantly relevant here.

That the Secretary of State had agreed to the partition of Bengal became widely known in India in July 1905. An agitation against this measure immediately broke out in Calcutta and spread out from there. On September 1, 1905 the orders constituting the new province of East Bengal and Assam were published. The new province was to come into being on October 16, 1905.⁵ Immediately following the publication of the order, the agitators threatened to retaliate with a call to systematically boycott European goods. The agitation spread rapidly into East

⁵ C.I.D. Report on Origin and Character of the Swadeshi Movement: Home Poll. Proceedings, 18 October 1907.

Bengal through the *National volunteers* movement. This movement originated in Serajganj in November 1905 and the 'volunteers' mainly comprised the students of two local high schools. During the months of January and February in the following year, the movement in the new province began to show signs of a decline. Where it did survive, it took on economic overtones and its political accent disappeared. The people of the districts became gradually indifferent to the partition, accepting it as a fact. The Muslims remained either aloof from the movement or were actively hostile to it. On February 26, 1906 the House of Commons debated the issue of the partition and the Secretary of State made a statement. Thereafter, the feelings against the partition gradually subsided but this also led to an attempt to revive the agitation. At first, this attempt failed. Then, when Sir Surendra Nath Banerjea was arrested in connection with a meeting of the Bengal Provincial Conference at Barisal on April 16, 1906, the Indian National Congress held a series of protest meetings throughout the country and the agitation against the partition gained a fresh lease of life. It was resumed with full force in May-June 1906 with the addition of several new features. The volunteer movement now assumed a militant form: the volunteers were taught drill and the use of quarterstaves. Those persons who were 'loyal' to the Government were threatened with social excommunication. The Muslims were pressurised into joining the campaign against the partition and shop-keepers were admonished to abstain from selling imported goods. The slogan *vande mataram* became the banner of patriotic resistance. The strikes on the East Indian Railway were a direct result of political instigation.

The British administration found the crisis in Bengal growing to ominous proportions. The Lieutenant Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam prepared a note for the Indian Association on January 4, 1906, which explained the portent of the Anti-Partition Movement in the following terms:

"... So far from the whole country being of one mind against the partition the Musalmans who form 60 p.c. of the population, are in favour of it.

"The holding of political meetings in public places and the shouting of *Bande Mataram* in the streets were prohibited be-

cause they were exciting school boys to gross misbehaviour. Insults were being offered to Mohamedans, and when the Lt. Governor first reached Dacca a deputation of the leading Mohamedan residents expressly asked for protection. Numerous complaints were received of insults and annoyance offered to Europeans in the mofussil, and specially to European ladies. At one place two missionary ladies were molested and pelted with stones, and all the windows of their meeting hall were broken. . . .”⁶

Sir Bampfylde Fuller, Lieutenant Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam, resigned at about this time. On July 5, 1906 the Government of India advised him to withdraw the local Government's request to Calcutta University to derecognize two privately managed schools in Serajganj. Sir Bampfylde Fuller requested the Government to reconsider the orders; alternatively, he sought permission to resign. The Viceroy was unable to reconsider the order and so he decided to accept Sir Bampfylde's resignation. Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Honorary Secretary, Mohamedan Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh wrote to W.A.J. Archbold, Principal, M.A.O. College, Aligarh the following letter on Sir Bampfylde's resignation:

“ . . . I find that Mohamedan feeling is very much changed, and I am constantly getting letters using emphatic language, and saying that the Hindus have succeeded owing to their agitation and the Mohamedans have suffered for their silence. The Mohamedans have generally begun to think of organising a political association and forming themselves into political agitation. Although it is impossible for the Mohamedans, on account of their lack of ability and union and want of funds, to attain any success like the Hindus, and they are likely to lose rather than gain by such a course, it is yet impossible for anybody to stop them. The Mohamedans of East Bengal have recieved a severe shock. I have got a letter from Syed Nawab Ali Chowdry of Dacca which gives utterance to the extremely awful feeling prevailing there. He says: ‘up till now the Mohamedans of Bengal have been careless. They have now begun to feel the consequences of their carelessness. If only the Mohamedans of Bengal, instead of following the Govern-

⁶ Minto Papers 1905-1910—Roll 1 (No. 33-a).

ment, had agitated like the Hindus and had enlisted the sympathies of the Mohamedans of the whole of India, and raised their voice up to Parliament, they would never see these unfortunate consequences'.

"The resignation of Sir Bampfylde Fuller has produced an unrest throughout the Mohamedans in the whole of Bengal, and their aspirations for higher education and increased rank and responsibility are being subsided. Looking at it from one point of view the Government has taught a good lesson to the Mohamedans by accepting Sir Fuller's resignation. It has served to awaken them after a sleep of carelessness. We shall now have to proceed on the same line as the Hindus not only in India, but in England".

"This is only a brief quotation of what I am getting from the whole of India. These people generally say that the policy of Sir Syed and that of mine has been doing so good to Mohamedans; they say that Government has proved by its actions that without agitation there is no hope for any community; and that if we can do nothing for them we must not hope to get any help for the college. In short, the Mohammedans generally will desert us, because the policy of the college is detrimental to their interests. My dear Archbold, nobody can say that the present state of Mohamedan feeling is without its justification. The liberal Government . . . is responsible for it. I consider it a wrong policy arising out of the . . . [Too indistinct to read] Mr John Morley is a philosopher and might well . . . to give lectures in philosophy. . . .

"His policy has done a lot of injury to India, and may do much more. I may hope that the Government of India will do something to subside the growing Mohamedan feeling and to remedy their hopelessness."⁷

There is yet another letter written at the same time which expresses the fear that if Muslims modelled their organizations on the same political lines as the Hindus the consequences would not be healthy. This letter, written from Shillong by Mr L. Hare, Lieutenant Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam to Mr Dunlop Smith is dated September 1, 1906. It says:

⁷ Vol. II, The Lord Minto—Enclosure to a letter—W.A.J. Archbold addressed to Mr Dunlop Smith.

“ . . . The next point which I think must be taken up is whether the Government of India can accept the Mohamedans who address them and the other several Mohamedan bodies who have met and expressed their views, as representatives of the feeling and opinions of the Mohamedans generally.

“If Government can do so, and if it does so, I think it will have a great political effect. It is then unnecessary for the Mohamedans to start on a campaign of political agitation

“If the Home Government will not accept the assurance that these representative Mohamedans do truly represent Mohamedan opinion, so far as any opinion has been formed at all, then I think the Mohamedans will decide that they must organize meetings to voice Mohamedan opinion. They can do it. The Mohamedan organization through their Moulvies, and based on religious practices is far and away in advance of the Hindu organization, which is only a political organization, dependent on the engineering of the agitators. The recent events at Dacca, which I will refer to in my demi-official to Lord Minto, seem to prove this, and we all know it well. We have advised the Mohamedans so far that it was unnecessary to organize counter-demonstrations. If these are started, the fat will be in the fire, and we do not know where it will end. There will be a recrudescence of all the old disturbances in a much worse and more dangerous form, and the country wants peace. There are a thousand *budmashes* in Dacca to take advantage of any disturbance.

“Mr Morley may ask, do these Mohamedan opinions really represent Mohamedan opinion? I answer most certainly they do. The Hindu papers may talk of the Tailors of Toolcy Street, and no doubt in East Bengal Mohamedan leaders of position and distinction are few; but unless these leaders go counter to the Moulvies, which would only be in some religious or quasi-religious question (e.g. a blow at the Madrasas, which train Moulvies, might be such an issue), the Mohamedans will follow their leaders without question and to a man almost. As a matter of fact all political agitation must be engineered. Not one in a thousand of either the Hindus or Mohamedans in the districts care now lots about partition, how can they even know of the partition unless they are told; whether I live at Calcutta or Dacca, or whether Sir A. Fraser or I give orders

to the District Officers does not interest them at all, but they will follow their leaders."⁸

The boycott and the *Swadeshi* movement continued in the new province throughout 1907, and it showed signs of spreading to other provinces. The destruction of imported goods was reported frequently in both the Bengals. The 'volunteers' continued to picket at fairs and bazaars and tried to prevent the sale and purchase of imported goods. In April-May 1907, they used force against Muslim shop-keepers in the Mymensingh district as the latter retailed imported goods. The disturbances soon assumed the proportions of a general riot. By this time, the Muslim shop-keepers and *ryots* were already considerably annoyed by the agitator's interference in their own affairs and they started attacking the Hindus in retaliation. Local ruffians took advantage of the situation by using it as an opportunity, for arson and looting and some of them even settled personal scores in the prevailing chaos by avenging their personal enmities.⁹

On November 7, 1908, a Bengali student made an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal. Only two days later, Nando Lal Banerji, a sub-inspector of police employed in the Criminal Investigation Department, was shot dead in the streets of Calcutta. Banerji was instrumental in tracking down one of the Muzaffarpur culprits. All attempts to trace Banerji's assassins failed. Meanwhile, evidence accumulated to point to the existence of organized societies—known as *samitis*—which disseminated 'incendiary literature' and some of which raised funds through dacoities.¹⁰ The members of these organizations had a sworn commitment to *Swadeshi* and had taken other similar vows. They were also trained in the use of *lathis* and arms. While open agitation and explicit acts of protest had decreased,

⁸ *Minto Papers* 1905-1910, No. 66.

⁹ A detailed description of Hindu-Muslim rioting is on record in a Police Officer's (Garlick) Report submitted to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam which the Secretary sent along with a letter to the Secretary to the Government in the Home Department on 24 April 1907.

¹⁰ A detailed and thorough account of anarcho-terroristic movement in India during 1907-1917 is given in a secret Home Poll. publication entitled *Political Trouble in India 1907-1917* by James Campbell Ker (Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1917). This should be consulted by research scholars working on any political aspect of emerging India.

there was a marked increase in the subversive activities of secret organizations. It was in these circumstances that Lord Minto's Government, acting on the two Bengal Governments' recommendations, issued orders for arresting nine persons on December 11, 1908. These nine persons were ordered to be detained in jails in the United Provinces, the Punjab and Burma.

There was some improvement in the political situation at the beginning of 1909. However, bombs were discovered in the possession of certain persons in Bengal and in other provinces. Bombs were also thrown at several places, and shots fired as well, at trains in the vicinity of Calcutta. Ashutosh Biswas, Public Prosecutor, Alipore Sessions Court, who was engaged to prosecute the Calcutta conspirators, was murdered on February 10. At the end of March, the search of a house in Nasik revealed the existence of two secret revolutionary societies. One of them was based in Gwalior and the other in the Deccan and both had branches in a number of towns. In July, a secret revolutionary society was uncovered in Mymensingh in Eastern Bengal and Assam. This society was responsible for terrorism and several acts of political crime.

A serious feature of the movement in Bengal and Eastern Bengal and Assam was the attempt by young Hindus of the *bhadralok* class to raise funds for revolutionary activities through planned dacoity. Eight such dacoities occurred in 1908 of which the first was committed at Barrah in the Dacca district. In 1909 and 1910, the number of dacoities rose to seventeen and property worth about 85,000 was stolen. Ten of these seventeen dacoities were committed in Bengal and the other seven in Eastern Bengal and Assam. Only in two cases it was possible to convict people accused of the crime. The increase in this form of crime was a symptom of the spread of lawless tendencies in the younger members of the intelligentsia and the bourgeois sections of the public. By this time Indian nationalist politics was clearly divided into two distinct movements between whom there was a marked rift. There was a radical element in it which subscribed to militant and subversive methods; they were the 'revolutionaries'. On the other hand, there were the moderates who followed constitutional methods of protest and persuasion. The cleavage between the two became so marked that in February 1910 the Viceroy decided to release the nine Bengali agitators arrested

earlier and deported in December 1908, under Regulation III of 1818. On February 8, 1910—the date on which the Press Act was passed—the Viceroy issued orders for their release. At about the same time, the Government of Bengal submitted a proposal to deport fifty-four persons involved in active agitation against the British Government. Several of these people were suspected, and some convicted, subversionists. The time, however, was considered inopportune for further deportations and the Government of Bengal was advised to launch proceedings against the conspirators if there was any legal proof of their crimes. Accordingly, a case was instituted under sections 121-124 and 400 of the Indian Penal Code.

A large amount of evidence had already been collected in both Bengal and Eastern Bengal and Assam which implicated revolutionary and subversive organizations active in certain areas. These organizations were found to have interfered with law and order and the masses, either due to the fear of the terrorists or out of sympathy to them, desisted from helping the administration to maintain order and even to detect crime. The trend of political events of this entire period are clearly reflected in the contemporary history of the Indian National Congress. The twenty-first session of the Indian National Congress was held in Benares in December 1905 and it was presided over by Gopal Krishna Gokhale. It clearly indicated the increasing strength of nationalistic aspirations in India and, significantly, it vindicated the movement to boycott imported goods as a perfectly constitutional form of protest against the British Government's unpopular measures.

The Twenty-second Session of the Congress, presided over by Dr Dadabhai Naoroji in December 1906, revealed the deep differences between the moderate and radical groups in the Congress. The breach became wider and more explicit in the Twenty-third Session at Surat on December 27, 1907.¹¹ It should not be thought that the Anti-Partition movement had been entirely motivated by secular interests. Nor was the pro-Partition attitude free from communal interests. Rival meetings were held in Calcutta—the centre of the agitation—by the pro- and anti-Partition groups. 'The former consisted entirely', observed the

¹¹ For a detailed study of this conflict see M. Das, *India under Morley and Minto*, pp. 88-122.

Chief of the Central Intelligence, 'of Muhammadans. The latter consisted mainly of Hindus The President, Khan Bahadur Mohammad Yusuf (who was to preside over an Anti-Partition Meeting) who is also President of the Muhammadan Association, was dissuaded by the Mohammadans from presiding at the meeting, but the only concession that they could obtain from him was that he would announce that he attended in his private capacity and not as representing the Muhammadan Association in any way'

About the observance of the Partition Day in Calcutta, the following remarks are significant:

"the numbers of the persons who attended these demonstrations were not in the same ratio as the communities bear to each other in the population of Calcutta. Proportionately a larger number of Muhammadans attended the pro-partition demonstration than Bengalis did the anti-partition demonstration. Actually the number of Bengalis was of course large"

The same report makes the following observations on the Muslim response to the call for an anti-Partition Agitation:

"The Muhammadan shops one and all remained open. The New Market remained open, and the fish, vegetable, and the meat suppliers were practically not interfered with, although efforts had been made to prevent fishermen supplying fish to the stall on that date The direction of the agitators to the effect that no food should be cooked on the 16th October was universally observed by the Bengalees.

"The Muhammadan demonstration took place at Marcus Square, a large open plot on Machwa Bazar Street within 150 yards of the route followed by the Bengalee processions proceeding from College Street to the proposed site of the Federation Hall, which by the way has not yet been acquired.

"The Principal attraction at the Muhammadan meeting was the presence of a very celebrated Maulana named Abu Bakr, who came from Phur Phura in the Hooghly District and delivered a dissertation on religious subjects, on the benefit of the partition, and on loyalty to the British Crown. He exhorted his hearers to take no part in Bengali demonstrations against the action of the Government; he also prayed for the recovery of the Sultan of Turkey. Abu Bakr is a very powerful Maulana—the most powerful in Bengal and his presence added largely

to the effect of the gathering."

The same report makes a revealing observation while describing a large anti-Partition gathering held in front of the Anti-Circular Society Building, College Square, Calcutta:

"No speeches were made here, but a flag was hoisted half-mast. The crowd assembled there and went in procession along College and Cornwallis Streets through Sukeas Street to the proposed site of the Federation Hall, where other processions from North of the Town also proceeded. And these crowds were addressed by Khan Bahadur Muhammad Yusuf, a Vakil of the High Court. It is obviously the writing of a Bengali agitator and was merely given to him to deliver. At this meeting were perhaps some 30 or 50 persons dressed as Muhammadans. It is however doubtful whether a large proportion of these were not in Muhammadan costume.

"There were undoubtedly some 500 Muhammedans among them. There were, claimed the report, principally Muhammadan vakils and others who were largely indebted to Hindu solicitors for their Hindu practice. . . ."

The report sums up by commenting on the tactics frequently used by Congressmen in Indian politics:

"Much capital will undoubtedly be attempted to be made by the Bengali agitators of the fact that the President of their meeting was a Muhammadan; but this will probably, I think, be largely discounted by communications from Muhammadans to the Press and otherwise as there is no doubt that the allegation that Muhammad Yusuf in any way represents the feelings of the Muhammadan community was strongly combated. . . ."¹²

One can thus conclude, on the basis of formidable data, that the anti-Partition movement was launched against the British Government by the professional Hindu urban middle class. Very few Muslims joined this movement with conviction.¹³ At one

¹² Ibid., pp. 152-153.

¹³ Note of some very revealing meetings held by the Muslims of either Bengal has been taken of, and the resolutions adopted by them have been reproduced in the appendix. Yet, some more resolutions were sent to the British Government, mostly from Western Bengal hailing the decision of the Government. (See Appendix 'B').

time, the Muslims appear to have been confused by the nature of the movement. At another time, they completely boycotted it. Only one Muslim name appears in the police reports on the Anti-Partition agitation, and that is the name of Leakat Hussain,¹⁴ a Bengali Muslim. However, the reports themselves use the term Bengali only for Hindus and not for Muslims who are referred to as 'Muslims'. Against this single Bengali Muslim name, there are a number of Hindu names such as Aswini Dutt—a formidable leader of the movement in East Bengal, Babu Prianath Guha, a Narayanganj physician, Babu Mathura Das, a Narayanganj lawyer, and Lalit Babu of Narsanghi. The list could be stretched further easily.¹⁵

In August 1907, a public meeting in Calcutta was addressed by two leaders: Bepin Chandra Pal and Leakat Hussain. According to a fortnightly police report of August 1907:

"At the above meeting the programme for boycott day, 7th August, was arranged. After bathing in the river the people are to march to Kalighat Temple where the boycott vow will be renewed before the Goddess Kali. . . ."¹⁶

The same note reports on the increasing momentum of the movement in the following words:

"August 24, 1907. Aswini Kumar Dutt has returned to Barisal. Accused in Commilla Case have started back from Dacca. In Dacca arrest of the Editor of the *Bande Mataram* is much discussed and considered harsh. Mohammedans much dissatisfied at the Commilla Case judgement. . . . Aswini Kumar Dutt said to have accompanied Leakat Hussain by boat to Maulvi Bazar in Backerganj on 15th August."

The Government of India's Home Department has, in its secret files, several such instances recorded in the form of Police Reports

¹⁴ Simla Record: 1907 from the Diary of Mr. B. C. Allen (Collector) 21 April, 1907.

¹⁵ It might be of interest to note that this fortnightly report was done very carefully by the local police station and then sent to the Ministry of Home Affairs, through the proper channels. After severe scrutiny, it used to be sent to the Secretary of State for policy decision and future course of action that the British Government were supposed to follow.

¹⁶ Home Poll. files 1907-B-6-43, Simla. Report on the Political situation during August 1907.

and the letters exchanged between the Chief Secretary, Eastern Bengal and Assam and the Home Secretary, Government of India. These records are to be found from the year 1907 onwards. They describe Hindu-Muslim riots on the issues of boycotting imported goods, closure of shops, and support to the anti-Partition agitation.

To name a few among many Hindu efforts at developing the Swadeshi movement we should refer to the 'Report on the Samitis in the Dacca Division, East Bengal and Assam of the Criminal Intelligence office in the Home Department, Government of India'. It stated on July 13, 1908:

"This report refers mainly to the Swadesh Bandhab Samiti of Backerganj and to matters which occurred prior to August 1908.

"The existence of no less than 175 branches of the *Barisal Bandhab Samiti* have come to light in the Backerganj (p. 1).

"Two more societies called the *Kannia Shebak Samiti* and *The Fariapatty Mahajan Samiti* have, it is satisfactory to note, suspended operations during the last few months (pp. 3-4).

"(2) The report of the Swadesh Bandhab Samiti for the year 1906-7.

"(3) The 2nd and 3rd annual Report of this Samiti (p. 17)."

The report further suggests:

"With regard to (1) the course suggested by Aswini Babu was generally approved. He is clearly shown to be the leader of the extremists not only in Backerganj but throughout Eastern Bengal . . . At a meeting in the Brojo Mohan College (p. 32) the boycott was proclaimed against a cloth dealer Ganga Charan Das and it was decided to appoint three Maulvis to foster the Swadeshi spirit amongst Muhammadans and remove their malice towards Hindus."

From the Bengali Hindu point of view the Swadeshi movement was a popular effort to promote indigenous Indian enterprise by boycotting foreign goods. It was taken up by the educated classes in all the provinces, and especially in Bengal, and on its constructive side made an appeal to Indian capitalists to invest their funds in industry, and to the younger members of the

'literary' castes to abandon their aversion to manual labour and prepare themselves for industrial enterprise. The Indian Industrial Conference was started in 1905 as an adjunct to the Indian National Congress with this end in view.

The Bengali Muslims, in order to voice their political aspirations, began to act along more positive lines at this stage. This is proved by the historic memorandum submitted to the Secretary of State in October 1906. The initiative came from the Nawab of Dacca, who sent a telegram on 7 October 1906, requesting, on behalf of the other supporters to the memorandum, permission to submit the memorandum in question to the Secretary of State. This request seemed to the Private Secretary to the Viceroy 'an unusual one, (and) should have been made through the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam'.¹⁷ Surprisingly H. H. Risley, the Home Secretary sent the following reply: 'Await the letter 10.10.06'.¹⁸ A volume of correspondence passed between H. H. Risley and Nawab Salimullah of Dacca. Relevant portions of one of his letters are quoted below:

Dilkhosa,
Dacca.

The 8th October 1906.

**held on the 21st September, 1906, the following was unanimously adopted:

Resolved that the first Anniversary of the Provincial Mahomedan Association of Eastern Bengal and Assam, and the Partition Day following on the 16th of October next, be duly celebrated at Dacca, as a day of rejoicing by the Mahomedan community of this place, that Partition Day should be thus celebrated throughout the new province by the Mahomedans, and that, at all places where Mahomedan Associations are founded in alliance with and affiliated to this Association.

(1) That the Day be observed as a general holiday.

(2) The Maulad Shariff will be read,

(3) Prayers will be offered for the King Emperor, the Queen Empress, the Prince of Wales, and the Royal Family and for

¹⁷ Proceedings—Home Deptt. Public. Branch. 1906.

¹⁸ Ibid.

the Viceroy of India,¹⁹

The rest of the letter describes in minute detail how the 'auspicious' day will be observed in a very fitting manner. In the Home Political Proceedings several telegrams from H. H. Risley to the Home Secretary to the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam are available wherein he requested the Secretary to give all facilities asked for by the Nawab to the Mohammadans of that region.²⁰

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Besides what is being mentioned there were, to refer to a few, important correspondence passed between:

- (1) P.C. Lyon, I.C.S., Chief Secretary to the Government of Eastern Bengal & Assam and the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, Shillong, 23 October 1906, Admn. Dept.—No. 10890.
- (2) Nawab Salimullah's letter to H.H. Risley, Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, 7 October 1906. To which a telegraphic reply was sent on 15 November 1906 by the Home Secretary—Home Department.

CHAPTER 2

THE WIDENING GULF

THIS BOOK does not intend to present an elaborate account of the increasing differences between the Hindus and the Muslims.¹ It will suffice to observe that the roots of these differences lie deep in Indian history; they date back to the advent of the first Muslim conqueror of India.

The antagonism between the two communities is the result of two colliding cultural systems, meeting in a political arena and unable to reconcile with one another on common socio-cultural grounds. There have been innumerable points of contact between the two communities over a long span of history. Yet each one of these has also been a point of conflict, latent or open.

Rigid religious dogma characterises both the systems and their mutual repugnance can always be traced to these dogmas. In any one of its protean forms, the conflict between the two communities is almost always a religious issue.

However, as the base of political power in India was progressively widened by successive reforms, secular issues were superimposed on religious issues. Secular issues thus came to the fore, attained an immediacy over religious issues and, as a result, the politically conscious Indian Muslim began to view with increasing sensitivity his relatively disadvantageous position in politics and administration. He became apprehensive of the relative rise of the Hindu in politics and administration and began to insist on his community's protection from the other community. An early instance of this is found in the promises obtained by the Muslims from Lord Minto's Government in 1906.

On the other hand, the Hindus too were equally apprehensive of Muslim aspirations to power. They feared that the Muslims had not yet buried the hopes of a revival of their traditional

¹ Murray T. Titus, *Indian Islam*, 1930, p. 147; S. Khuda Buksh, *Essays: Indian & Islamic*, 1912, p. 1; Ameer Syed Ali, *The Spirit of Islam*, 1922, pp. xxv-x/iii; Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, 1922, pp. 75, 89.

rulership of India. They suspected that the Muslims, on the contrary, aspired to revive their rule and dominance. Leaders of both the communities saw in communal conflicts and misapprehensions a serious obstacle to the progress of Indian society and polity. The religious and social differences between the two communities were of such a nature that they defied any attempt at their mutual fusion and, the new political conditions in the country only tended to drive the Hindus and the Muslims apart due to mutual doubts, anxieties and fears.²

In 1915, some progressive leaders of Hindu and Muslim opinion arrived at a rapprochement.³ Until then, the All-India Muslim League had only been a body which sought to protect Muslim interests against anticipations of Hindu dominance. Now it had gradually come under the control of leaders who shared the new ideal of self-government for India with some of the Hindu leaders. By the end of 1916, it had become known that Lord Chelmsford's government was engaged on an elaborate proposal for post-war reforms. Nineteen members of the Imperial Legislative Council, at this juncture, evolved their own reform proposals and published them. These proposals were considered in the Lucknow meetings of the Congress and the Muslim League. The Muslims conditionally accepted a modified form of the proposals on the assurance that Muslim interests would be safeguarded by conceding a very heavy representation of Muslims on some of the proposed councils. This pact was ratified at Lucknow and thus the Congress and the Muslim League jointly accepted an amplified and modified version of the original proposals made by the nineteen members of the Imperial Legislative Council. The Lucknow Pact was received with due euphoria as a great triumph of the *avant garde* of the nationalist party. It was seen as a historic achievement because the two parties had, until then, regarded each other with great suspicion.

Unfortunately, the gulf between the Hindu and the Muslim

² Facts of political-communal differences narrated in the chapter have been largely culled from the secret files of the Home-Political Department (Reforms): File No. F. 4/27 Special.

³ Editorial, *The Bengalee*, January 1 and November 21, 1916; *The Hindu Patriot*, April 8, 1916 ('Communal Representation'); Editorial, *The Hindu Patriot*, March, 11, 1916 ('Relations between Hindus and Mussalmans') bear testimony to this fact.

masses still remained as wide as it had been. The conservative Hindu press criticized the Hindu leaders for acquiescing to the Muslim demand for what seemed to be over-representation in the councils. The conservative Muslim press likewise continued to spread doubts about the *bona fides* of the Hindu leaders and went on to assert that the Muslim political leaders who assented to the Lucknow compromise had no basis to assume that they represented real Muslim opinion. Among the two, the Muslim press was far more vociferously critical of the pact than the Hindu press.

In the meantime, Turkey met with an army debacle, Baghdad fell and Palestine was lost to the advancing Arabs. The power of the Sharif of Mecca was on the rise. These were events to which the Indian Muslim showed a high degree of sensitiveness while the Hindus continued to remain indifferent to them. The Hindus could not understand why the Muslims showed such anxieties about developments in the Arab world. The Indian Muslims' continued obsession with these developments which meant nothing to the Hindus, only alienated the two communities further from each other.

A tragic confrontation between the masses of either community and their respective leaders came in September 1917. The Muslims hold annually the festival of *Bakr-Id* to commemorate Abraham's contemplated sacrifice of his son. At the *Bakr-Id* feast, cows and other animals are sacrificed.⁴ The Hindus hold the cow in great veneration and are sensitive to its slaughter. Not infrequently, the *Bakr-Id* is an occasion for the outbreak of communal violence in India. As a rule, the leaders of both the communities used to prevent the instigation of communal violence on the occasion. In 1917, however, rural Hindus in areas in the Patna Division of Bihar appeared to have made a carefully pre-organized attempt to put an end to cow-sacrifice for good. The first riot broke out in the village of Ibrahimpur in the Shahbad district of Bihar on September 28, 1917. Despite a previous agreement between the two communities, a large body of Hindus attacked and looted the village. The rioters dispersed as suddenly as they had struck. Since the previous compromise had thus been violated by the Hindus, the Muslims performed cow-sacrifice

⁴ Home-Political 52-Deposit-November 1917: anti-cow killing agitation.

in keeping with their custom. On September 30, a mob of more than 25,000 Hindus attacked Ibrahimpur and the neighbouring villages. The mob was dispersed only after hand-to-hand fights with the police and much looting was done before the mob dispersed. It also attacked the police station. Military police was sent in as reinforcement and for the next thirty-six hours there was calm in the district. But on October 2, the rioters broke the peace suddenly again, simultaneously at several places. This was followed by six consecutive days of lawlessness and complete disorder. Large Hindu mobs attacked Muslims, destroyed their houses and looted their property. In the south of the district, the Muslims put up dogged resistance and bloody fights ensued. Small landholders often led the rioting mobs, riding elephants or on horseback. Troops were moved into the district and initially they found it difficult to cope with the mobs which were more mobile and numerous. The countryside was waterlogged and neither the cavalry nor the infantry could make rapid movements. The rioters were helped by their informers of impending troop movements and they struck sudden blows only to disappear before the arrival of the troops. The resistance of the rioters collapsed only when a cordon of military posts was established and the main roads were effectively patrolled. On October 9, similar disturbances broke out in parts of the neighbouring Gaya district where over 30 villages were looted. But this time the troops were close at hand and order could be restored within a few days. Rioters were arrested in large numbers and were tried by special tribunals constituted under the Defence of India Act. About one thousand individuals were convicted and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment. These riots immediately affected Hindu-Muslim relations and their impact was felt throughout India. The gulf dividing the two communities widened. Muslim leaders felt in particular an increasing anxiety about the interests of Islam. Hindu masses showed a different temper and this made some Muslim political leaders increasingly apprehensive. At a meeting of the All India Muslim League held two months after these incidents these fears found political expression in a demand on part of some members that the representation of the Muslim community in the Councils proposed in the League's scheme be substantially increased. In May 1918, two religious leaders of Lucknow issued a pamphlet

declaring that a Home Rule which gave predominance to the Hindus would be contrary to the principles of Islam. In such a highly charged atmosphere the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was published on July 8, 1918. Muslim leaders expressed disappointment at the provisions of the new scheme. The *avant grade* young Muslims who were in agreement with the nationalist Hindus resented the criticism of the Congress-League proposals by the authors of the report. They were also displeased by the prospective loss of the over-weighty representation which the Muslims of some provinces had secured under the Lucknow Pact. Many Muslim leaders resented the provision disqualifying the Muslims from voting in the ordinary constituencies since special electorates had been conceded to the Muslims. The Shahabad riots continued to be a disturbing memory. The continued Military debacle of the Turks was taken by Indian Muslims as a setback to Islamic power itself. All these factors tended to create a climate of depression, anxiety and distrust among Muslims of all classes. The occurrence of further riots on religious grounds was a clear indication of the wide gulf between conservative Muslims and the Hindu masses. There were no signs yet of this gulf being bridged.

At the close of 1918, there was only a political entente between the leaders of progressive opinion on either side. However, India stood then on the verge of momentous developments in its political life and in 1919 the two communities were destined to come close together. Already in 1918, the Government of India had appointed a committee to make detailed investigation based on all available evidence about the sedition movement in India. Mr. Justice Rowlatt presided over the committee which unanimously agreed that the existing provisions of the law were inadequate to cope with the extraordinary situation prevailing in India at the beginning of the World War. The committee concluded, in effect, that powers corresponding to those temporarily acquired by the Government through the Defence of India Act were needed permanently in order to strengthen law and order in the face of disruptive activities and movements. Accordingly, the Government decided to introduce two Bills in the spring session of the Indian Legislative Council. One of the bills was a temporary measure intended to deal with the situation anticipated to arise upon the termination of the Defence of India Act six

months after the formal restoration of peace. This Bill would have empowered a special court comprising three High Court Judges to try all anarchistic offences expeditiously and without granting the right of appeal to the accused. These procedures were to be made effective only when the Governor-General was satisfied that in a particular part of India the activities of revolutionaries threatened law and order. The bill provided for further powers which could be assumed in case the Governor-General was satisfied that political movements likely to lead to offences against the State existed on an extensive scale.

The second of the two Rowlatt Bills sought to make a permanent change in the ordinary criminal law of the land so as to make the possession of a seditious document with the intention to publish or circulate it punishable with imprisonment. An accused person willing to turn King's evidence was promised official protection. District Magistrates were to be given greater powers to enable them to deal more effectively with sedition. Of the two bills, only the second was passed into law. It was, however, repealed in 1922 without any use made of its provisions since its institution. Ever since the introduction of these two Bills in the Imperial Legislative Council in February 1919, waves of protest and agitation rose throughout India to greet them. The Bills were denounced as proof of the Government's intention to deprive Indians of their legitimate rights and also as a breach of promises made by British statesmen during the war.

Gandhi, coming into prominence in Indian political life for the first time led the agitation against the Rowlatt Bills and launched a movement of passive resistance (*satyagraha*) on the lines of a similar movement conducted effectively by him earlier in South Africa. The discontent of all Indians was effectively directed against the Rowlatt Bills and throughout India extraordinary rumours about the motives underlying this legislation spread rapidly. One of the commonest and generally accepted rumours was the belief that the Bills would penalise marriage by heavy exactions and that it would prohibit three or more villagers from discussing even their own affairs in a public place. The Government was powerless against this campaign of misrepresentation. The nationalist party undertook to carry on a powerful and nation-wide movement of passive resistance and Gandhi called upon his supporters to observe certain days as

days of public mourning. On March 30, 1919, the police clashed with *satyagrahis* seeking a suspension of all business in the city of Delhi. Serious disturbances developed out of this confrontation and troops were called to restore order. Fire was opened on the mob and five people were killed while many more were injured.

The most notable feature of the general excitement that followed was the unprecedented fraternisation between Hindus and Muslims. The casualties at Delhi during the demonstrations of March 30 included, as a coincidence, both Hindus and Muslims. The great *hartal* organized on April 6 sought to emphasize their unity. Hindus and Muslims publicly accepted drinking water from each other and both their slogans and the banners they carried as part of their demonstrations underlined communal unity. The fervour was so overwhelming that in its sweep the deepest communal prejudices were swept, albeit temporarily. A Hindu religious leader was even permitted to preach inside their mosque by some Muslims, which is probably a unique incident in the history of the two communities.

The *satyagraha* movement led to disturbances in the Punjab and the Punjab disturbances were a contributory factor in the outbreak of the Third Afghan War. The Secretary of the State had announced that an enquiry would be made into the causes of the Punjab disturbances and measures taken to suppress them. However, this promise was hardly sufficient to deal with the India-wide storm of protest and agitation. Gandhi was waiting for an opportunity to identify himself with the Muslim cause so as to create a united Hindu-Muslim opposition to the British Government. Towards the end of the year, Gandhi found the chance he awaited. In the meanwhile there was a long delay in the announcement of peace terms to Turkey and the Muslim elite in India was feeling increasingly restless during the latter half of 1919.

The Nagpur Congress of 1920 adopted the non-cooperation programme and added the Khilafat demand to the national demands of India.⁵ Gandhi toured throughout India in the company of the Ali brothers in the year 1920. The combination of his

⁵ Home-Political-1920-Part B, January, Nos. 279-282 K. W. contains proceedings of the All-India National Congress, the All-India Moderate Congress, the All-India Muslim League, a collection of newspaper cuttings on the proceedings and resolutions of these bodies.

remarkable influence on the masses with the militant zeal of the Muslims supporting the Ali brothers proved formidable. Schools, courts and councils were boycotted as a non-violent measure of non-cooperation. Attempts to boycott the elections to the new legislative bodies in November 1920 failed. Yet, the meeting at the Indian National Congress at Nagpur in December 1920 was a notable personal triumph for Gandhi. Gandhi secured support to his movement of non-violent non-cooperation. He also succeeded in bringing the creed of the Indian National Congress in alignment with the sentiments of the extremists in the Muslim League by eliminating the proviso of adherence to the British raj and the constitutional methods of agitation. Gandhi's personal ascendancy as a national leader of the Indians was now unquestioned. He was regarded as the accredited champion of the causes of both the Hindu and the Muslim communities. Thus the Congress itself gained the status of a party whose leadership was acceptable to both the communities.

During the first quarter of 1921, it became increasingly apparent that the working agreement between Gandhi and his Muslim supporters was very sound. They were allies to whom each other's strength was a mutual necessity. Gandhi's espousal of the Khilafat cause and his public identification with the Ali brothers placed at his disposal the militant force of Muslim religious sentiment. On the other hand his own stature as a national leader and his soft attitude to Muslim sentiment allowed the Muslims to take such liberties as they would have found impossible to take at any other time in different circumstances.⁶

The theme of this study being Hindu-Muslim relations, it is not necessary to review the entire course of the non-cooperation movement. Only those events during the movement which have a bearing upon Hindu-Muslim relations have been taken into account. It must, however, be mentioned that the movement became increasingly aggressive and began to show total disregard to authority and a general disregard towards law and order. Gandhi, undoubtedly, had condemned violence; but his followers did not heed his commitment to non-violence. The extremist

⁶ See Home-Political Proceedings (Print) February, 1918, and K. W., H. P. June, 1918, Nos. 359-360; H. P. March, 1919, Nos. 116-117; H. P. B., January, 1919, Nos. 189-203; H. P. B., March, 1919, Nos. 123-134; H. P. July, 1919, No. 1; H. P. July, 1919, Nos. 2-32; A

Muslim agitators whose cause was championed by Gandhi diverged from Gandhian methods and in particular from the non-violent character of the agitation.

Gandhi's movement had been criticized as a non-cooperation movement which was purely negative and destructive in character. In March 1921, Gandhi attempted to answer his critics by launching a campaign to promote total abstinence from liquor, removal of untouchability, and the use — in every Indian home — of the handspinning wheel or *charkha*. When Gandhi declared that the *charkha* was the key to India's freedom, many of his followers, and particularly Muslims, were painfully confused. The Khilafat extremists, particularly the Ali brothers, countered Gandhi's call by delivering a series of violent speeches, unequivocally championing the supremacy of Islam, a religious war, and the liberation of India from British rule with the help of trans-frontier Muslim forces.⁷ The Hindus were shocked by this public tirade coming from Gandhi's close associates and the softness Gandhi had shown to Muslim claims to the right to cow-slaughter and the way in which he had yielded to their demand for Urdu in preference to Hindi further reinforced their resentment. The Ali brothers, on the otherhand, had no hesitation in declaring that they were "Muslims first and everything else afterwards". As a result, a large section of Hindus were steadily alienated from the non-cooperation movement by the blatant manifestation of religious fanaticism and pan-Islamic ambitions by the extremist Muslim supporters of the earlier movement.

With their extremist speeches, the Ali brothers were clearly forcing the authorities to take action against themselves. A prosecution was inevitable unless something desperate was done. Gandhi embarked on a course of action which at once ruined his own movement as well as his reputation for consistency. Through an intermediary, interviews were arranged between Lord Reading and Gandhi. The talks were not made public, but a few days later the Ali brothers published an apology expressing regret that passages in their speeches might have been held to

⁷ Mohamed Ali's Presidential address delivered at the INC at Kakinada on December 20, 1923; his 'leader' on Gandhi's Presidential Address to the INC at Belgaum in January, 1925; another 'leader' on communal representation on February 6, 1925, both published in *Comrade*, are a few examples.

show a tendency to incite violence. Gandhi then returned to his own programme with renewed vigour and he was not deterred by the increasing deterioration of order in the country.

In the interval between the Karachi conference and the persecution of the Ali brothers, Gandhi found himself in an embarrassing position. In their speeches at Karachi, the Khilafat leaders had not only attacked the British Government but also challenged the validity of Gandhi's policy of non-cooperation to which he was bound by the most solemn pledge. Muslim extremists now openly expressed their lack of confidence in Gandhian methods. On the other hand, Gandhi's Hindu supporters became increasingly apprehensive about the aggressive efforts of the extremist Muslim supporters of the Khilafat movement.⁸ In order to tide over the crisis, Gandhi proclaimed his belief that the Ali brothers did not really intend to depart from the principles of non-violence and added that the demand of independence, if not universally acceptable, was permissible under the new creed of the Congress. However, at a meeting of the All-India Congress Committee held in Bombay in August, Gandhi opposed the impatience of his over-enthusiastic followers and the talk of independence or of a republic was quietly relegated to the background. While Gandhi was thus making efforts to prevent a collision between the two parties to his alliance, a far more severe blow was dealt elsewhere to Hindu-Muslim unity than any which it had yet received.

The Malabar district of the Madras Presidency had a population of about two million Hindus and about one million persons of mixed Arab and Indian descent known as the Moplahs⁹ who had acquired an unenviable reputation for crimes committed under fanatical impulses in the name of religion. Systematic efforts to educate the Moplahs and to raise their economic status had long been made, but their progress had been slow. The Moplahs still remained susceptible to instigation from agitators using religious fanaticism to obtain popular response. During

⁸ Ameer Ali, *The Spirit of Islam*, 1922, p. 594.

⁹ A Comprehensive report on events in Malabar is available in the Home-Political Proceedings (H. P. 1921-24, A, Nos. 1-123). Also see Appendix of the same report pp. 57-58. Contains reports received from the military authorities on the Malabar disturbances followed by a detailed information in telegrams passed between the Headquarters, Southern Command, Poona, and the Chief of General Staff, Simla. I have largely drawn on this report.

British rule, no fewer than thirty-five outbreaks of Moplah violence occurred. Most of them were minor, but the worst was the one which erupted in August 1921. From the beginning of the Khilafat movement, the Government had feared the dangerous consequences any inflammatory propaganda might have had in the Moplah strongholds of Malabar. Considerable pains had been taken to keep notable members of Gandhi's Muslim contingent out of the Moplah area. However, during early 1921, excitement spread from mosque to mosque and village to village as the violent speeches of the Ali brothers, the prediction of early *swaraj*, and the July resolutions of the Khilafat conference combined to create increasing tension. Throughout July and August, the Moplahs held meetings passionately endorsing the Khilafat resolutions at Karachi. The commitment to non-violence was scarcely heeded. The police were obstructed in the exercise of their duty. But worse was yet to come. On August 20, the District Magistrate of Calicut attempted, with the help of the police and troops, to arrest certain leaders at *tiruangadi* who had arms in their possession. There was a serious clash which acted as a signal for Moplah uprising throughout the entire locality. Roads were blocked, telegraph lines cut, and the railway was damaged in a number of places. The District Magistrate immediately returned to Calicut to prevent the northward spread of the trouble. The machinery of the Government was reduced to a number of isolated offices and police stations had to face rebel attacks. A leader named Ali Musaliar was proclaimed king. Khilafat flags were flown and Ernad and Waluvanad were declared Khilafat kingdoms. The major brunt of Moplah ferocity was borne not by the Government, however, but by the helpless Hindus who constituted the majority of the local population. They naturally did not join the purely Muslim revolt and therefore had to pay a high price for their loyalty when the Government's authority temporarily collapsed, and their savage neighbours enjoyed their brief rule.

The first reports of the mutiny were honoured in the press as fabrications by a Government eager to drive a wedge between the Hindus and the Muslims who were showing signs of unity. But stories of the distress and the suffering of the Hindus continued to pour in at an alarming frequency and increasing numbers of desperate Hindu refugees pouring into Calicut substantiated

them. When the office-bearers of the local Congress and Khilafat committees themselves bore testimony of the Moplah outrages, denial of the reports as untrue was no longer possible.¹⁰

Hindus throughout India were struck by horror and this was even more intensified when certain Khilafat leaders passed resolutions congratulating brave fight put up by the Moplahs for the sake of religion. Gandhi, undoubtedly deceived by the propaganda of some of his colleagues, himself spoke of the "brave and God-fearing Moplahs" who were fighting for "what they considered religion and in a manner which they considered religious". But the stories of Moplah savagery proved irrefutable and he could do little to prevent the rising Hindu feelings of horror and resentment. The rift between the two communities now widened and it was not possible for Gandhi to bridge it.

Gandhi's faith in non-violent civil disobedience was not shaken by the Moplah rebellion. It was dealt a blow only when violence broke out in Bombay on the occasion of the arrival of the Prince of Wales on November 17. It shook his belief in his people's capacity to sustain non-violence while pursuing the disobedience movement. When the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League met at Ahmedabad in December 1921, the chief problem Gandhi faced was, however, the difficulty in maintaining the unity between the two organizations. Gandhi proposed in his resolutions that individual civil disobedience was to be undertaken only when the nation was adequately prepared to carry it out without violence. He showed a stronger determination, on the other hand to intensify the opposition to the British Government. The extremist supporters of the Khilafat movement wanted a far more radical approach. The President of the Muslim League, Maulana Hasrat Mohani frankly voiced his followers' preference for an immediate declaration of complete independence, unaccompanied by any embarrassing prohibition to the use of force. He also defended the conduct of the Moplahs towards the Hindus on the plea that in the course of their "defensive war for the sake of their religion" they had been hindered rather than helped by their non-Muslim neighbours. The kind of Hindu-

¹⁰ See H. P. F 601/22 regarding the issue of Moplah (they spelled as Mopilah) White Paper. Contains in the most part a detailed military report of operations, showing continued progress in capturing 'rebels', reducing the area affected.

Muslim unity which Gandhi envisaged was already wearing out rapidly.

Gandhi received another setback when, on February 4, 1922, twenty-one policemen and village watchman were murdered by a mob of violent 'volunteers' and peasants at Chauri Chaura in the United Provinces. Gandhi had found that Congressmen were involved in the incident and that there was considerable need for him to discipline and re-organize his followers. He therefore called an emergency meeting of the Working Committee of the Congress at Bardoli on February 11 and 12, 1922. At this meeting he decided to suspend at once the mass civil disobedience planned at Bardoli and to instruct his followers to devote themselves wholeheartedly to the constructive programme. From this time onwards, there was a marked decline in the confidence in Gandhi's political leadership. Internal dissensions developed between those who saw a confession of failure in Gandhi's latest pronouncement and those who were convinced that the Bardoli retreat was the best course under the circumstances. Gandhi was arrested on March 10, 1922 and was sentenced to six years' simple imprisonment.

Gandhi's removal from the political scene brings to a close the first phase of Hindu-Muslim relations. Under his leadership the advanced sections of both the Hindu and the Muslim communities had been temporarily brought together on a common platform. But though this brief togetherness lasted for a period of about three years, at no time did it show signs of developing into a stable union. Since the two communities were brought close only by a common hatred of British rule and little else, their temporary union was intrinsically insecure for the lack of more solid content. No real attempt was made to bridge the traditional gap between the two communities or even to reconcile their divergent immediate goals. From early 1922, an increasing number of Muslims had begun to feel that the programme of non-violent non-cooperation was futile for their own purpose.

The time was most opportune for any campaign for religious revivalism. Swami Shraddhanand led the enthusiastic revival of the *Shuddhi* movement and, as in 1909, attention was first directed towards the reclamation of the Malkanas. The campaign developed and spread rapidly from Agra to the neighbouring districts and from there into the Punjab and other provinces.

Within a short time, the *shuddhi* missionaries claimed to have re-converted almost 20,000 people in Agra and its neighbourhood to Hinduism. Simultaneously with the revival of the *shuddhi* movement, Hindu leaders sought to revive the influence of the Hindu Mahasabha which was linked with the original *shuddhi* movement. Hitherto the Mahasabha had devoted its energies to give political expression to orthodox Hindu opinion and had given attention to such issues as cow protection. At a meeting of the Hindu Mahasabha held in Benares in July 1923, resolutions approving the *shuddhi* movement were passed and it was agreed that re-converted Hindus should be restored to their former caste. (The Arya Samaj went even further in accepting converts from other creeds who had never been Hindus). Other resolutions recommended the formation of a *Samaj Sewak Dal* to encourage physical culture among the Hindus and the promotion of unity ('*sangathan*') as a necessity for the growth of the movement. At its next meeting held in Allahabad during the *Kumbh Mela* in January 1924, the Mahasabha affirmed its earlier resolution about the depressed castes, but modified the previous decision by declaring that such castes were not entitled to wear the sacred thread, the learning of the Vedas, or to take food along with upper-caste Hindus. It was further affirmed that non-Hindus might be admitted into Hinduism, though not into the existing castes. The meeting, in an attempt to widen the Hindu fold, adopted a definition of Hinduism which included Jains, Sikhs, Brahmos and Buddhists. Recommendations were also made for the establishment of local *Sangathan Sabhas* to promote Hindu unity. In short, the Hindu Mahasabha changed its tenets in tune with the *Shuddhi* movement of 1923, thus lending its support to the missionary efforts of the Arya Samaj.

The enthusiastic response to the *Shuddhi* movement indicated the strained relations between the Hindus and the Muslims. The new interest in social reforms was strengthened by the growing realization that the lower castes offered potential converts to Muslim missionaries. Unless the structure of Hindu Society were made more resilient other communities would have gained proportionately increasing strength. On the ground that the Hindus had been the worst sufferers in communal riots, the organizers of the *Sangathan* movement emphasized the need to establish volunteer corps and physically trained cadres to cope

with such situations. In doing so, they were usually careful to explain that they meant no harm to the Muslims. But in the prevailing mood of communal tension, this movement was hardly calculated to promote mutual understanding and improvement of ties.

The Muslims were quick to respond to the *Sangathan* and *shuddhi* movements. The Jamiat-ul-ulema was to take the lead on behalf of the Muslims to patronize *Tabligh* societies for the propagation of Islam. Soon, *Tanzim* or 'organization' societies were also formed to counter the *Sangathan sabhas* of the Hindus in the Punjab.

It was clear, then, that the political entente established between the two communities by Gandhi was a thing of the past. Further efforts to consolidate the civil disobedience movement would have failed unless a working understanding were re-established between the two communities. During the last quarter of 1923, Congress leaders worked hard to bridge communal rift, but to no avail. They rushed with relief aid wherever communal riots broke out and exerted their full personal influence to restore harmony. But they found the antagonism between the communities beyond their control. Eventually, the Congress decided to nominate a small committee to prepare a draft national pact. The committee came out with a tentative agreement which sought to secure religious freedom for each community and to offer arbitration in cases of conflict. But the draft was silent on the most vexed question of the time, the question of communal representation with regard to power and office. It also left untouched several other thorny disputes between the communities.

The successive stages in the relations between the two communities during the period 1915-1923 have now been described. Gandhi had failed to achieve unity or even harmony. Instead of a united opposition leading the struggle against the British government, communal leaders promoting mutual antagonism dominated the political forefront.

The Congress camp was in a state of helpless disarray. Gandhi was released from Jail on grounds of health on February 5, 1924. But he was hardly the political *homme necessaire* he had once been. The Gandhist and the Swarajist factions continued their contest for power, vigorously and even virulently, making only intermittent efforts to arrive at a *modus vivendi*. Leaders of

both the sections partly realized the necessity to revitalize the once powerful national organization and to give it renewed solidarity. It was also realized that growing communal violence posed the threat to every kind of political ambition. The series of paper pacts and protocols that were evolved attempted a working compromise rather than to resolve policy differences. In dealing with communal dissensions the Congress Leaders faced the same difficulties as the Khilafat leaders faced *vis-a-vis* the *shuddhi* movement of the Arya Samaj. A weakened Congress failed to check the rapid rise of the communal Hindu Mahasabha which the Muslims resented. The price had still to be paid for the general disrespect for the law encouraged by the non-cooperation movement which had given both the Hindus and the Muslims a habit of treating both public authority and private rights with contempt. The legacy of the superficial Hindu-Muslim unity between 1919-1921 thus proved impotent.

In November 1924, Gandhi, Nehru and Das signed a statement reiterating the necessity of bringing together nationalists of different groups to support the national cause. The programme gave prominence to the promotion of Hindu-Muslim unity. An all-party leaders' conference was accordingly convened in Bombay on November 21. The conference was a failure and a sub-committee appointed to arrive at a Hindu-Muslim agreement dispersed without finding any common ground. In opposition to the Swarajist programme for unity, the Muslim League resolved not to merge itself with the Congress. Even the Khilafat conference held at Belgaum did not express agreement with the Indian National Congress which was already deserted by most Muslim leaders. The President, Dr. Kichlew, adopted an uncompromising pro-Muslim position and pressed Muslim claims for representation on elected bodies and in the services which considerably disturbed the Hindu Congressmen listening to him. The Hindu Mahasabha also held its own sessions in Belgaum arousing as much interest as the Congress deliberations. The Mahasabha passed resolutions stressing the need for Hindu solidarity, discipline and power.

This was the beginning of a period of undisguised communal rivalry and exclusiveness. The *a priori* exclusion of communal issues at political discussions was a convention of the past, which was found impossible to follow now. The leaders had to face fully the vital interrelation of communal disagreement and

political advance. The two problems could no longer be separated. Both religious and political issues separated the two communities as illustrated by the riots in Calcutta in April and July 1926 and the disturbances in Rawalpindi in June the same year.

While religious issues regularly brought the two communities to blows, political issues conspicuously came to the fore along communal lines on either side. First there was a serious cleavage of opinion on the future administration of the North-West Frontier Provinces in which the issue was purely political. The excesses of the Calcutta riots were due to disputes arising out of the religious issue of playing music in front of the mosques. When the riots subsided, several people suggested that the origin of communal conflict was in the ill-will created by separate communal electorates prescribed under the existing constitution. This much-debated political decision has since occupied a prominent place in discussion on communalism in modern India. There was, indeed, an obvious connection between the religion-based disorders of this troubled period and the political rivalry between the two communities.

Riots broke out in Calcutta within the following few weeks; to be precise, at the beginning of April. They proved that fanaticism was not confined to northern India.

Calcutta, in fact, shared communal ill-temper with the rest of India. Incidents which took place during the *Bakr-Id* led to a riot at the Kidderpore docks in July 1925. Subsidiary causes of communal hostility in Calcutta were the formation of the Bengal League for the Protection of Hindu Women (from Muslim attacks) and the activities of the Cow Protection League which resulted in a decrease in the sale of cows during the year preceding the riots. The C. R. Das Pact was also a contributory factor. Instead of bringing the two communities together, this pact became a source of contention between them and it agitated both Hindu and Muslim opinion. Another contributory factor was a series of Arya Samajist meetings held in Calcutta in November 1925. A number of provocative speeches were made at these meetings. This was followed by Sir Abdur Rahim's presidential address to the All-India Muslim League which brought communal feelings out in the open.

By this time, feelings of communal hostility had attained an alarming level throughout India. Wild rumours began to spread.

The Government was charged with indifference and even that it was fomenting communal disorders in order to create obstacles in the way of India's self-government. On April 1, 1926, Lord Irwin assumed office. Soon, at a dinner given in his honour by members of all the communities in India as well as members of the British community, he took the opportunity to speak on Hindu-Muslim antagonism and the need for greater tolerance. He repudiated the charge that the British Government welcomed communal dissension and dealt with the suggestion of holding a Round Table Conference of all concerned parties to arrive at a solution to this problem. Lord Irwin then pointedly referred to the failure of the Unity Conference of 1924 and observed that the failure was due to the lack of adequate change of heart or feelings on the part of the participants. He said that as long as the two communities remained equally intransigent, any similar conference would meet a similar failure and therefore, in his opinion, the time had not yet come when a Round Table Conference could be usefully summoned.

Hindu leaders, at this time, were making the suggestion that communal electorates were at the root of communal differences. The Muslims viewed this suggestion with the greatest suspicion. It will be remembered that the system under which Muslims selected their own representatives on the legislatures, in separate constituencies of their own, was a direct concession made to meet Muslim demands at the time of the Morley-Minto reforms in 1909. The joint meeting of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League confirmed this by what was known as the Lucknow Pact. The joint authors of the reforms scheme recognized the system of communal electorates as a serious hinderance to the development of self-government but felt themselves bound to the pledge given in 1909 and, in view of the importance attached by the Muslims to their right to separate electorates of their own, they conceded the demand for the time being. The Muslims feared that the Government might yield to the agitation that had been started for the abolition of separate communal electorates and they sought an assurance that no change in the system was contemplated. Lord Irwin publicly gave this assurance in the speech referred to in the preceding paragraph. He said that the matter fell within the purview of the Royal Commission and till the Commission had made its enquiry the Government

would not take any steps either to curtail the separate electorates or to extend them.

The proceedings of the Indian Legislature, which met at Simla in August 1926, were dominated by the communal problem which was now the preoccupation of all the parties. In a debate in the Assembly, a Muslim member urged immediate legislation to regulate the performance of religious ceremonies of the different communities in India. Two Hindu members moved amendments to this resolution with the common object of inviting the Government to convene an All-India Conference to examine the situation in the country so as to make appropriate recommendations regulating the performance of religious festivals. The resolution as well as the amendments were subsequently unanimously withdrawn. However, it was generally felt that a public debate on the causes of communal conflict had been useful. At the same session, the Government passed a Bill amending the Criminal Procedure Code to enable the authorities to confiscate publications calculated to promote feelings of hatred or enmity between different classes of the Indian people.

Throughout 1926, sporadic riots and disorders occurred. On December 23, 1926, Swami Shraddhananda, a leader of the *shuddhi* movement, was murdered in Delhi by a Muslim fanatic. This event shocked the whole of India and it swiftly dispelled any hopes of restoring better relations between the two communities. The news of the Swami's murder led immediately to disturbances in Delhi in which one person was killed and several others were injured. Muslim opinion at once condemned the murder but, all the same, it placed a severe strain on the feelings of the Hindu community and the result was that the communal climate was charged with dangerous possibilities of further violence.

Political leaders again diverted public attention to the question of communal electorates. The All-India Muslim League had already discussed the subject in its session held in December the previous year and the delegates were firmly in support of communal electorates. On March 15, a Hindu member of the Council of State introduced a motion that there should be no constitutional advance until both Hindus and Muslims had agreed to abolish communal electorates. A Muslim member immediately moved the amendment that separate electorates should be includ-

ed as a fundamental principle in any future constitution. Subsequently, both the resolution and the amendment were withdrawn. However, in the course of the debate, no Muslim member expressed the view that the time had not yet come when communal electorates could be abolished. It was therefore surprising when four days later, a number of Muslim members of the legislature issued a statement to the press announcing that at an informal conference among themselves they had agreed to the provision of joint electorates on the condition that Sind, which was a part of Bombay Presidency, should be made a separate province and that reforms should be introduced in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan on the same terms as the other provinces of India. If these conditions were acceptable to both the communities, Muslims would accept joint electorates in all provinces and would make the same concessions to Hindus, wherever they were in a minority, as the Hindus would make to the Muslims wherever the latter were in a minority. In the Punjab and Bengal representation should be on the basis of population and in the Indian legislature there should be no less than one third of the members elected by mixed electorates.

These suggestions received little support in Muslim circles. In Bengal and the Punjab, Muslims were in a majority and presumably would always return a majority of Muslim members to the provincial councils. The North-West Frontier Provinces and Baluchistan were overwhelmingly Muslim while Sind was preponderantly Muslim. The suggested reforms would thus have given a strongly Muslim complexion to the administration of these provinces. Therefore, while the suggestions would have opened new lines of discussion they were not likely to be accepted by the Hindus without serious examination of their implications. It also appears that there was no real unanimity among those who attended this informal conference. One or two members, in fact denied to the press that they had endorsed the proposals. They also said that they would refuse to accept joint electorates on any conditions. Jinnah, who had taken a lead in convening the conference, announced to the press that the Muslim proposals should be accepted or rejected *in toto*. About three weeks later, the representative of the North-West Frontier Provinces in the Assembly made the statement that if Muslims desired to preserve their identity, they should not allow

themselves to be merged with the Hindu majority. He concluded that under the existing circumstances, a joint electorate would lead to an unequal distribution disadvantageous to the weakened side. From comments made in the Muslim press throughout India, it was clear that — whatever the Hindus thought of the proposals — Muslims in general would not have been much favourable to the suggestions.

Three days after the Muslim conference, the Hindu members of the Indian Legislature met at Delhi to consider the Muslim proposals. At this meeting, the following principles were generally accepted as the basis for further discussions:

- (i) There should be joint electorates for all the legislatures throughout India;
- (ii) Everywhere, seats should be reserved on the basis of population;
- (iii) Religious and quasi-religious rights should be safeguarded by specific provisions in the constitution;
- (iv) Problems involving the rearrangement of provincial boundaries should be left alone for the time being.

The pronouncement of these principles made it clear that no material change had taken place in the Hindu-Muslim attitudes *vis-a-vis* the issue of the composition of the electorates. A few days later, a meeting of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha decided that the suggestions of the Muslim conference could not be discussed at that time. The issue was thus to remain unresolved.

CHAPTER 3

THE NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT¹

THE NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT arose out of various factors: (1) The nationalist spirit stimulated by World War I; (2) the racial bitterness resulting from the disturbances that took place in the Punjab; (3) Muslim resentment over the "Peace Settlement" with Turkey (which found itself ventilated in the Khilafat Movement later); (4) the extremists' disappointment with the Montford Reforms; and (5) the economic distress that followed the war. However it was the remarkable personality of Gandhi² which gathered these various threads of discontent and knitted them into a single fabric with the object of overthrowing the British Government. While laying down his programme of action he emphasised the need for self-discipline among his followers, as a vital factor for its ultimate success.

He outlined his programme of action in three stages: (1) relinquishing the titles and honours bestowed by the British; (2) resigning from Governmental Offices, except the police and the army; and (3) refusal to pay taxes.³ A little later he added boycott of Government schools and colleges and replacing them by national institutes, boycott of courts, foreign goods and withdrawal of candidates from the election to the council under the Montford Reforms. Though Gandhi met with little success his programme of action nevertheless helped in bringing together the radicals and the moderates and he laid great emphasis on the moral aspects of the programme. This helped Gandhi to veer the Indian National Congress to his point of view, at its Nagpur session in 1920. But this indirectly gave fillip to the extremist elements despite Gandhi's constant harping on the efforts to

¹ The material for the Non-Cooperation Movement has been taken from the Confidential publication of the Home Department entitled *Histories of the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movement* by P. C. Bamford, Deputy Director, Intelligence Bureau, Delhi, 1925.

² See Appendix to this Chapter (For the rise of Gandhi).

³ Simla Records-Home Department-Political. File No. 18, 1921.

keep the movement within bounds of non-violence. The immediate result, therefore, was a spirit of disloyalty and lawlessness and the year 1921 saw intensification of this spirit at the various public meetings. The Khilafat leaders openly called the British anti-Islamic and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema issued a *fatwa* stating that service under the Government was forbidden by Islam and particularly to be employed in the police and the army was to be considered heinous. In the month of August the Moplah rebellion broke out in Malabar.

Bengal opened its tally of violence with a general strike in schools and colleges, followed by industrial strikes and later by the exodus of the labour in tea-plantations in Assam. It culminated in the purely political strike by the employees of the Assam-Bengal Railway. Jail-breaks involving loss of life and property occurred on a large-scale in Rajshahi and to a smaller extent in other places. Midnapore witnessed an intensified defiance of the Village Self-Government Act. The tragic feature was that politicians seized upon any legitimate grievance, however small, and utilized it to whip up fury against the government which was left helpless from pursuing any dispassionate inquiry. When the Government tried to act it was held upto ridicule and odium. Irresponsible promises of all kinds were made by politicians to the workers who found themselves deluded at the end of all this. A pathetic example can be found in the warning issued by some of the strikers of the Assam-Bengal Railway: "All that is left to us now is to tell our brother labourers in India how we have been treated so that they may profit by our experience. Let them not be persuaded by our leader politicians to strike for political reasons only and, like us, be made pawns in the game of politics."

Coupled with this was the development in the activities of the volunteer associations which had been originally started for philanthropic and social service and had done excellent work in the beginning, like assisting strangers, maintaining order at fairs, pilgrimage centres, conferences, etc. Politicians were quick enough to realise the potentials of these organizations and sought to use them as instruments for their activities. The original recruits were educated youths, later it drew adherents from unemployed mill-hands and slum-dwellers. As a result violence and destruction became more pronounced. In the beginning of October, 1921, Gandhi and several others issued a manifesto asking people

to sever their connections with the Government.⁴ This was followed by an intensive campaign to undermine the loyalty of the police force and a rapid development of the activities of the volunteer organizations. Instances like attempts to usurp the functions of the police, 'forced' hartals, boycott of foreign goods and temperance movements became the general pattern of working of these associations, with a view to undermining the Government's authority. Appeals for protection to government were half-hearted due to a general disinclination to take recourse to the ordinary course of law and partly due to the fear of further intimidation. It thus became difficult for Government to act at the proper time.

However by November the Government felt that it had to act as the course of the agitation and the methods used as well as the repercussions gave no indication of any change in Gandhi's attitude. On the other hand the AICC at its meeting in Delhi on 4 November directed its provincial units to start the Civil Disobedience movement which Gandhi characterized as "a civil revolution which, wherever practised, would mean the end of Government and its laws". Thirteen days later a serious riot took place in Bombay due to an enforced hartal in view of the visit of the Prince of Wales to India, resulting in 53 killed and 400 wounded. Mob violence erupted in Calcutta and its suburbs; only a few days before Howrah had witnessed a riot and a prolonged tramway strike. Confronted by the explosive situation the Government decided to put into operation the Criminal Law Amendment Act, Part II.

On 21 November Lord Ronaldshay reviewed the situation in a speech to the Legislative Council. He said, "The activities of these bodies (the volunteer associations) have become a menace to the liberty of law-abiding citizens, and they have accordingly been proclaimed to be unlawful associations, under the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908. That is the first step Government has considered it necessary to take. . . .

"There is another form of action well calculated to impair the efficiency of the force and to render more difficult the maintenance of order, and that is the adoption of the attitude on the part of a certain class of persons, that whenever the police are compelled to take action to quell disturbances, it is the rioters

⁴ P. C. Bamford, Chapter II, p. 21.

who must be in the right and Government who must be in the wrong. . . .

"But let me beg of them with all the power I can command not to forget that when once the forces of disorder are thoroughly roused, they will find themselves quite incapable of controlling them. Mr. Gandhi himself is discovering this eternal truth at the present moment. He publicly admits that he has been more instrumental than any other in bringing into being a spirit of revolt. And what is he doing now? Let me quote his own words: 'the Swaraj that I have witnessed during the last two days has stunk in my nostrils'.

"Mr. Gandhi confesses that he found the crowd in Bombay bent upon mischief and destruction and unwilling to listen to him. 'With non-violence on our lips', he says, 'we have terrorised those who have differed from us and in so doing we have denied our God'. Let us at least be thankful for this that Mr. Gandhi has at last realized what from bitter experience many have come to know, viz. that to talk about non-violence in connection with non-co-operation is a pitiful travesty of language."

The Government's policy drew forth protests and made the moderates and extremists to close their ranks. A deputation of moderate leaders met the Viceroy and suggested that a Round Table Conference be convened to find a solution. The Viceroy, as expected, replied that the Government's policy was not a new one but one which lay at the root of all civilized governments, and that the "unlawful" activities be suspended as a precondition to the Conference. The deputationists could give no such assurance and further the Subjects Committee of the Congress rejected the proposal by an overwhelming majority.

Despite his personal convictions Gandhi remained undecided and this found its echo in the Congress resolution which *inter alia* suggested that civil disobedience was to be restricted to defiance of the Seditions Meetings Act.

The Moderate group in the Congress, however, still toyed with the idea of a Round Table Conference and in 1922 a meeting was held, at the instance of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, at Bombay to explore such possibilities.⁶

⁵ Home Deptt.-Political File No. 25 of 1923.

⁶ "A deputation headed by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya waited on H. E. the Viceroy at Calcutta on 21 December to suggest the summoning

Gandhi was invited to attend this meeting presided over by Sir Sankaran Nair who however withdrew later as he found himself at logger heads with the former's proposals. In a letter to the press Sir Sankaran Nair stated that Gandhi while reserving his right to actively and intensively prepare for the civil disobedience movement by propaganda and enrolment of volunteers rejected the proposals of the convenors. He further stated that Gandhi refused to retreat from his stand on the Congress party's demands as regards the Punjab, the Khilafat Movement and Swaraj, and demanded the unconditional release of all those volunteers arrested as a *sine qua non* for such a conference. And lastly Gandhi was prepared to suspend the movement only upto 31 January.

Naturally all prospects of a settlement disappeared and a letter dated 4 February from Gandhi to the Viceroy declared that the brutal repression had made civil disobedience an imperative duty and for the present he proposed to confine it to Bardoli in Gujarat. At this time the Chauri Chaura tragedy occurred, proving once more that Gandhi was again wrong in his assessment of the mass movement he was sponsoring.

It was futile to expect the Government to sit idle when its authority was being challenged by violent activities at Salanga Hat, Pabna, Titagarh, the 24-Parganas, Madarihat and Ulipur. The facts worth noting were: (1) that it was the "non-cooperators" who attacked first thus compelling the Government to use force, and (2) while the Congress had defined and incorporated "civil disobedience" as part of its programme in the beginning of November 1920, action was taken against the volunteers by the Government only at the end of the month. Gandhi was arrested in March 1921.

Gandhi's arrest dissolved the cementing force which had so far held together the conflicting elements, and the months that followed witnessed a noticeable tendency to overlook, in fact abandon, the specific items of his programme of action. The extremists, particularly, never had concealed their contempt of the moderate policies that Gandhi sought to incorporate in his programme. Added to this was the growing disenchantment between Hindus and Muslims whose unity Gandhi had so

of a R.T.C. with a view to finding some way of bridging the breach between the Government and the Nationalists...." [*Attitude of the Moderates* (1947)] P. C. Bamford.

strenuously sought to achieve. By the middle of the year the Government had acted, the ban on volunteer organizations had been withdrawn and the Sedition Meetings Act had not been renewed. Lord Lytton reviewing the situation in November said: "Lord Ronaldshay said last year that a wonderful new era would have dawned for India had it not been for the wild passions which had been let loose upon the land, by those who have pinned their faith to revolution. Well, I think I may say with truth a year later, that a new era has dawned in India in spite of these wild passions which have been let loose, and it is not now in the power of any section to prevent that dawn from passing into day. Whether it will be a wonderfully good or a wonderfully bad day, whether in fact it would be wonderful at all, depends upon the work which is done in the day." He continued: "To undo the Act of 1919 would be the action of revolutionaries. The new Government in England is a conservative Government and conservatives are not revolutionaries. Now I want to say to all those who take an interest in politics in this province our political destinies are in our hands — they are ours to make or mar."⁷

Lord Lytton's hopes were however belied by the events that followed. The third quarter of 1922 saw the final break with the methods that Gandhi had sought to lay down. That the Congress should enter the Councils only to break them was advocated first at the provincial conference of the Party held at Chittagong.

Earlier in June the AICC had sought to get a first hand report from persons whom they had authorised to tour the country to gauge the support for the Civil Disobedience Movement and two months later C. R. Das submitted his report to the Bengal Provincial Congress advocating a change in the programme. The report showed unanimity on the unpreparedness of the people for action but divergent views were expressed on the question of entering the Councils for the sole purpose of wrecking them. The latter was to be the beginning of the schism that later split the Congress into two groups. C. R. Das issued a manifesto wherein *inter alia* he declared, "The question is if we are in a majority, what are we to do? We should begin our operation by a formal demand of the particular way in which we desire

⁷ Page 50, (55) Bamford.

to mend the Councils. If our demands are accepted, we have obtained a real foundation for *Swaraj*. If our demands are not recognized, we must non-co-operate with the bureaucracy by obstructing everything, every work of the Council. We must disallow the entire budget. We must move the adjournment of the House on every possible occasion. In fact, we must so proceed that the Council will refuse to do any work unless and until our demands are satisfied”.

The rank and file were however not largely with C. R. Das whose group began to prepare for a showdown at the forthcoming Gaya session. At this meeting after analysing the Government's policies Das in his Presidential address referred to the items that the Congress should set forth as part of its programme: (1) the rights of different communities under a *Swaraj* Government should be clearly defined; (2) the Lucknow Pact should be confirmed without any reservation; (3) propaganda to be carried abroad to enlist the sympathies and support of foreigners; (4) a clear definition of the system of Government that would be formed by the Congress, if it came to power; (5) both urban and rural labour must be organized as experience had proved, “that labour and peasantry of India to-day are, if anything more, more eager to attain *Swaraj*, than the so called middle and educated classes”.

He warned his countrymen against the bureaucracy which had become stronger and “the policy of allowing these Reformed Councils to work their wicked will. There will undoubtedly be a further increase of taxation and there is an apprehension in mind, that if we allow this policy of drift to continue the result will be that we shall lose the people we have with us today. Let us break with the Councils, if the bureaucracy does not concede the demands of the people. If there is fresh taxation as there is bound to be, the responsibility be on the bureaucracy. Then you and I and the people will jointly fight the powers that be”. As regards the form of Government Das said, “I am firmly convinced that parliamentary government is not a government by the people and for the people. Many of us believe that the middle class must win *swaraj* for the masses. I do not believe in the possibility of any such class movement being ever converted into a movement for *Swaraj*. If to-day the British Parliament grants provincial autonomy in the provinces with responsibility in the Central Government, I for one would protest against it

because that will inevitably lead to the concentration of power in the hands of the middle class. I do not believe that the middle class will then part with their power. My ideals will never be satisfied unless the people co-operate with us in its attainment. Any other attempt will inevitably lead to what European Socialists call a 'bourgeois Government' To me the organization of village life and practical autonomy of small local centres are more important than either provincial autonomy or Central responsibility." This in effect summed up the attitude and programme of those who were to later become known as Swarajists.

Gandhi's hold on the Congress was however too strong and C. R. Das and his colleagues Hakim Ajmal Khan and Motilal Nehru could not make much headway. A schism therefore became inevitable. On January 8, 1923, the faction led by Das issued its manifesto calling itself the Swarajya Party.⁸ For the time being however it decided to remain within the Congress fold and work for the success of its line of thinking.

The succeeding period saw the rise of the Swarajist faction, especially in Bengal. Bickerings started developing between the "No-changers" and Das's supporters and would have gone on toward a head-on clash but for the compromise arrived at the end of February 1923. It was largely due to the quite but determined organizing of C. R. Das that brought success to the Swarajists. Due to its unsuccessful attempt at the Barisal Conference to bring a resolution removing the ban on entry into the Councils, C. R. Das retired from the Conference and the faction led by him decided to propagate their views through a daily which they proposed to start.

Despite the setback received, C. R. Das was encouraged by reports of supporters of his stand from other provinces, who were expected to attend the AICC Conference in May. However Bengal alone challenged the AICC decision and the differences between the factions became more acute. Therefore it was decided to hold a 'special' session in Delhi in September. Before the session could take place the Swarajists managed to capture

⁸ For Gandhi-Das differences; see 'Congress Affairs in Bengal', *The Englishman*, 15 July 1921; 'Gandhi's Loss of Temper' 28 Sept. 1921, 'Development of the Congress', *The Banglar Katha* (Das's paper), 13 Dec. 1922; 'Why Council Entry?' *The Banglar Katha*, 14 Dec. 1922; for the Swarajya Party's rise and formation, see IAR 1923, pp. 144-158.

the Bengal unit due to the resignations of certain 'No-Changers'. There began a growing feeling that unity should be maintained at all cost; this and Gandhi's 'alleged' message to Maulana Mohammed Ali, the Khilafat leader, advising a change in the programme, proved decisive.⁹ A resolution authorising Council-entry was passed but it was clear that efforts would now be made to secure the return of as many Swarajist supporters as possible. There is however little on record as to the efforts of carrying out the constructive programme of Gandhi. On the other hand there were evidences of growing tension between the Hindus and Muslims, and the attempts to revive the now-defunct terrorist organizations.

Outwardly there were no large-scale manifestations of estrangement between Hindus and Mohammedans, though there were stray incidents, especially in the mofussil areas, like the Muslim cultivators rising against Hindu money-lenders; the objections of the Moulvis to Muslims singing the *Bande Mataram*; the face-to-face confrontation between the two communities in Faridpur district. The year ended with a riot at Howrah.¹⁰

⁹ Home Deptt.-Political-File No. 18, Part 1922.

¹⁰ Home Deptt.-Political-File No. 25 of 1923.

CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL FORCES IN BENGAL UPTO 1937

BEFORE SETTING forth in detail the political forces which were at work in Bengal between 1924 and 1937, it would be worthwhile to know, generally, about the strength of opinion that existed.

It was the Indian Statutory Commission that analysed the public opinion then available. According to the survey political thought and influence were largely concentrated in the urban areas which had in them professional classes of people like lawyers, journalists and educationists, the trading community, students and the small but growing body of educated women.

The land holding class represented the conservative side of the picture. Though their views did not coincide with their urban counterparts, the rural folk had definite views on the political situation. In the urban areas there were elements who were in closer contact with the political movement but their contribution largely consisted of being the vanguard of mob violence and demonstrations, and it was this section which fell an easy prey to communist and anarchist propaganda.

Of the two lines of arguments used by politicians to rouse the masses one was religion, as witnessed by Gandhi's non-co-operation movement and the Khilafat movement; the second was through appeal to the peasant. Radicalism of the later days was yet to open its account.

At the end of 1931 the Round Table Conference¹ adjourned having tentatively arrived at certain general conclusions like that the future constitution of India should take into account not only British-held India but also the 'native' states. In other words a broad federalism was to be substituted for a unitary type of government.

Differences that arose during the Conference were mainly

¹ Materials for the R.T.C. have been taken from the files of the Reforms Department — Reforms 147/30-R-147/31-R.

centred around the meaning of the word Federation. There were two opinions of a diverse nature: whether the provinces of British India were to be federated as one Unit and the 'native' states a second federation with a joint council to be formed of the two bodies: or, whether 'British India' and the Indian princely states to be component units of a single federation.

The Hindus who favoured the formation of a powerful central executive and legislature were inclined to favour the first view; while the Muslims, the Indian princes and the British delegates favoured the second which ultimately prevailed. What is certain, however, is that this cleavage arose out the age-old rivalry between Hindus and Muslims.

If the provisions and recommendations arrived at the Conference had been given effect to, Muslims would have heaved a sigh of relief, at least in those places where they were in a majority. In a strong federation with powers largely vested in the centre the Muslims would have never been anything but a minority; while in a loose form they would have had vast powers in the component units. In addition they also supported the plea for a separate status for the N.W.F.P. and the creation of an autonomous Sind state. Viewed at from the map of India it was obvious that they wanted to have a chain of provinces predominantly Muslim stretching from the north-west of India to the west of India. This line of thinking was to have momentous consequences later.

There were endless discussions regarding separate electorates, special weightage to Muslims in those places where they were in a minority, the extent of Muslim representation in Punjab and Bengal, but all were futile. Mr. A. K. Fazl-ul-Huq speaking on behalf of the Muslims stated that no settlement could be arrived at without special safeguards. He said, "In the circumstances we feel that the only course consistent alike with the position of our community and its peculiar needs, and the smooth working of the new constitution which we have been seeking to evolve during the last nine weeks, is to reiterate our claim that no advance is possible or practicable, whether in the provinces or in the Central Government without adequate safeguards for the Muslims of India, and that no constitution will be acceptable to the Muslims of India without such safeguards".

Though this failure is definitely laid at the doors of the

Conference it was neither due to lack of appreciation on the part of Hindus and Muslims nor the absence of any goodwill but the failure is to be attributed to those forces which they were unable to control, viz. the fundamental antagonism between the two based not on arrogance but fear which had its roots in the centuries of Indian history.

One of the marked effects of the 1935 Act was that it brought a greater development of political consciousness and a determination to combine for action. People who shared common interests recognized that their demands could be met if they came together on a common platform.

The year 1924 marks the victory of the Swarajists in achieving their object: entry into the Council.² The split that took place in the Congress has already been alluded to earlier. It is worthwhile to refer to the Fortnightly report on Bengal politics, prepared in 1922 by the Home Political Department of the Government of India. It observes *inter alia*:

"The A.I.C.C. met on several occasions and discussed at length the proposal to enter the Council at the next elections. C. R. Das remarked that if the majority were against the resolution he would be forced to resign his Presidentship of the Gaya Congress, and Pandit Motilal Nehru similarly intimated that he would have to resign his secretaryship of the A.I.C.C. In order to avoid an immediate split the resolution was not put to the vote but it was privately estimated that 100 were against Council-entry and 86 in favour of it."³

A little later in 1923 the report observes: "Probable result of the Congress split is increasing divergence of opinion between Hindu Congressmen and Muhammadans of the Khilafat Party. A tendency in this direction has already shown itself in the District Congress Committee of Dinajpur and it is also reported that one of C. R. Das's meetings at Gaya nearly resulted in a general fight owing to Muhammadan opposition. There is a possibility indeed that by way of reaction the Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal and perhaps also of Northern Bengal may turn

² For a detailed description see 'Bengal Administrative Report' 1923-24 (p. i, ii), for S. P. Manifesto I. A. R., October 14, 1923; for Hindu-Moslem Pact, see I.A.R., the same vol., p. 63

³ Fortnightly Report on the political situation in Bengal, File No. 18 Confd./Second-half of November 1922. Simla Records.

to more violent forms of political activity. At present the Mohammedans consider themselves bound by the decision of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema that entry into the Council is *haram*, and this view has been endorsed in public by Abul Kalam Azad who has recently been released from jail. It is understood however, that privately the latter disagreed with this decision and will do his best to get it reversed with a view to effecting a reconciliation between the two wings of the Non-co-operation movement. On the other hand, Maulana Akram Khan, another prominent Muhammadan leader in Bengal, is believed to be in favour of a more violent programme and in this he probably has the support of Badshah Mia who exercises considerable influence in Eastern Bengal.”⁴

By mid-march, 1923 the estrangement between Hindus and Muslims had become more manifest as various incidents showed.⁵ The nadir was however reached when in Punjab there was an agitation over the *shuddhi* movement. The Anjuman-Waizini-Hanifa-Bangla led the band of Muslims trying to fan unrest among the Community and a ‘looting’ took place in Jalpaiguri.⁶

It was in the background of this dismal situation that C. R. Das had banked on Muslim support when he had issued the manifesto of the Swaraj Party.⁷ Das had declared that “the policy to be adopted in the Council was in theory an agreement on the basis of which the rights of each Community were to be safeguarded upon the attainment of Swaraj”.⁸ The Bengal Administrative Report analysing this observes: “It was in fact almost entirely Muhammadan in sympathy. It provided that representation in the Bengal Legislative Council should be on the population basis with separate electorates, that representation on local bodies should be in the proportion of 60 for the Community in the majority to 40 for the Community in the minority, and that 55 per cent of Government posts should be for Muhammadans.” There were also provisions for the adjustment of religious susceptibilities.⁹ The Hindus reacted strongly to this and the

⁴ Simla Records, Home Political 1923, File No. 25 of 1923, Report on the Political situation for the first-half of January 1923.

⁵ Report on Political situation;

⁶ File No. 25 of 1923 — Home-Political;

⁷ I. A. R., 14 October 1923.

⁸ Bengal Administrative Report, 1923-24, p. ii.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. iii.

Pact was not ratified by the Congress which met at Kakinada in Andhra Pradesh in 1923.

By the middle of December, the election results were announced and the Swarajists had scored all over Bengal. Obviously, they were jubilant while the Moderates were despondent. "Present indications", observes the Home Department, "are that the Swarajist Party is counted rather by a label than by identity of principles and leaders are endeavouring to consolidate the party by negotiation with those outside, especially the Muhammadans."¹⁰ Immediately at its meeting on 16 December the party declared that it would refuse the Governor's invitation to accept office. The composition of the elected members were: 54 Hindus, 40 Muhammadans, 16 Europeans and 2 Anglo-Indians. Of these 18 Hindus, 20 Muhammadans, the Europeans and the Anglo-Indians belonged to the 'ministerial' group while the 'opposition' consisted of 38 Hindus and 20 Muhammadans.¹¹

Allusion has already been made to the crisis that had developed in the Bengal Provincial Congress. To settle the question a meeting was called in November when the Swarajists found themselves in a minority. After much deliberations the Swarajists were able to get the meeting adjourned to December. At the second meeting the Swarajists had been able to muster a majority and naturally were able to pack the executive committee with their supporters. This was an additional victory as the Swarajists now were supreme both in the legislative and organisational wings.¹² This situation had a great bearing on Hindu-Muslim relations at a later period.

It has been noted earlier that relations between Hindus and Mohammedans were becoming strained. The Non-cooperation Movement had laid special emphasis on the religious and communal differences with a view to using them against the British. We have also seen that the failure of the movement left the forces to operate freely against each other. Though Bengal did not witness the situation as prevalent elsewhere indications were not wanting. At a separate meeting in Serajganj Muslims expressed dissatisfaction at the failure of the Swarajist

¹⁰ Home Political Files 1923, December (first-half)

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² A detailed description of the S.P.'s rise in Bengal Congress is available in *Bengal Adm. Report* (1923) and also IAR of the same year.

Party to put into practice the terms of the Hindu-Muslim Pact.¹³ Dacca, Mymensing, Faridpur, Pabna and Rangpur witnessed explosive situations which were fortunately prevented from growing into mass violence by the timely action on the part of government officials. There was a clear evidence of a growing distrust of the Hindus by the Muslims, especially among the "progressives" and at the end of the year a section of the Muslims began to view the Government's policy in a favourable light.

Commenting on this the Report on the Administration of Bengal, 1924-25, says that "the Congress was thus representative of only Hindu opinion, and although resolutions were carried advocating Hindu-Muslim unity, the discussions on this, the erstwhile main plank of the Swarajya platform, elicited little or no enthusiasm. At the Muslim Conference (the Serajaganj Conference) the trend of the debate was rather in the direction of the airing of communal grievances than the establishing of mutual goodwill. Such incidents were symptomatic of the weakening of Swarajist influence over the Mohammedan Community" (p. xi). At this critical juncture occurred the death of C. R. Das, though Gandhi stepped into the breach and maintained some semblance of unity.

Though there was less violence accompanying political agitations, Hindu-Muslim distrust grew on a larger scale. From 1926 onwards "Communal politics came once more prominently to the fore with the opening of the All India Hindu Mahasabha under the presidency of Lala Lajpat Rai at Calcutta on 11 April. *Mahasabha* which is a Compound of two sanskrit words, means literally 'big meeting' and the Hindu Mahasabha is therefore, the central meeting of delegates of the many local Hindu Associations which existed all over India for the organization of the Hindu Community, for protection of their interests, and, in some places, notably in the United Provinces for the reclamation of converts from Hinduism to Christianity or Islam.¹⁴

"May (1925) opened with a number of political meetings and various communal conferences. The way was led by Mr. Gandhi, who addressed a large meeting at Mirzapur Park in

¹³ See Report on the Administration of Bengal 1924-25, p. xi.

¹⁴ *East India (Progress and Condition)*. Statement exhibiting the moral and material progress and condition of India during the year 1925-1926. Sixty-first Number, printed in India, 1927, p. 6.

Calcutta on May 1st. He referred to the negotiations which were said to be proceeding between Lord Birkenhead and Mr. C. R. Das, but disclaimed all knowledge of them. He said that instead of entering into diplomatic relations with 'the matchless diplomats from England' he preferred to concentrate on a constructive programme for developing the power of India from within. This constructive programme contained three items: first Hindu-Muslim unity, regarding which he said, 'Is that... unattainable by us?... I have admitted my incompetence. I have admitted that I have been found wanting as a physician prescribing a cure for the malady. I do not find that either Hindus or Mussulmans, are ready to accept my cure and therefore I simply now-a-days confine myself to a passing mention of this problem and content myself by saying that some day or other we Hindus and Muslims will have to come together if we want the deliverance of our country; and if it is to be our lot that before I say the sooner we do so the better it is for us. If we propose to break one another's head let us do so in a manly way; let us not ask for sympathy from any quarter if you do not propose to give any quarter, that is what I have to say about Hindu-Muslim unity'."

This frank statement of Gandhi regarding the failure of his action was a sad commentary on the Bengal situation.

The President of the District Muslim Conference, Fazl-ul-Huq, striking an aggressive note, said that the political position of Mohammedans demanded serious attention. He was afraid that the Hindus would sooner or later monopolise all power and therefore it was necessary for the Muslims to organise themselves on the lines of the Hindu Mahasabha. There was a heated discussion regarding a *Fatwa* issued by a Bengali Moulvi characterising all those Muslims who had attended the Bengal Congress meet, *Kafirs*. At the intervention of Gandhi and Das it was brought to a close, emphasis being laid on the unity of the communities.

The Swarajist Party had been born on the ruins of the Non-co-operation and Khilafat movements. It symbolised a step towards moderation which replaced revolutionary, militant mass action by Parliamentary constitutionalism. According to the C.P.I. it had saved, by its method of Parliamentary obstruction, the nationalist movement from being transformed into a 'spinning

guild' or a 'prayer fraternity'. However the Swarajists' biggest blunder was that they had staked everything on parliamentary activities. The consequences of this was that it had to ultimately fail before a power that was ruthless in demanding their total surrender. Further though the Party promised to win *Swaraj* for all it became a champion of only the affluent. Once they had entered the legislature their attitude changed so noticeably that the Government only marked time for its collapse.

The result of this was a further lease of life to that section of capitalism which was rearing its head. Since political power rested with the British a few concessions to Indian Capital did only strengthen rather than weaken Britain's hands. Cheap labour availability, easy accessibility to raw materials would only go to strengthen British trade. They needed an ally — and it was there in the form of bankers, manufacturers and merchants.

CHAPTER 5

BACKGROUND TO PAKISTAN

POWER WAS transferred by the British in 1947, with the birth of two nation-states: India and Pakistan. It would not be out of place to review the events earlier to analyse the partition that took place.

Bengal up to 1905 was one province ruled by a Lieut. Governor assisted by five secretaries and a 'powerless' legislative council. In 1905 Bengal was partitioned into two halves with Dacca becoming the capital of the eastern wing. This was not acceptable to the people and there was widespread agitation and in 1911 it was annulled and Bengal became a British Province. Two years earlier the Morley-Minto Reforms had introduced the system of separate electorates which was retained even after Bengal was reunified. The succeeding years saw the birth of the Non-cooperation movement, the Swaraj Party with its mission of 'Council-entry', the Gandhi-Irwin Pact and the Round Table Conferences of 1931, 1932 and 1933.

Since the Hindus and Muslims failed in their attempts to come to an understanding the then British Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald put forward the 'Communal Award'. As per this the Muslims in Bengal who formed 54.7 per cent of the population were given 119 seats as against 80 seats to the Hindus including the Depressed classes. The Depressed classes were also allowed to vote in the general constituencies apart from special constituencies where they alone could vote. Women were allotted a few seats, but again on a communal basis. The other seats were distributed among the other minorities like the Sikhs, the Anglo-Indians, and special seats were allotted to labour, commerce and industry, mining, plantation and the landed gentry. The table on page 74 gives us an idea of Muslim representation under the Communal Award.

In the Punjab the Sikhs (13.2%) were given 32 seats in a house of 175.

Among the first to object was Gandhi who described the award

| Province | Muslim Percentage of population | Total Number of seats | Number of seats reserved for Muslims |
|------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| Madras | 7.9 | 215 | 29 |
| Bombay, excluding Sind | 9.2 | 175 | 30 |
| Bengal | 54.7 | 250 | 119 |
| The United Provinces | 15.3 | 228 | 66 |
| The Punjab | 57.0 | 175 | 86 |
| The Central Provinces | 4.7 | 112 | 14 |
| Assam | 33.7 | 108 | 34 |
| Sind | 70.7 | 60 | 34 |
| The N.W.F. Province | 91.8 | 50 | 36 |
| Bihar & Orissa | 10.8 | 175 | 42 |

as an attempt to vivisection Hinduism by the setting up of a separate electorate for the Depressed Classes. Accordingly he commenced a 'fast unto death' on 20 September, 1932. He requested his countrymen to do away with the injustice meted out to the Depressed Classes so that the British Government would find no 'excuse' to divide the Hindus. As a result of his efforts the Poona Pact was born and the British Prime Minister had to withdraw his award. Under the pact the Depressed Classes got *more seats out of the general seats* in the following order: Madras: 30; Bombay (with Sind): 15; Punjab: 8; Bihar and Orissa: 18; C.P.: 20; Assam: 7; Bengal: 30; U.P.: 20.

Thus the Depressed Classes got 148 seats reserved for them as against 81 seats allotted by the British earlier. Election to these seats were to be by joint electorates subject to the following procedure: all the members of the Depressed Classes registered in the general electorate would form an electoral college who would select a panel of four candidates from the Depressed Classes for each of the reserved seats; the members getting the highest number of votes in such primary election would be the candidates for election to each such reserved seat. The representation of the Depressed classes in the Legislature was to be on the same principle. Further these arrangements were to be in force for ten years from the date of promulgation.¹

No Bengali Hindu was, however, a signatory to the Poona Pact

¹ Largely drawn on the Prime Minister's statement, being kept in the Secret Home Poll Files: 41/5—Poll. 'KK' 1932.

and they contended that they were not parties to the Pact. Both Pact and Award, they alleged, were inequitable and had made it impossible for the Hindus who were the most influential community in the province to have the representation in the Legislature to which they were entitled. In a Report² they stated as follows:

“The Communal Award is marked out for its scheme of weightage of representation lavishly bestowed upon non-Hindu communities. The Hindus have never stood either for separate electorate or fixed quotas and weightages of representation setting up statutory majorities and statutory minorities in the Legislatures against all conceivable canons of democracy. But if weightages are to be given at all to communities, the Communal Award has grievously denied the claims of Bengal Hindus to such weightage. And yet in the Bengal Legislature, the scheme of weightages has been given full scope for other communities. A weightage of 25,000 per cent has been granted to Europeans, 3,000 per cent to Anglo-Indians, and 300 per cent to Indian Christians. The only ground for granting such weightages is the political importance of the communities concerned. That ground applies no less to Bengal Hindus who, besides contributing as much as three-fourths of Provincial revenue, have admittedly acquired for themselves an overwhelmingly important position in all spheres of national life—educational, economical and administrative.

“In their national struggle for their legitimate rights and liberties, the Bengal Hindus have been tried by many an obstacle, the last of which was the Partition of Bengal. The strength of their national opposition unsettled that settled fact. But the Communal Award is far more harmful to Bengal's national life and unity than the Partition of Bengal. That Partition was a mere geographical and physical partition, introducing a division of territory. The Communal Award introduces a moral and spiritual division, and creates a complete social cleavage between communities, making it impossible for them ever to come together on the basis of a common citizenship.”³

² *Bengal Anti-Communal Award Movement—A Report*, Calcutta, 1939,

³ For a detailed analysis of Hindu reaction see among dailies like

Among others this was signed by Rabindranath Tagore, Acharya Brojendra Nath Seal and many other eminent Bengali Hindus.

The Press was equally critical of the Award. A highly indignant Nationalist Press expressed its vehement condemnation but since they were almost owned by Hindus it became difficult to distinguish between genuine protests from those tinged with a communal bias. The only important Indian-owned newspaper and expressing the Hindu point of view, *Justice*, expressed partial approval of the award. All others ranging from liberal organs like *The Hindu*, and the *Leader* to extremist papers like the *Free Press Journal*, the *Bombay Chronicle* and the *Hindustan Times* generally contended that the award was specially designed to break up the nationalist movement and perpetuate Communalism.

The Sikhs were no less vehement than the Hindus in their denunciations. Influential Sikh leaders declared that their faith in British sense of justice and fair-play, was shaken. There was also loose talk of secession while some others declared that they wanted the status quo to remain.⁴

Among those who expressed their approval, either openly or otherwise, were the moderates and the Muslims. A number of moderate leaders like Sapru, Patro, Setalvad, Ali Imam and Ramaswami Mudaliar urged that "unless the Award is accepted and worked pending spontaneous Indian settlement of Communal Problems then the introduction of a constitution that will function must inevitably be delayed."⁵ That the British also believed that those opposing the award would eventually fall in line is seen from the observation made by a high official: "... it is possible that those Hindu leaders who are more interested in nationalism than communalism will as soon as the first wave of excitement has spent itself as a whole come round to this point of view."

On the other hand the Muslims, though ostensibly expressing a general disappointment were secretly pleased. In the Home Political Proceedings it is observed that the Muslims, especially from Bengal, were "likely gradually to realise solid advantages

Amrita Bazar Patrika and monthlies like *Modern Review*, which played important part in vindicating Hindu opinion on the subject under review.

⁴ A detailed analysis is on record in Home Political Proceedings of the C.A. 41-4/32. Telegram to the Secretary of the State for India, London, dated 22 August 1932.

⁵ *Ibid.*

they have gained. Muslims in provinces where Hindus are in a majority generally appear satisfied.”⁶

At its annual general meeting in Calcutta the Bengal Provincial Muslim League resolved:

“(3) That any statutory reservation of a minority of seats for the Mussalmans in Bengal Legislative Council is under no circumstances acceptable to the Mussalmans of Bengal.”

Later, discussing the joint electorate, it demanded the following:

“[5(a)] That the future electorates for the Bengal Legislative Council should be based on adult franchise and there should be no reservation of seats for the Mussalmans in the Council.

“(b) The League is of opinion that any reservation of seats for the majority community in Bengal is prejudicial to their own interests in as much as dependence on an artificial prop will stand in the way of their being self-reliant and self-dependent and will retard the growth of manhood in them.

“(c) That in case adult franchise is not established the qualifications of voters should be made so low that above 20% of the total population may be on the electoral rolls.”

This resolution was proposed by Moulana Mohamed Akram Khan and seconded by Dr. R. Ahniad.

An amendment to this resolution read as follows:

“That whatever the nature of franchise may be, there should be joint electorate with reservation of seats for the Mussalmans on the population basis in the Bengal Council for two terms only.”⁷

The Muslim attitude was reflected in an editorial in the *Star of India* under the caption “A Disappointing Allotment—Muslims and the Communal Award”. It said:

“Speaking for the Muslims it must be admitted that they are sadly disappointed. And, we may add, disillusioned.... It

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *The Mussalman*, 5 April 1932, p. 7. The amendment was moved by Moulvi Syed Majid Bakshi, M.L.C., and seconded by Moulvi Jalaluddin Hashemy, M.L.C. and was supported by Moulvi Abdul Karim.

is in connexion with the Special constituencies that the Muslims feel they are in the gravest danger. It must be admitted 20 (twenty) seats so designated have in the past, almost wholly gone to the Hindus, and with conditions as they are at the moment, and as they will probably be for several years to come, it seems fairly certain that a very large proportion of those 20 seats will still go towards increasing the Hindu allotment. For example, in commerce the five seats which it is anticipated will go to Indians must of necessity be filled by Hindus; the five seats set apart for landholders, will under present conditions, also be at least eighty per cent Hindus; and of the seats reserved for labour at least six will presumably be Hindus.”⁸

On the ten-year duration of the system it observed:

“Ten years is not very long in the life of a nation, and it is anything but certain whether it will prove enough to produce conditions justifying the abolition of separate electorates. . . .”

The communal temper of Bengali Muslims was indicated by a telegram sent to the Secretary of State for India by the Bengal Government:

“Communal Award has met with mixed reception in Bengal. Statement issued by A. K. Fazlul Huq and thirty prominent Muslims including several members of the Legislative Assembly regard Award as distinct advance and pleased with it though they demand statutory majority of total council. Certain Muslims of Congress sympathies but unimportant in Bengal, demand joint electorates. General impressions of Muslim opinion is that Muslims are satisfied but are determined to continue demand for statutory majority more as offset to Hindu demands than as demand in itself sustainable.”

Describing the caste Hindu reaction it said:

“Caste Hindus almost universally dissatisfied on the grounds that their superior claims in respect of education, wealth and work in past years not given recognition and that their percentage of seats composed with present council much reduced.

⁸ Leader, *The Star of India*, 17 August 1932.

Hindus also unanimously opposed to Separate Electorate.”⁹

On the whole the award had pleased none. The Hindus had condemned it. It had not satisfied the Muslims completely as they felt that most of their demands were still left undecided. The Europeans reluctantly accepted the award with a feeling that they should have had an increased representation. It had not satisfied the Depressed Classes, judging from the opinion expressed by some of its leaders. The Anglo-Indians, the Indian Christians and other minorities had expressed no opinion while the Sikhs had been highly critical.

As regards the Press except the *Times of India* none of the moderate papers welcomed the award, on the grounds that it retained or extended the communal electorates. Of the moderate associations the Deccan Sabha and some members of the Council of the Western India National Liberal Association objected to the award, while individuals like M. R. Jayakar and N. M. Joshi strongly disapproved of it. Even Sir Chimanlal Setalvad who had commended it (for which he was vehemently criticized by his party) had done so with some reservation. He had stated that, under the circumstances, the Indians having by their own failure invited the decision, “they must now make the best of a bad bargain and submit to it provisionally.”¹⁰

The main objections to the award can be summarised as follows:

1. ‘Its basic principle is wrong. It will make national unity in India extremely difficult, if not impossible.
2. It is reactionary. It not only retains separate electorates but increases their number and perpetuates communal differences. The Separate electorates for the Depressed Classes will divide the Hindus.
3. It favours the Muhammadans, the Europeans, the Anglo-Indians and the Indian Christians in that (a) the Muhammadans have been given an effective if not a statutory majority in the Punjab and Bengal and weightage in other provinces. . .

⁹ Serl. No. 13, Telegram R. To the Secretary of State for India, London, dated 22 August 1932, 41-4/32-Political and K. W., 1932.

¹⁰ Letter from C.W.A. Turner, Reforms Officer, No. 166, dated Poona 10 September 1932. 41-4/32—Political and K.W., 1932.

4. As a result of the Award the political importance of the Hindus will be reduced and they will practically be converted into a minority community.
5. The Muslim demands for a statutory majority in the Punjab and Bengal, such as one-third representation... equal status with the other provinces for the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, separation of Sind and residuary powers in the provinces have not been granted, while the representation proposed for the Muslims in the Presidency proper, if Sind is separated, is inadequate...¹¹

Thus we can see that Pakistan was yet to be born even as an idea. Penderel Moon's book *Divide and Quit* explaining the genesis of Pakistan says:

"The quasi-monopoly of political power which the Hindus' superior numbers would tend to give them was diminished by abandoning the old tradition of unitary government in favour of a federal form of Constitution under which the Provinces would enjoy a large measure of autonomy; Sind was detached from Bombay and made a separate province so that there would be four Muslim-majority Provinces out of a total of eleven (Bengal, Punjab, Sind and the North-West Frontier Province). The system of separate electorates for Muslims and weightage was continued; and it was envisaged that the Native States would be included in the Federation and that their representatives would have a neutralizing influence at the centre."

Though Jinnah had characterised the 1935 Act as 'fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable', the Muslims appeared quite contented.

The British view is seen from a letter written from London to the Government of India:

"(4) For many years Mr. Gandhi has interested himself in the circumstances of the Depressed Classes and has professed an earnest desire that, despite the ill-treatment they have for generations suffered at the hands of the caste Hindus (which he freely admits), they should not, in a self-governing India, be detached from the main body of the Hindu community. It appears that his present decision is based on the idea that

¹¹ *Ibid.*

this is what will occur as a result of the arrangements devised by His Majesty's government.

'(5) ...For not only will members of the Depressed Classes under the new constitution, vote in the same general constituencies as caste Hindus, but the right to record an extra vote in a special constituency, which they are also granted, will be automatically withdrawn 20 years hence, by which time it is estimated that the disabilities under which they now labour will in some measure have been overcome. No responsible person, and certainly not Mr. Gandhi would attempt to deny the existence of these disabilities, which in Southern India particularly are severe.

'Indeed, the assumption that the special hardships from which the Depressed Classes have suffered for countless generations, will be removed in 20 years, has, by many who have knowledge of Indian conditions, been adjudged to be unduly sanguine, and may in itself be considered as sufficient proof that the intentions of His Majesty's Government in this matter are the reverse of what Mr. Gandhi appears to believe. In any case, it was solely in order to safeguard the position of the Depressed Classes during the transitional phase, and to ensure that genuine representatives of their interests are returned to the new Legislatures, that the right to record an extra vote in Separate electorates in certain areas has been conferred upon the terms of the Award. For it would seem obvious that if the Depressed Classes were only given reserved seats in general electorates in which caste Hindus predominate, there would be little likelihood, under existing circumstances, that the majority of the Depressed Class candidates elected would be other than mere nominees of the caste Hindus. It is surely a matter for astonishment that a man like Mr. Gandhi, who unquestionably has the welfare of the down-trodden and oppressed much at heart, should make the introduction of measures designed for their protection the occasion for so drastic and extraordinary a protest'.¹²

From the above it is apparent that the Government of India were 'worried' by the growing influence of Gandhi and the

¹² A Secret letter written by the P.M.'s Secretariat to the Government of India—41/5-Poll & K.W. 1932.

emergence of the Indian National Congress as a mass movement. When the tactics of communal and separate electorates failed to deliver the goods they started looking elsewhere for a counterpoise to the Congress. This they sought to do with the help of the princely states, by pampering the educated elite and perpetuating social divisions, pretending to agree to political reforms which did not endanger British interests, etc. Unfortunately, neither Hindu Bengal, nor Muslim Bengal, understood this move of the British.

Despite the wholehearted support for the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League (March 1940), it was not many among the Muslims who were really for 'dividing' the country; They believed that some kind of compromise could be reached; some acceptable loose federal arrangement could be worked out avoiding a complete split. There was a school of thought who were convinced that the rigid insistence on the part of the Hindus on the one-nation theory, was the cause of Partition. Among those who belonged to this view were Nawab Dr Nazir Yar Jung and Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif. Dr. Jung's pamphlet is noteworthy.¹³

Commenting on the Provincial autonomy under the 1935 Act Dr. Jung observes: "The Provincial part of the Constitution Act of 1935 had just been inaugurated, giving the Congress a decided position of vantage in a greater part of the Country. The Muslim League had, as a reaction to this, to reorganize itself. But it had no specific goal before it. The utmost that it could think of was to fit into the Congress goal and programme on the basis of cultural safeguards for Muslims".¹⁴ This view is supported by Keith Callard in his brilliant study *Pakistan: A Political Study*. Discounting the position of Jinnah even in the late 30's he

¹³ For a detailed discussion see *The Pakistan Issue*, being the correspondence between Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif and Mr. M. A. Jinnah, edited by Nawab Dr. Nazir Yar Jung.

¹⁴ An interesting evidence for this contention will be found in *Recent Speeches & Writings of Jinnah*, Colls. ed. by Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Lahore 1943, where it is on record that for the first time 'on 12th April 1936, the M. L. at its session, the first in its history, undertook the policy of programme of mass contact.'

In his well-written book, *Pakistan—The Formative Phase*, Khalil Bin Sayyid had drawn our attention to this particular point that until 1937 Jinnah was not at all confident if his much valued Pakistan *in toto* was to be achieved (pp. 89-90, 96-97, 192).

correctly sums up what the League stood for. He says: "When Mr Jinnah returned from England in 1934 the Muslim League was moribund. The Indian National Congress had clearly taken the lead with its demand for India's self-determination. By comparison with the Congress the League was a defensive organization composed of wealthy zamindars and a few discontented intellectuals who wanted greater access to government employment. Many of its members were still within the Congress, or like Mr Jinnah, were ready to co-operate substantially with it". He further goes on to say: "there was no air of enthusiasm about the League of that period; it had no sense of mission. Many of its members looked back to the glorious days of the Khilafat Movement".

Dr. Jung, summing up the essence of Dr. Latif's Inaugural Address at Hyderabad (August 1937) writes: "The address made it clear that the culture of Islam was not a culture which attached importance to the mere externalia of life. It was, on the other hand, expression of the inner forces of Muslim life, and embodied two fundamental laws of human existence — the law of movement, and the law of unity, stimulating and welcoming on the one hand every urge for progress and on the other striving to let that urge subserve or advance the cause of unity in life. The abiding or permanent form in which it manifested itself was the law of Islam called the Shariyyat which moulded its followers into a distinct social order with its own problems to solve on its own lines—problems of education, social, economic, and political, national and international. Indeed, it was a culture to be preserved as a force for national emancipation if its intrinsic value could only be properly appreciated by the non-Muslims."¹⁵

At its Haripura session in February 1938 the Indian National Congress admitted the need for cultural safeguards and asked the Muslim League to spell out these safeguards. The latter however had no such clear-cut ideas about them. Thus it was, writes Dr. Jung, a humiliating position for Dr. Latif and he spelt out his ideas in a pamphlet *The Cultural Future of India*. In this tract he called upon the Muslims to work for securing autonomous zones from where they could work for the good of entire India. It was his feeling now that India could not be a homo-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

geneous nation so long as the Hindus and Muslims did not make honest attempts to forget their differences and work for a new society fused with both cultures.

In this background it would be interesting to note the interests promoted by the Congress right from its inception to 1917 when Gandhi assumed charge and the Moderates had left. Gandhi's interest essentially were those of the educated urban middle class, despite the demands made for land reforms, reduction of taxes for all, etc.¹⁶

Dr. Latif was in a quandary. Yet he felt confident that his proposed plan of a nation being formed on the lines of Canada might be worked out in India. He therefore suggested the establishment of a federation of culturally homogeneous states or zones to be evolved wherever necessary even by means of an exchange of population spread over a long period of time. With this end in view he approached Jawaharlal Nehru who turned a deaf ear to his proposal. That this was a historical blunder has been proved by later events. Here was a man with an accommodating gesture, when the Muslims were looking askance at the Congress but Nehru dismissed him so curtly that he sent the following letter to him.

Yusuf Manzil
Adikmet, Hyderabad, Deccan
10th January 1940

'Dear Panditji,

The difference is only this: you pit yourself only against British Imperialism. I disapprove of Imperialism in every form, British or Congress or Muslim or any other... It is why I am against the Pakistan Movement as conceived by its original promoters which in my humble opinion is a separatist movement, and would call for two federations in the country (Vide pp. 27-28—*The Muslim Politics in India*). I am in favour of a single federation but composed of.... You do not attempt seriously at this hour to bring about a lasting settlement of the

¹⁶ For a classified presentation of Congress Resolution, see D. Chakrabarty and C. Bhattacharya, *Congress in Evolution*, Part I (1885-1934), Part II (1935-1940), The Book Company, 1935 and 1940.

problem of communities in a less arduous style. The idea of cultural zones is a mild idea compared with that of Pakistan. But that will be thrown into the limbs of oblivion, and the spectre of Pakistan alone will stare you in the face tomorrow, if you fail to use your opportunities to frame a constitution for the country agreeable to all.'

Here we have to refer to Callard who says:

"Political parties are founded upon the shared recollection of powerful emotions. It is for this reason that the significance of the period from 1919 to 1922 is essential to an understanding of the Muslim League in Pakistan. During this time a number of elements was added to the ideology of Muslim politics in India that was to be of importance in the ensuing years. Firstly the use of the vocabulary and concepts of classical Islam was accentuated. The Movement directed attention to the Islamic heritage of the series of Caliphs stretching back ultimately to the rule of the Prophet himself.¹⁷ It invited the defence of ancient Islamic forms as such. It was admitted that the actual Caliphate of the 20th century had its faults, but their remedy was to be found, not by trying to build a new structure but by return to the ideals of the purer epoch of guided caliphs."

To explain the extra-religious interest on the part of the Muslims one would have to refer to the growth of the various Muslim groups in India.^{17a} During the period of the Simon Commission's visit (1923-28) the community was being guided to hark on two demands: cow-slaughter and playing of music before mosques. The memorandum submitted by the community of U.P. under the leadership of Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan clearly demonstrates that they wished to be treated as a separate entity. Jinnah's demands had by and large nothing to do with the uplift of the down-trodden members of the community.¹⁸ Among the

¹⁷ For innumerable instances supporting this 'swing-back' the Muslim Bengali daily *Azad*, monthly *Mohammadi*, English *Morning News*, *Star of India* and a good number of newly established but short-lived monthlies are to be consulted. The English quarterly *Moslem Institute Journal*—a very learned journal—played upon this orientalism vigorously.

^{17a} See Appendix A at endd.

¹⁸ For a detailed discussion see *India Divided* by Rajendra Prasad, 1946, p. 31.

fourteen points formulated by the Muslim League, which remained unaltered more or less until 1938, were:

2. The Congress should withdraw all opposition to the Communal Award and should not describe it as a negation of nationalism.
3. The share of the Muslims in the State services should be definitely fixed in the Constitution by a statutory enactment.
4. Muslim personal law and culture should be guaranteed by statute.
5. The Congress should take on hand the agitation in connection with the Shahidganj Mosque and should use its moral pressure to enable the Muslims to gain possession of the Mosque.
6. The Muslims' right to call Azan and perform their religious ceremonies should not be fettered in any way.
7. Muslims should have freedom to perform cow slaughter.
8. Muslim majorities in the provinces where such majorities exist at present, must not be affected by any territorial re-distribution or adjustments.
9. The *Bande Mataram* song should be given up.
10. Muslims want Urdu to be the national language of India and they desire to have statutory guarantee that the use of Urdu shall not be curtailed or damaged.
11. Muslim representation in the local bodies should be governed by the principles underlying the Communal Award.
12. The tricolour flag should be changed or alternatively the flag of the Muslim League should be given equal importance.
13. Recognition of the Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organization of Indian Muslims.
14. Coalition Ministries.

In his letter to Jinnah, Nehru wrote: "It is further stated that the formula evolved by you and Rajendra Prasad in 1935 does not satisfy the Muslims now and nothing on these lines will satisfy them. It is added that the list given above is not a complete list and it can be augmented by the addition of further 'demand'." (IAR 1938, II, 369-370). From this it is clear that Jinnah made these 'Uneconomical' demands only as a tactical move.

The real reason however was that the Muslim League was in no position to effectively counter the Congress. So it was careful to draft its election manifesto more or less based on the Congress Programme. It also expected that the Congress would invite it to join them in ministry-making. But its hopes were belied when the Congress started feeling as to why it should be extra charitable to the League, having been victorious in the 1937 elections.

This apparent anti-League attitude compelled some leading non-League Muslim groups and parties to cast their lot with the League. In Punjab the Unionist Party under the leadership of Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan walked over to the League camp; the Muslim Premiers of Bengal and Assam followed suit. Punjab especially is significant because the League had been worsted at the polls and almost all the Muslim seats had been won by the Unionist Party which remained as a force despite its walking over. In Bengal during the days of the Communal Award prominent Muslim Members of the Congress were also effective Leaguers. This phenomenon is a feature that has occurred again and again in the Indian political groups.

It is here that the Home Political Department has some interesting facts to offer.¹⁹

"Before he left for Kashmir Mr Jinnah got together this committee to work for the League in opposition to Sir Fazl-i-Hussain and the Punjab Unionists. . . . Khalifa Shuja-ud-din has been won over from Sir Fazl-i-Hussain and the Committee is now giving its attention to the Ittihad-i-Millad.

"Sir Mohammad Iqbal dislikes Sir Fazl-i-Hussain as much as Mr Jinnah does and this, I think, is the main reason why he is figuring prominently here. The Committee composed of Urban Muslims, does not carry much weight, but it lends support to Ghazanfar Ali (Jinnah's most ardent helper) and his activities are well worth watching. From the Punjab's point of view, the present combination in the Unionist Party is more likely to give the province stability than any other party, and it would be most unfortunate if anything, or any one, upset it."

On the growth and development of the Unionist Party in Punjab the Department's file reveals the following facts.

¹⁹ Sect. Home Political Files 88/1936 No. 15 MA/36.

"From the beginning of the life of the Muslim League (1906) the Punjab branch of the League was vigorous and soon after it came to view with alarm the decline of its All-India parent due to its pro-Congress leanings and, during the great war, to the Khilafat agitation. In 1929, the Punjab Party felt that the Muslim League was neither loyal enough to ensure that the Mohammadans were given all that was justly due to them, and the efforts of Sir Mohammad Iqbal resulted in a Conference in Delhi at which Muslims with similar views attended from all over India. Thus the All-India Muslim Conference with Sir Mohammad Shafi as President and Khan Bahadur Haji Rahim Baksh as Secretary was formed with a duty to represent Indian Muhammadans in all Conferences and deliberations held in connection with the grant of further reforms to India, and to demand that the Mohammadans were recognised as a separate entity in political India and to ensure to them their due share in the administration; as to this the All-India Muslim Conference leaders were successful. . . .

"In the Punjab those who were the leaders and supporters of the Muslim Conference have for long been concerned in the Punjab Unionist Party. The leader of the Party in the Punjab council has been Rai Bahadur Chaudhury Chhotu Ram, but is recognized that Sir Fazl-i-Hussain is now the real head as it has been announced that he has as his lieutenant Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, Nawab Muzaffar Khan and Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot as well as his own real followers who include Sir Feroze Khan Noon. . . . It (Unionist Party) is non-communal but because the party has a very definite Muslim majority, almost all regard it as one which will look to Muslim interests before all others. . . ."

Commenting on the Muslim League's fear of political isolation the file says:

"There is little doubt that the AIML sees in the Punjab Unionist Party the biggest stumbling block in its purpose of dominating the Muslims of India in the Political arena. There is even less doubt that Mr Jinnah is determined to do all he can to wreck the party or at least to prevent it from having a majority in the Punjab Assembly."²⁰

²⁰ Extract from Jinnah's note in file quoted earlier (14/5/1936).

Jinnah therefore manoeuvred to gain control and this was evident at the Conference held in Bombay in April 1936. Despite Jinnah's trying to win over the Muslims of Punjab the Unionist Party members secured 19 seats as against the others out of a total of 34 seats for Punjab. That Jinnah's manoeuvres were quite evident to the Unionist Party leaders is seen from the following:

"Mr Jinnah's plan regarding the formation of a Central Parliamentary Board are well known and it is only his endeavours in regard to the Punjab which merit consideration here. During his recent visit to Lahore, he lost no time in trying to win over the various political groups to his way of thinking and even approached Sir Fazl-i-Hussain, although he must have realised that there was little to gain in that direction. Sir Fazl-i-Hussain's stated reason for not merging with the League was that the Unionist Party was an organization open to and then for the benefit of all communities and he could not, therefore allow any of the Party's non-Muslim members to suffer by permitting the party to come under the control of a purely communal organization."²¹

What is important here is that it was not the non-Muslim support that the Unionist Party was worried of losing but that it distrusted the Muslim League as vehemently as the earlier period when the Muslim Conference was formed.

As regards Jinnah's position vis-a-vis Muslim Politics, it can be gauged from his manoeuvres at Bombay when he decided that the seats which were not filled at Bombay could be filled at a later date at Delhi to which the Unionist Party leader Sir Fazl-i-Hussain objected. Jinnah therefore successfully negotiated for an alliance with the Ahrars. Reference has already been made to the DIB note regarding Jinnah's plan and Sir Hussain's rejection of his suggestion. As Jinnah did not make much headway with the Ittihad-i-Millad, the Majlis-i-Ahrar was his only hope and also because the Ahrars realised that they would not be in a position to form a better alliance in Punjab. Commenting on Jinnah's determination on strengthening the League's position W. D. Jenkins, the Intelligence Chief concludes:

²¹ *Ibid.*

"Mr Jinnah has stated his intention of holding a meeting of the League's Council and of the Parliamentary Board in Lahore at the beginning of June and it would seem that he still entertains hope of some measure of success in the Punjab. So far as can be seen at present, there is little justification for his opinion. . . . It must be remembered, however, that the majority of the Leaders are imbued with the power to come, and most of them are striving not for their country or community but for themselves. Organisations and alliances built on so insecure foundations are liable to topple without warning."²²

Bengal Politics

Under the Government of India Act, 1935, a General election was held and there were 3 leading parties in the field — the Muslim League, the Krishak Proja Party and the Indian National Congress. The results gave 60 seats to the Congress, 40 to the Muslim league and 35 to K.P.P. whose leader was A. K. Fazlul Huq. The rest of the seats were distributed in the following manner: Independent Muslims 41, The British Community 25, the Independent Scheduled Caste Group 23, and the Independent Caste Hindu Group 14.²³

However the Congress High Command was still in the midst of a debate as to whether to enter the ministry or not and despite Huq's initiatives, refused to form a Government. The K.P.P. was therefore forced to form a Government with the Muslim League, the Scheduled Caste group and the small but important group of Independent Caste Hindu legislators. It was not a strong Government as was evident when the entire ministry resigned in 1938 and was reappointed to the exclusion of Nausher Ali whose ouster they wanted. The Congress also contributed its share at efforts 'to topple' the ministry by making repeated attempts to bring about the resignation of N. R. Sarkar, the able Finance Minister, who was at one time a leading light of the Congress.

Fazlul Huq made repeated attempts to work in co-operation with the Congress but failed. The Congress, he said, had more than once offered him the premiership in a coalition ministry,

²² Ibid., end portion of the same Report.

²³ The corresponding strength in the Legislative Council was as follows: Independent Muslims 13, Independent Hindus 12, Muslim League 11, Congress 10, European 6, and others 11.

but if he had accepted, he would have 'signed the death-warrant of Islam'.²⁴ A piece of rhetoric in communal vocables indeed!

However the constant opposition of the Congress resulted in the drawing together of the various Muslim groups in the Assembly; and the Huq Government's fate depended on a consolidated Muslim front. It was therefore natural that Congressmen characterised it as a 'Muslim' government. It is well to remember here that the Muslim League till the mid 30's was a small group composed of landlords, high officials and members of the noble families. The 1937 elections gave only 4.5 per cent of the Muslim vote to the League but ten years later, 1947, it won three-fourths of the same Vote. Professor Myron Weiner writes: "It was in the three years between 1937 and 1940 that the League grew from a limited-interest group to a vast mass movement which was to win its demand for a Pakistan state of eighty million people."²⁵

The Huq Ministry enacted a number of legislations which benefitted the cultivators. Unfortunately by sheer historical accident the cultivators happened to be largely Muslims and a great majority of those who were adversely affected, the Zamindars, were Hindus.²⁶ By enacting the Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act (1938) the government abolished the landlord's transfer fee and his right to pre-emption; the realisation of *abwabs* by the landlord or his agent was made punishable by fine. Ninety per cent of the landlords were Hindus, while the tenants were almost Muslims.

By the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, the debtors were given a moratorium on payments and Arbitration Boards were set up to look into disputes.

The Bengal Money Lenders Act curbed the activities of the individual money-lenders who were adversely affected by the government's abolition of compound interest, fixation of maximum rates of interest and provision for repayment by instalments.

The Bengal Secondary Educational Bill drew forth heavy criticism from the Hindus who felt that the 'Muslim' ministry was trying to wrest power from Hindus in another sphere—education. It was a fact that no specific provision existed in the Indian Universities Act for secondary education and Muslim representation in the Senate and the Syndicate of the Calcutta University—which was hitherto exercising control—was small.

²⁴ *Leader*, 20 April 1938.

²⁵ *Political Change in South Asia*, p. 4.

²⁶ *Report on the Administration of Bengal, 1935-36*, p. x.

Another measure which irritated the Hindus was the Calcutta Municipal Amendment Act which gave the Government powers to supercede any department of the Municipal Corporation²⁷ where the Hindus were in a majority.

In the case of the education bill the Hindus alleged that it was a cloak to introduce communal representation in the Calcutta University and that in the case of the Municipal Corporation civic affairs were becoming politicalised; it was also contended that the object of the Municipal act was to increase Muslim representation by the introduction of separate electorates.

Yet another irritation came in the form of reservation of appointments in favour of Muslims, and that too of inferior capacity they alleged.

Apart from the animosity caused by the legislative enactments the feelings of both communities had been inflamed by communal propaganda — both through the Press and the Public platform. The Muslim League advocated Pakistan which meant independent control by Muslims of those provinces where they were in a majority. The communalists among the Hindus countered this with 'Akhand Hindustan' on the plea that India was one and indivisible and that the proposal of the League was destructive, which would reduce the Hindus to a statutory minority. Meetings were held by both sides: Dr Shyama Prasad Mookherjee, the Hindu Mahasabha leader held a big meeting in the Corporation Park, Dacca, in December 1940, while the Muslim League organised the Bhairab Conference in Pakistan Park in January 1941.

With a few exceptions political propaganda did not make much headway but when added to the economic conditions, the situation assumed monstrous proportions. There is also reason to believe that slowly but steadily the feeling was growing among the illiterate section of the Muslims, in the rural areas especially, that the advent of Pakistan and the taking over of Bengal by the Muslims, would leave no alternative to the Hindus except to leave Bengal or become converts to Islam.²⁸

Fazlul Huq was in a dilemma. It is at this stage his behaviour

²⁷ *Ibid* pp. x, xi.

²⁸ To understand the bitterness that divided both the communities see Appendix B to this chapter where a portion of a secret Government publication is cited, showing the objective situation of public services in Bengal and the scramble for that sphere of influence.

needs a careful study. He was all the while looking for a rapprochement between the K.P.P. and the Congress against the Muslim League. Further though he was wont to use strong language on occasions²⁹ his record was not always that of an uncompromising communalist.

Communal relations were now taking a turn for the worse. The various festivals like Id, Moharrum and Holi were accompanied by ugly incidents and unfortunately fuel was added by the Press who showed a tendency to exaggerate events. *The Statesman* and the *Star of India* remained more or less faithful to the Government in so far as its policy was consistent with the instructions of the Muslim League, but were otherwise somewhat critical while the other papers, obviously representing the Congress and Hindu point of view, were critical of everything that the Government did. The Government tried, with little success, to counteract the propaganda of the nationalist press by launching two papers, the *Bengal Weekly* and the *Banglar Katha*.

Fazlul Huq who championed the Muslim cause challenged Jawaharlal Nehru for joint investigation into the communal incidents that took place. The Hindu Mahasabha, very active in Bengal, made a lot of noise especially as regards Government policy in respect of recruitment in services. At its annual meeting held in Calcutta in 1939 the party made violent attacks on Muslims in general and the ministry in particular and gave a call for the formation of a 'Hindu National Militia'.³⁰

It is here that Fazlul Huq's career needs comment. Eulogised by his followers as the 'Lion of Bengal' he had a remarkable hold on the masses and was active in the Muslim League; it was he who moved the famous Lahore resolution in 1940. Allusion has been made as to how he came to lead a coalition government in 1937. In 1941 he was expelled from the Muslim League and two years later the then Governor of Bengal, Sir John Herbert who did not conceal his dislike for Huq, relieved him of his post on 28 March 1943. This brought in the Khwaja Nazimuddin Ministry which prepared the way for the subsequent chaos in Bengal leading ultimately to a communal clash which occurred on an unprecedented scale. It was the prelude to Pakistan.

²⁹ R. Coupland, *Indian Politics, 1936-1942*, p. 27.

³⁰ *A Brief Summary of Political Events in the Province of Bengal during the year 1939*, A Confidential publication for official use, 1941, p. 12.

The Congress has its share of this tragedy by its refusal to see beyond its nose. The leadership in Bengal lacked the foresight to arrive at a 'compromise' with Huq who, though a somewhat immature politician, was never a total separatist like many other Bengal Muslim Leaders. The Congress should have taken advantage of Huq's antipathy to the Muslim League and perhaps Huq would have been the answer to Pakistan. But the internal quarrels in the Bengal unit of the Congress made this impossible. In fact even the relations between the AICC and the Bengal unit was far from satisfactory. "The views expressed by the President at the Lucknow Session were by no means generally acceptable to Bengal Congressmen, who especially were disappointed at the lack of interest displayed in their grievance against the Communal Award. The Presidential address was eulogized by the nationalist papers of Bengal; but, reading between the lines, it was quite clear that a considerable body of Congress supporters felt doubt over the socialistic trend of policy it disclosed, and the opinion was expressed that the Soviet ideals of Russia might not be suitable to India."³¹

Further the Congress Legislature Party failed to take advantage of the well-intentioned policies of the Huq Ministry. The League, though a partner in the coalition, was dead set against the Legislation, not because of any other reason but for the fear that the Hindus and Muslims might come closer. Fazlul Huq, as noted earlier, was not a strong politician who could blast his way through his critics and this enabled the League to connive with the bureaucracy in defeating the implementation of the proposals. What was needed at this time was a strong personality but Huq failed miserably and the League succeeded in forcing him out without opposing him openly. The failure of the Huq ministry only goes to show that history has had examples of good men with weak convictions and lacking the dynamism that is needed at critical times, have done more harm to mankind than men with evil intentions. Huq's failure and dismissal was the signal for a hardening of Hindu-Muslim confrontation producing the disorders which finally resulted in the division of India into two separate sovereign states.

³¹ *Report on the Administration of Bengal, 1935-36, PV5.*

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

EVER since the days of Macaulay's reform in the 1830s all higher education in India was conducted in English. Anglomania became the fashion among the social and intellectual élite, whose derision of Indian culture became a token of their degree of westernization. A strong Anglo-Indian world came into being in which all things Western were adopted with enthusiasm by the progressive-minded Hindus of Bengal: books, newspapers, dwellings and clothing; everything changed under the cultural impact of the West. Leading Bengali Hindus had warmly encouraged this trend. Rammohan Roy had given the signal, and thousands followed in his wake, mostly Brahmos such as Ramtanu Lahiri, who embarked on a career devoted to the diffusion of European culture. Newspapers such as the *Gyanneshun* ('search for knowledge') or *The Bengal Spectator*, societies such as the famous *Society for the Acquisition of General Knowledge* were all started in order to familiarise the intellectual classes of Bengal with the chief traits of Western civilization. The British authorities welcomed these trends warmly and expended their support to such activities. In 1854, a Department of Public Instruction was created in every province to give financial assistance to educational institutions run along European lines. But something went wrong, and the whole movement reached a dead end by the end of the nineteenth century.

Although it gave rise to a genuine Anglo-Indian culture, this wave of Anglomania also produced generations of young Indians who found themselves rootless, out of touch with their own culture and yet unable to compete with the British in their own language and their own techniques. The Royal Commission of 1882 saw all this quite clearly but failed totally to alter the course of a vast movement flowing on its own momentum.

The gap between the British educated upper classes and the rest of the population increased steadily. Yet, for all its defects, it is this education and the use of the English language

that gave actual coherent unity to new India. If this had not happened, if the British had concentrated on developing the vernaculars, there is no doubt that there would not have been one Indian nationalism, but several; that the regional loyalties of Bengalis and Punjabis, Maharashtrians and Gujaratis, Tamils and Andhras, would have taken the upper hand and destroyed the fabric of Indian unity developed under British administration. In spite of everything, modern India was moulded by British education and tightly united by the use of English.

These developments in the nineteenth century set in motion the forces that were subsequently going to revive the purely indigenous culture in the twentieth century—on which Indian nationalism was eventually to base itself. By the time of World War I, there were in Bengal over 38,000 private institutions of learning, the overwhelming majority of which consisted of Hindu and Muslim schools (*tols*, *pathsalas*, *madriassas* and *maktabs*).

On the other hand, there arose a new type of higher education that was almost purely Indian. One by one, Hindu and Muslim institutions came into being: the National Council of Education devoted to rescuing India's great cultural heritage, the great centres at Benares and Aligarh, the Hindu Academy at Daulatpur, numerous educational institutions of the Arya Samaj in the Punjab and the Uttar Pradesh, and the Osmania University in Hyderabad. Leading Indians felt a new pride in Indian culture and tradition.

To this reaction, institutions such as Arya Samaj added their contributions. It remained staunchly Hindu even though it was impregnated with a dynamism that was the direct result of the British impact. For instance, Munshi Ram, one of the leaders of the Arya Samaj, under the name of Swami Shraddhananda, began to lead the typical life of a *sannyasin*. But instead of retiring into mystical contemplation, as he might have done in the olden days, he joined the *Shuddhi* movement, which aimed at reconverting to Hinduism the Muslim descendents of converted Hindus—thus making it plain that a rejuvenated Hinduism could not help coming into conflict with non-Hindu elements in India.

In essence, this awakened all the dormant centrifugal forces that lay deep in India and had been laid to rest by the unifying action of the British Government. They encouraged the profound cultural cleavages that divided Hindus from Muslims. While

the Hindu university of Benares became a hot-bed of orthodox Hindu revivalism, Muhammad Iqbal in the Punjab and Osmania University in the Deccan revived the glories of Urdu language and Muslim culture. They also awakened the cultural separatism of the various provinces by reviving the vernacular literatures. Added to the fissiparous tendencies already present in India, was the development of Indian nationalism in the twentieth century, conditioned by this cultural movement, which was all too lightly dismissed as inconsequential by political leaders.

The most potent and dangerous centrifugal force in this period of resurgence threatening to tear India apart was the Muslim revivalism. A correct reading of the past would have given to the leading Hindus a better understanding of one the most baffling problems confronting them: the presence of eighty million Muslims on the soil of India. Former rulers of the sub-continent, the Muslims had been deprived of their last shadow of power and waning self-respect by the final transference of Indian sovereignty to the British Crown after 1857. But they never thought of themselves as Indians (nor at the time did the Marathas, Bengalis, Punjabis etc., whose loyalty was regional and not national). They were, first and last, Muslims who looked to Mecca and Medina in Arabia or the Khalif of Turkey, even if they happened to be located in Bengal. The changes that had taken place in the nineteenth century were galling, especially in view of the swifter adaptation of the quick-witted Hindus to the requirement of the new industrial age.

The Muslim leader Sir Syed Ahmad Khan made bold attempts, however, to westernize Indian Muslims by raising the level of scientific education, by reverting to the old rationalistic interpretation of the Koran of the Mutazila School and by turning its back on the rest of the Islamic world. Sir Syed opposed any allegiance to the Caliphate; sought to dispel the prevailing anti-British feelings of the Muslims and founded the Aligarh College, the first Muslim institution in India to be run on Western lines. But on the political side he too made grievous mistakes by separating the Indian Muslims from the Indian National Congress. His rationalization of Indian Islam by attempting to prove Islam's truth as lying in its 'conformity to nature' soon earned him the opprobrious epithet of *nechari* and incurred the wrath of the founder of the nineteenth century Pan-Islamic movement, Jamal

ad-Din-al Afghani, who from Cairo wrote his violent treatise *The Refutation of the Materialists*, against it. In closer contact with European power and culture than with Middle Eastern Islam, it was inevitable that Indian Muslims would be the first to attempt an adjustment to the two alien cultures. After all, the Hindus had paved the way and demonstrated the necessity of such a 'modernization'. The scathing denunciations of Middle Eastern Muslims did not break Aligarh; the contrary forces gradually became supreme. But the whole movement was caught in a tight web of inner contradictions from which it could not disentangle itself. If Indian Muslims turned back on international Islamic solidarity, they feared the possibility of becoming a powerless minority in the land they used to rule as absolute masters. This possibility they refused to accept through historical memories. In fact, this movement was no more than the intellectual awakening of the higher social classes of Indian Islam. Indian Muslims remained for the most part, impervious to any change.

We should bear in mind that the Wahabis and Mujahidins had attempted even in Bengal, nothing more than an Islamic revival: they had tried to unite under the banner of a common faith millions of the population, with the ultimate object of overthrowing the Christian government and replacing it by a Muslim one. The seed sown by a few earnest untitled men, had borne abundant fruit, and at that time overshadowed the whole of Bengal.

It is not that there was no rationalistic interpretation of Muslim theology and philosophy. There was the Shia theologian Syed Amir Ali, who worked out a liberal apologetic which had great influence, not only in Muslim India, but all over the Muslim world. Naturally the intellectual awakening was bound, sooner or later, to percolate down into the world of action and politics. Powerful societies along communal lines (*anjumans*) sprang up for the service of the Muslim community; an influential Muslim press was started to parallel the Hindu press. Thought soon became action, and proselytism followed. The famous Ahmadiya Movement that spread all over the Islamic world, was started originally by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian in the Punjab.

But such movements did not touch the Muslim masses of India any more than the Brahmo Samaj had affected the Hindu masses. But they all prepared, unconsciously, the ground for the grim realities of the twentieth century. The Indian Muslim was put on

the defensive from the start by the fear that the Hindus were already able to control the sinews of modern power in India — banking, trade, industries — and therefore took the initiative of starting religio-political movements. This gradually, brought out the fact that Hindu and Muslim nationalisms were fundamentally opposed to each other. While the Hindus could uncover their past at home, on the very land on which they dwelt, the Muslims looked outside India to rediscover their Arab, Turkish or Persian roots and retain their pride as former conquerors.

The gravity of the problem, however, lay beyond this. First of all, the Hindu-Muslim conflict was not merely a religious one in the western sense of the word; it was cultural as well, the protest of an alien civilization which could only be reconciled by a new synthesis. But the reverse happened: all their antagonistic characteristics, dormant for generations, were quickened to new life by Hindu and Muslim political leaders. Among these characteristics, the *concept of national allegiance was one of the most important*. A genuine Muslim nationalism arose among Muslim communities in India, which was still rooted in the old concept of Islamic civilization: a nation is equated with a community of the faithful, with a 'consensus' (*ijma*) of faith irrespective of geographical location or spatial boundaries. In the traditional Islamic view, states are always *multiracial*; religious communities could coexist in the same space and yet be entitled to the privileges of autonomous nationhood. And while the Hindus and Sikhs felt that their nationalism was rooted in the soil of India irrespective of religious creeds, the Muslims clung tenaciously to their old concept but eventually modernized it so as to include a definite geographical formation carved out of India; that was the origin of the modern state of Pakistan.

At this stage a short discussion is necessary on the elective principle which was adopted from time to time ultimately culminating in communal electorates, because it was largely responsible for the ultimate bifurcation of the country.

By about the beginning of the twentieth century the Congress was growing in influence in the country and had attained a certain stature. The growth of Congress was to some extent influenced by the activities of the British Government. In 1900 Lord Curzon wrote to the Secretary of State: "My own belief is that the Congress is tottering to its fall, and one of my great ambitions while in

India is to assist its peaceful demise".¹ The Bengalis were antagonised by the Universities Act, the Calcutta Municipal Act and the Partition of Bengal. On 28 May 1906, a little over six months after his arrival in India as Viceroy, Lord Minto wrote to John Morley: "I have been thinking a good deal lately about a possible counterpoise to Congress aims. I think we may find a solution in the Council of Princes or in an elaboration of that idea".² On 6 June Morley wrote to Lord Minto: "Everybody warns us that a new spirit is growing and spreading over India. Lawrence, Chirol, Sydney Low all sing the same song; 'You cannot go on governing in the same spirit. You've got to deal with the Congress party and Congress principles, whatever you may think of them. Be sure of that before long the Muhammadans will throw in their lot with the Congressmen against you', and so on and so forth." On 11 July in the same year, Minto again wrote to Morley: "Nothing was truer than what Morrison says in the extract you sent me. Ideas can only be combated by ideas, and you won't keep the younger generation away from the Congress unless you have another programme and another set of ideas to place before them".³

It is at this point that we see the beginning of the war of ideas. Morley and Minto were arrayed on one side, and the Congress on the other side. On 1 October 1906 a Muslim delegation headed by the Aga Khan saw the Viceroy and this is important for future developments.

The effect of the Muslim claims was that in any system of representation, whether it affected a municipality, a district board or a legislative council, in which it was proposed to introduce or increase an electoral organization, the community should be represented as a community. The deputation also asked for representation on the basis of political importance and not only on its numerical strength. The Viceroy assured the Muslim community that their political rights and interests as a community would be safeguarded by any administrative reorganization.

Lord Minto and his Executive Council approved the claim made by the Muslims, and it was finally accepted with some reluctance by Lord Morley and the British Government. Morley

¹ Curzon Papers, Roll 2.

² Minto Papers, Roll 4.

³ *Ibid.*

himself had proposed a plan for a mixed or composite electoral college in which Hindus and Muslims should pool their votes. "Such a plan", said Lord Morley, "would have secured to the Muhammadan electors wherever they were so minded the chance of returning their own representatives in their due proportion. The political idea at the bottom of that recommendation which found so little favour was that such composite action would bring the two great communities more closely together, and this idea of promoting harmony was held by men of very high Indian authority and experience, who were among my advisers at the India office".⁴ But there was opposition from the Muslims and the Government of India to this scheme and it was reluctantly abandoned.

As a result, the Indian Councils Act of 1909 and the rules framed under it made provision for separate Muslim electorates in all the major provinces and the North-West Frontier Province, where there were no Legislative Councils at the time; and the Punjab, where it was thought that special protection would not be necessary. Muslims were also allowed to vote in the general constituencies, which were mainly composed of big landowners, members of Municipal Corporations and district boards, and members of Chambers of Commerce.

This settlement was bitterly criticized by the Nationalists. At a meeting in 1910 the Congress, 'while recognizing the necessity for providing a fair and adequate representation in the Legislative Councils for the Muhammadans and other communities where they are in a minority', condemned the system of communal electorates. There is no doubt that the introduction of communal electorates was totally opposed to the principle of democratic government.

It was in this setting and against this background that the principle of communal electorates was introduced in the Indian Constitution.

In 1916, when it became known that the British Government was considering reforms, Hindu and Muslim members of the Indian Legislative Assembly drew up an agreed plan of their own. Perhaps, to Indian Nationalists it seemed that Home Rule was in the offing. As a result, the two major political parties sank their differences, made concessions to each other and produced a plan known as the Congress-League Plan, based on a

⁴ *Ibid.*

Republican form of government. The most important feature in this plan from our point of view was the 'Lucknow Pact'. Although Hindus had been bitterly critical of communal electorates when they were first put into operation in 1909, this Pact provided for the distribution of the elected seats in the Legislature on the basis that each community should elect its representatives in separate constituencies. The seats were allotted on an all-India basis. In the United Provinces, for example, where the proportion of Muslims to the total population of the electoral area was just over 14 per cent, the Lucknow Pact gave a 30 per cent representation, and in Bombay, where it was about 20 per cent, the Lucknow Pact percentage was $33 \frac{1}{3}$. In the Central Legislative Assembly it gave a representation of $33 \frac{1}{3}$ per cent to the Muslim community which was 24 per cent of the population. The Congress agreed to the introduction of communal electorates in the Punjab and Central Provinces, and the Muslims, on the other hand, were to give up the additional advantage of voting in the general electorates which the Morley-Minto Reforms had secured for them.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report (1918) criticized the system of communal electorates on the grounds that they were opposed to the teachings of history, that they perpetuated class divisions and they stereotyped existing relations. At all events the Report reluctantly accepted the principle of communal electorates for the Muslims on the basis of the Lucknow Pact. After much discussion and debate the Bill of 1919 was finally passed and communal representation was widely extended.

The Act of 1919, therefore, continued the policy of counterpoise which had been eating like a canker into the body politic in India, dissipating the chances for unity and a healthy, progressive nationalism in the country.

The period from 1919 to the appointment of the Simon Commission was one of increasing rift between Hindus and Muslims. The Congress and the Muslim League were almost united for a period of about four years from 1919 as a result of the Khilafat movement, but communal riots continued to increase up to about 1927. At the end of that year the Simon Commission was appointed. In the summer of 1928 a group of Indian nationalists of all parties got together to draft a constitution for India. The result of their work was embodied in the document known as the Nehru Report.

This Committee examined the communal problem exhaustively. It pointed out that if the fullest religious liberty were given and cultural autonomy provided for, the communal problem would in effect be solved. A definite stand was taken against communal electorates because they violated the principles of self-government and 'failed to pave the way for better understanding between the communities, as was hoped'. Joint or mixed electorates were suggested, with reservation of seats as a communal safeguard for the Muslims only and for the non-Muslims in the North-West Frontier Province. Seats were to be reserved only at the centre and in those provinces where Muslims were in a minority. No weightage was allowed, but the right to contest other than reserved seats was conceded. 'Communalism', said the Report, 'can only go when the attention of the people is directed in other channels, when they begin to take interest in questions which really affect their daily lives rather than in fancied fears based on an artificial division of society'.

The All-India Muslim Conference under the presidentship of the Aga Khan rejected the Nehru Report. It issued a manifesto claiming that Muslim rights of representation granted to the Muslims under the Act of 1919 be retained. While Indian politicians were trying to reach some agreement the Simon Commission was examining the whole political complex of Indian society. Simultaneously Muslims of the United Provinces submitted secretly a bulky volume, giving data, particulars of governmental, non-governmental, educational, social, political and economic organizations with the positions that the Muslims enjoyed in those bodies. This representation prepared under the chairmanship of Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan will be considered by future historians as a brilliant piece of work based on both fear and a sense of superiority⁵.

In England the Labour Party went out of power and a National Government came in with Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister. The Minorities Sub-committee having failed to reach an agreement, the British Prime Minister introduced the Communal Award in 1932. Separate electorates were retained for the minorities and for Bengal and the Punjab, where Muslims were in a majority. Weightage was conceded to the Muslims where they

⁵ *Representation of the Muslims of United Provinces (India) to The Indian Statutory Commission*, July 1928, Allahabad, The Indian Press Ltd., 1928.

were in a minority and to the Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab. The Depressed Classes were also entitled to separate electorates as a minority community, and 3 percent of the seats in each Provincial Legislature were reserved for women. Separate electorates for the Depressed classes caused some dissension among Hindu politicians. Gandhi was opposed to this and after the panic caused by his fast, the Poona Pact was born. By this agreement the Depressed Classes gave up their separate electorates but the number of seats reserved for them was increased from 71 to 148. The Depressed Classes were first of all to elect a panel of candidates, and from this members would be elected by the general Hindu voters.

The Act of 1935 followed the Communal Award though modified by the Poona Pact, so that in the constitution working up to the outbreak of war, separate electorates with weightage continued to obtain.

The Aligarh Movement

It is clear that this movement which attempted the introduction of English education and modern western values in general presented such wide divergences that it could hardly be called a school of thought similar to its counterpart in Bengal, the Hindu College (1816). Culturally and socially the men behind it were not influenced by western ways of life and thought. As a matter of fact, these developments deepened the Muslims' pride in their past, and heightened still further the Muslims' consciousness as a religio-social unit within India. Nor can one show that, neo-Islam developed on the lines of neo Hinduism. Neo-Islam developed essentially as an apologetic against the western influences in Islam and as a mechanism for releasing the inner forces of the community for its own progress. Potential discord was always there between the two communities, born out of traditional differences and aggravated by the relative backwardness of the Muslims.

Superficially speaking, Hindu-Muslim nationalism seemed to have considerable cultural expression particularly since the Khilafat days. Attempts were made to integrate Hindus and Muslims on the past cultural heritage of the respective religions. But all this cultural 'flirtation' remained conspicuously strained and artificial for more than one reason. First, at the social level,

the two communities remained as distant and exclusive as ever and, secondly, no religious basis could be found by either community for a real socio-cultural rapprochement. And what is more important, the period under study witnessed religious revivalism especially in the ethical and social spheres with an increasing anti-western attitude.

This particular backward-looking tendency of both communities deserves attention. General social fusion could not take place. There were reciprocal influences and a cultural fusion only. Afterwards, the Hindus — and later the Muslims — in order to reaffirm their religion and their culture, in the face of the Christian and western challenge, had to resort to their past glories and reform religion through revivalism. The appeals, on the one hand to the *Upanishads*, the *Vedas* or the *Gita*, and on the other, to the Koran and the early history of Islam, estranged the two communities. Further, the developing transition to a democratic ideology was left entirely in the hands of the middle classes, where rivalry developed for employment.

Lastly, there was the social heterogeneity of the two communities. The symbiosis of the two communities at social levels, particularly in the villages, would seem to show that the lower ranks lived in much closer relationship with their Hindu neighbours until the riots broke out in 1946. It is a common saying that in the villages they lived so peacefully that they seemed related to each other by family ties. Looking back, one could presume that following the Muslim conquest, the two communities had been drawn together pragmatically. In relation to their respective values, this is illustrated by the Muslims leaving the infidels to live their lives and even abolishing, from Akbar to Aurangzeb, the capitulation tax on them, — and by the Hindus accepting in fact that their rulers could not be transformed by Hinduism's influence. It follows that this coexistence had produced no general ideological synthesis. Whatever may be the truth about Akbar's moves in this direction only partial synthesis occurred (Kabir, Nanak, etc.). Further, we know that people who lived together for centuries do not really constitute a society if their values have not fused. Coexistence may be empirically accepted without being rationally legitimized, while much time is needed to rebuild new habits in individual life and traditions in social life to replace those which are breaking down. The

psychological difficulty consists in making the corresponding change in subjective values deeply embedded in customs, and institutions.

Hence the most serious aspect of revivalism in India in the nineteenth century was its conscious bifurcation. As a matter of fact Hindus and Muslims went back a thousand years to divergent traditions and therefore, further away from one another in social spheres of life. Hindus and Muslims began to give up many practices they had imbibed from one another and which formed bridges between the two communities.

In the sphere of education, the anti-British and Khilafat nationalist period saw the foundation of yet another university, the Jamia Miliya Islamiya in Delhi (1920). It was indeed a new educative venture to fuse three ideals into a unity — Western education, Islam and Indian nationalism. It still continues to exist, having earned the full status of a university under the Union Government. Its importance lay in the fact that it set out to produce a new type of educated Indian Muslim for the emergent India. It remains to be seen whether it has so far made any outstanding contribution to Indian Islam.

There are other issues leading to the Hindu-Muslim problem. It needs to be recalled regarding the general picture that the Congress appears essentially as a purely national movement. In the history of the Congress the dominant tendency was to refuse to take into consideration on the political level the religious distinctions found in Indian society. Pragmatically, the only way for the Congress to appear more realistic would have been to recognize the actual cleavages in the country, and not to pretend to a monopoly, as a purely national organization.

As to the practical limitation under which the Congress had to work from the beginning it is enough to show that except for one or two solitary figures, the founders of the Congress were all non-Muslims. Militant nationalism appeared to be based upon aggressive Hinduism. The extremist party was born and developed as a Hindu party. It was obviously actuated by Hindu religion; its ideology was derived from some aspects of Hindu philosophy. The Muslims with their fierce fanaticism could not be expected to feel themselves an equal part of one Indian society welded together by religious consciousness, and cultural traditions. On account of a superior education the Hindu intellectuals responded

more readily to those progressive political and social thoughts which gave birth to modern nationalism and the eventual foundation of the Congress. When the Western educated Hindu intellectuals began the agitation for representative Government, the Muslims were suspicious of them.

From the standpoint of Hindu-Muslim relations, the psychological tendencies were making for adjustment in some respects and maladjustment in a few particulars. The hold on principles served to counteract many fissiparous tendencies and to secure approximation between lines of cultural development. On the other hand, a tendency to obstruction had sometimes rendered compromise difficult; for example, negotiations between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League sometimes did not begin or else would breakdown. On one side there was the insistence by the Muslim League on the right to speak for all Muslims, and on the other the sturdy refusal by a largely Hindu Congress seeking national unity, to such a demand. It is not the merit of the demand or the refusal that calls for attention but the religious background. The exclusively Congress governments (1937) resting on the support of predominantly Hindu majorities, led to Muslim consternation at the possibilities of being under represented. Reference may be made to the *Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the All-India Muslim League to go into Muslim grievances in Congress Provinces*. This report (1938), was known as the *Pirpur Report* after the Chairman of the Committee, Raja Mohammad Mahdi of Pirpur, a descendant of the Mughal aristocracy in the United Provinces.

Another such indictment was the *Report of the Enquiry Committee appointed by the Working Committee of the Bihar Provincial Muslim League to enquire into some grievances of Muslims in Bihar* (1939).

A more significant non-political document, the *Report of the Kamal Yar Jung Education Committee*, appointed by the All-India Muslim Educational Conference at the end of 1939, was published in 1942, giving a sombre picture of Muslim education in all its branches.

Immediately, the League was put on its mettle and accepted what seemed to it an insolent challenge of power. A few bye-elections in the United Provinces and elsewhere soon demonstrated that the Muslim mass contact programme was still-born.

The fact that the oppressions and atrocities charged against Congress governments had never occurred and that the designs attributed to the Congress cabinets of suppressing Muslim culture had never crossed their imagination served to highlight the extent of resentment. What is of supreme importance is that the Muslim League sought to organise the Muslims solidly under one banner; in other words, it wanted to be the sole representative of Muslims and, as a logical corollary, equated the Indian National Congress with a Hindu organisation. And it demanded a veto on constitutional advance and, pending a satisfactory settlement, sought to immobilize the Indian national movement.

So far we have discussed the politics and divergent reactions that prompted the people of India in general and that of Bengal in particular, when Hindus and Muslims decided on their different lines of action.

The subsequent tale of horrifying misunderstanding that swept over the whole country, is too well-known a tragedy to need mention within the compass of the present study. That requires a separate full-length consideration. This may be called the 'last phase' leading to the transfer of power in India. The 'last phase', however, shall be considered in the concluding words in its bare outlines. The Cripps offer of 1942 was turned down, because India did not want to wait for independence till the end of the war. At the end of the war Lord Wavell tried to bring the two contending parties, the Congress and the League, together into a coalition government, but failed as there was no agreement. The Cabinet Mission of 1946 offered to put into operation any agreed plan for the formation of a Constituent Assembly, to frame the pattern of the future and to form an immediate interim Government representing all parties, but there was no agreement, and the Mission itself put forward a plan. After long negotiations only a part of the plan was put into operation. The Muslims remained out. Tension grew during the months that followed, and in February of 1947 the British Government announced that whether agreement was reached or not transfer would take place not later than June of that year. But by that time the two communities were moving towards separation.

In May 1947 Lord Mountbatten went to England to consult the British Cabinet. At that time relations between Hindus and Muslims had almost reached breaking-point. There was at the

Centre a joint cabinet in name only, and throughout India the communal tension had hardened to the point of despair. On his return Lord Mountbatten propounded a new plan, which was, that, that in default of agreement to preserve a united India, the country should be divided and two independent Dominions should come into being at the earliest possible moment. Both sides agreed to this at a historic meeting, and the date agreed upon was August 15.

APPENDICES

INTRODUCTION

The Indian Association Rooms,
34, College Street, Calcutta
The 5th December, 1885

My dear Sir,

There is to be a national Conference at Calcutta on the occasion of the Christmas Vacation (December 25th, 26th and 27th), I enclose a programme of the Conference and respectfully solicit your presence and that of your friends. No assembly of national delegates would be complete, without your presence; and your views upon the important questions that will be discussed would be most welcome. I do hope you will make it convenient to make or at any rate depute some one who may speak in your name. There will probably be a Parliamentary enquiry next year. We should set our own house in order and decide upon a common programme of political action by the mutual exchange of our views.

Hoping you are quite well.

I remain,
Yours V. Sincerely,
SURENDRA NATH BANERJEA

THE HON. SYED AHMAD KHAN BAHADUR, C.S.I.

Written to Syed Ahmad
Private & Confidential

6, Park Street,
3-3-87

My dear old friend,

I do want to have one real good talk with you—indirectly, through the indiscretion & unwisdom of your Lt., or representatives, you have, I honestly believe (I think I can show you that this is the case) been injuring not only the causes of the country but even, of your own people. Now, if my lifelong knowledge does not go for nothing you would rather cut off your hand than do either.

I think now that I understand a little your views and position and have an idea that most of what I have had to grieve over has been done to the miscomprehension of men of less grasp of mind than yourself who thinking to give effect to your views really distorted these.

Now when can we meet and talk the whole question over alone—I trust in confidence—it being understood that what passes between us shall go no further—I mean at any rate not unless you wish it.

Pray let us meet—you owe it to me—for I have been ceaselessly pouring oil on the troubled waters—and so far as I have been able to prevent it no unkind word has been said in the Press against you—the people have been furious believing you on the faith of what was told them to be the prime mover in all they have offence at—whereas I knew that the idea may have been yours. The offence has been caused by the floundering of subordinates in carrying it out—I do think between us we could allay feelings that if allowed to grow on will cause thousands of lives yet and involve tens of thousands of both races in unmerited trouble. For all this, as you and I both believe, all however indirectly responsible will have to answer before the throne of the Almighty—are we not bound to try and make peace? I have trusted you all my life. I trust you now. Let us see if together we cannot smooth away the growing antagonisms.

Yours very sincerely.
A. O. HUME

Bengal Times Office,
Dacca, 24th Sept. 1888

The Hon. Sir Seyed Ahmed Khan, K.C.S.I.,
Allyghur

Dear Sir,

It is proposed to hold a public meeting of Muhammadans on Sunday next at the Northbrook Hall if practicable; when resolutions will very likely be passed to propose affiliation to the National Patriotic Assocn. As an old and staunch friend of Muhammadan interests, I deem it right to inform you of this. It would be an encouragement if you wire approval as there is no time for a reply and I could not wire earlier as no day had been fixed. With best wishes.

Yours truly,
E. C. KEMP

P. S. I sent you a copy of my paper of the 19th.
Pray pardon a slip in omitting the prefix, Hon'ble.
I was much troubled and worried.

3, Royshaheb's Bazar,
DACCA,
the 27th Oct. '88

Sir,

I believe you have already heard of the Anti-Congress Movement that has been going on in Dacca since Sept. last. We shall, by the grace of God, hold a public meeting of the Mds. on the 11th Proximo to denounce the Congress agitation and express our sympathy with the aims and objects of the Patriotic Assocn. I shall be greatly obliged if you would kindly send, at your earliest convenience, a few copies of the lectures that have been delivered by you and others against the Congress Movement and also all the papers connected with the Patriotic Assocn.

The pamphlets and papers may be sent either to the undersigned or to Khajah Mahammad Yusuff Sahib, President of the Anti-Congress Movement Committee, Ahsan Manjil, Dacca.

Yours truly,
(Illegible) Hemazaluddin.
Member, Sub-Committee,
Anti-Congress Movement,
DACCA

No. 102

From: Moulvi Hamiduddin Ahmad
Hony: Secretary, National Cent. Mohdm. Assen.
Mymensingh Branch.

To: Sir Syed A. K., K.C.S.I.,
Nainital

Dated Mymensingh
the 31st Oct. '88

Dear Sir,

Perhaps you have learnt already that we were compelled to postpone the intended meeting at Dacca. The reason was simply this that after I had left the place Babu Surendra Nath Banerjee came there and that strong headed advocate of the Congress, the President of the so-called Anjuman-i-Islamia of Dacca of whom I spoke much in my last, like a man void of all sense of honour shamelessly threw away his mask, and against all his big promises and solemn assurances again joined the Baboos and allowed himself to be elected a delegate and threw me in a very awkward position. He presided in a meeting in which Mr. Banerjee made a vehement speech. But your letter which I thoroughly explained to the Dacca Mohammedans was fresh in their memory they violently opposed the speaker. This discouraged the Babu so much that he thought it advisable to change his programme. Without any attempt to come here as was pre-arranged he returned to Calcutta. However Syed Abdul Bari's treachery has provoked the whole community. He has already lost the sympathy of his friends and followers. He stands alone but to make up the loss he was trying to come here to entice away some fools but I got timely information and he is baffled in his attempt. He is against the Nawab of Dacca and is trying to gain notoriety by joining the Hindus. Though he has none of the qualifications of Bhimjee yet he aspires to soar like that notorious merchant. The friends of the Congress have made much out of Abdul Bari's

disgraceful conduct. To counteract this we intend to hold a grand meeting on the 11th November, 88 at the Nawab's palace in which we of East Bengal and all the associations of this quarter. . . . The meeting will be held chiefly on the basis of your note and the prospectus of the Patriotic Association so although it is too far yet it is desirable that the Patriotic Association should send some one to explain fully your views to that meeting. That will add great weight — If it be not convenient you may at least empower me or any other gentleman to do the task. At the same time I shall feel much obliged if you send me a copy of your first speech against the Congress or any other paper which may assist me in explaining your views.

I send you a printed Urdu letter which itself will prove how far I am successful at Dacca notwithstanding that Syed Abdul Bari has deceived me.

An early reply will highly oblige.

Yours faithfully,
H. AHMED
Hon. Secretary

Calcutta
16, Taltollah
30 November 1888

Dear Sir,

I am desired by the Committee of the Mohamedan Literary Society of Calcutta to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, inviting the society to join the Indian United Patriotic Association and in reply to observe that the Mahomedan L. S. of Calcutta, have, as you are no doubt aware, already declined to join the National Congress, both in 1886, when the Congress held its sitting in Calcutta, and in 1887 when it met at Madras.

The M. L. S. have therefore the fullest sympathy with the efforts of the U.P.A. to counteract the objects and influence of the Congress and its agitation here and in England.

To
The Hon'ble
Sir S. A. Khan Bahadur, K.C.S.I.,
Hony. Secy. to the Indian U.P.A.

I am,
Dear Sir,
Yours very sincerely,
ABDOOL LATEEF,
Secy. to the M.L.S. of Calcutta.

Krishnagar,
Bengal

Dated the 11th Dec. 88

Much respected & most honoured Sir,

We the poor Mohamedans of this town and its suburbs beg most respectfully to inform your honour that we have formed an anti-Congress Party in which almost all the Md. gentlemen of this Dist. are represented. The resolutions passed by the meeting have been reported in the *Englishman* of the 4th Dec. 1888. Now we hope that our proceedings might meet with your honour's approval and sympathy, so that we might be encouraged in our work.

We are dogged with these big-bellied Congress-wala baboos who are trying to entice some Mds. of this place in which they would never be able to succeed. The Mds. are as firm as rocks.

In conclusion we beg that if your honour would be kind enough to invite our Association with your far famed Indian Patriotic Association then we should be much obliged. We therefore most respectfully pray that your honour would be kind enough to send down a copy of the rules and regulations of your Assocn.

I have the honour to be
Sir,

Your most obedient servant

SYED JAJUMAL ALI

Asst. Secy. N.

The Mdn. Assocn., Krishnagar

M.A.O. College,
Aligarh,
March 30, 1890

My dear Sahib,

Upto date we have received 1,516 signatures to the petition,
as below:—

| | |
|---------------------------|-----|
| Sent off last week— | 838 |
| From Moradabad— | 86 |
| From Md. Ismail Khan— | 50 |
| From Jabalpur— | 22 |
| From Meerut | 87 |
| From Chaudhury Nasrat Ali | 309 |
| From Md. Sulaiman— | 124 |
| <hr/> | |
| 1,516 | |

I opened the envelope of Chaudhury Ali and took out the signatures. I forward you the letter accompanying them.

I am pretty cheerful since this last batch came in. At the same time there is need of very active work. Have you seen the *Advocate*? It prints the petition and makes some remarks about it. It is evidently in some alarm about your movement. "Sir Syed Ahmad is up and at work", it says. Further on it says that the Congress-walas must get up a counter-petition of Mahomadans in favour of the Congress and get it signed by thousands of Mahomadans. No doubt they will try to do so. We must be very certain therefore to have a very much larger number of signatures on our petition than they have on theirs. I am writing to everybody I can think of. Don't you think it would be well to get 500 more copies of the Urdu petition printed? I think we might send our Petition now to the *Pioneer*. If you could make a few remarks about it at the same time it might be a good thing. Have you seen that Mr. Bradlaugh has written an Article to an English magazine in which he has tried to prove that the

Mahomadans are in favour of the Congress? I think it very necessary for us to prove to the people of England in the most unmistakable way that the Mahomadans are opposed to it. Evidently Mr. Bradlaugh and the other English supporters of the Congress think it to be a matter of the greatest importance what the opinions of Mahomadans are on the matter. They will put their case very much weakened if it is proved that the Mahomadans are opposed to their proposal.

I intend, as I suggested to you, to insert a notice in Tuesday's number of the *Institute Gazette* stating the progress the petition has hitherto made. I think it will encourage our supporters, who will otherwise work in the dark not knowing what has been already done.

My love to Mahmood and yourself.

Yours affectionately,
THEODORE BECK

SEAL

Hugli Emambarah
Hooghly,
7 April '90

My dear Sir,

I have got just your circular through the Hon. Sayid Amir Hossain, C.I.E. of Calcutta and should try my best to have the signatures of the leading Mohammedans of my Assocn. Please let me know whether our appeal against the prayer of the Congress will have to produce any effect beneficial to the Mohammedan interests before Parliament.

On my part I am rather doubtful as the cry for reformation and reorganisation is rapidly gaining ground under the patronage of Mr. Bradlaugh and other well known M.Ps. in England.

Hoping you are quite well.

I remain,

Yours very sincerely,

SAYID ASHRAFUDDIN AHMAD
Secy. to the Hooghly Dist.
National Mohammedan Assocn.

No. 3.

From The Secy. of the Branch
National Mahomedan Assocn.,
Jehanabad

To

The Hon: Syed A. Khan Bahadur,
K.C.S.I. of Aligarh.

Honoured Sir,

I most respectfully beg to leave to represent that I have been directed by the Hony. Syed Ameer Hossain. C.I.E. the Hony. Secy. of the Central N.M.A., Calcutta, to have signed by as many Mahomedans in my sub-Dist., the memorial to parliament on the subject of the Bill, now pending before the Parliament for the extension of Legislative Councils, and to forward the same to your honour.

So I beg to inform, that the forms of the said memorial having been signed, forwarded to your honour herewith in a separate packet, per post.

I hope your honour will be kind enough to let me know the arrival of that.

Dated 20th of May 1890.
Russulpoor, Via Sha. . .
Post in Dist. Hugli.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
GHOLAM HOSSAIN CHAUDHURY,
Secy. of the N.M.A.
Jehanabad in Dist. of Hugli

CHAPTER I

"Papers Relating to the Reconstitution of the Provinces of Bengal and Assam", Government of India, 1906.

Annexure 1

Letter dated Gouripur, the 15th February 1904; from Raja Prabhat Chandra Barua, President, Assam Association, Gouripur.

With reference to your letter No. 32. For.-62-74-P., dated Shillong, the 8th January 1904, asking me to offer my suggestion and comments as President of the Assam Association from the Assam point of view on the subject of the proposed extension of the territorial jurisdiction of Assam, I beg to submit herewith the full proceedings of the meeting held on the 14th February 1904, at Gouripur, for your kind perusal and information.

I beg to add here also that the resolutions I submit herewith are in conformity with those of its Branch Associations at different places of Assam, which had been invited to submit their opinion.

Annexure 2

Proceedings of the meeting of the Assam Association held on the 14th February 1904.

A public meeting of the Assam Association was held this evening, the 14th February 1904, to discuss and consider on the subject of the desirability or otherwise of the expansion of the territorial jurisdiction of Assam by incorporating with her certain

districts of East Bengal as proposed by the Government of India, whereon the President of the said Association was asked by the Chief Commissioner of Assam, in his letter No. 32. For.-62-74-P., dated the 8th January 1904, to submit his opinion from the Assam point of view. The meeting was thoroughly represented by all sections and classes of people, among whom the following gentlemen of note were present:

- Srijut Raja Prabhat Chandra Barua, of Gouripur, President.
- " Abhaya Nath Chakarbutty, Assistant Secretary.
- " Amrita Bhosan Adhikery, Joint Secretary.
- Babu Dijesh Chandra Chakrabutty, M.A., B.L.
- " Jogendra Nath Dutta, B.A.
- " Tarini Sankar Majumdar, B.A.
- " Ishan Chandra Roy.
- " Damodar Dutta Choudhury.
- " Har Kumar Gupta.
- " Satish Chandra Barua
- " Purna Narain Barua.
- " Rudra Kanta Barua.
- " Jadab Chandra Chakarbutty.
- " Nityananda Mojumdar.
- Munshi Ayenal Hawk Ahammad.
- " Abdul Gani Ahammad.

The President on opening the meeting asked the Secretary to read out the Proceedings of the last meeting, which having been read out by *Srijut Amrita Bhosan Adhikery*, Joint Secretary, Mr. Risley's letter was placed for the public discussion. Srijut Abhaya Nath Chakarbutty, Assistant Secretary, read out the letter and explained its objects very concisely both in English and Bengali, after which an elaborate discussion followed regarding the advantages and disadvantages to Assam of the proposed territorial changes from Assam point of view. The resolutions of the meetings of the several Branch Associations held at different places, viz., (1) Goalpara, (2) Barpeta, (3) Gauhati, (4) Tezpur, (5) Nowgong, (6) Golaghat, (7) Dibrugarh, were also read before the meeting. And with reference to, and in conformity with, the majority of these resolutions, the following resolutions were unanimously adopted:

RESOLUTIONS

(1) That the Association is of opinion that, even in the event of the proposed changes taking place, the new province thus constituted *cannot have a self-contained Civil Service* which will attract its members and that the Association is at one with the arguments advanced by *Sir Henry Cotton, the late Chief Commissioner of Assam, in his official minute of the year 1897 on the subject of annexation of Chittagong Division to Assam.*

(2) That the Divisions of Chittagong need not be added to Assam to give the province a port, inasmuch as the improved means of communication between Assam and Chittagong is offering her the same advantages whether Chittagong is within the province or not.

(3) That the meeting is of opinion that the Bengal form of administration is too highly developed, too impersonal for such a backward province as Assam, and it apprehends that the cause of Assam and the interest of her people will greatly suffer if the highly-advanced districts of Dacca and Mymensingh be annexed at present to her territorial jurisdiction when her people have not attained to such a position as to stand without the protection, special privileges, and parental care of the Government.

(4) That the meeting apprehends that by the proposed territorial change the *historic name of Assam will be obliterated for ever*, her language suffer, and the removal of the seat of Government to a place outside Assam proper and further away from the geographical centre will necessarily make her lose the amount of care and attention which it at present receives from the Government.

Amongst the Branch Associations, *the Dibrugarh Branch* suggested that Chittagong may be added to the advantage of Assam, and in the meeting of Gouripur it was suggested that, if territorial redistribution is necessary at all for the efficient form of government in Assam and to lighten the excessive burden of Bengal Government it may be better effected by annexing Rangpur, Kuch Behar, Jalpaiguri, and some parts of Bogra district to Assam, as the inhabitants of those places are identical in race, religion, and language with those of Lower Assam, which is contiguous to them.

With regard to the latter, it was resolved that the above two suggestions be circulated to all the District Associations for their opinion, and that the matter may be brought forward in a meeting, the date of which to be fixed later on, after the replies from the branches received.

Annexure 7

From Babu Sita Nath Roy, Honorary Secretary, Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, dated Calcutta, the 3rd February 1904.

Adverting to the letter addressed by the Government of Bengal, formulating a proposal for curtailing the territorial jurisdiction of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, by transferring portions of it to adjacent provinces, I, on behalf of the Committee of the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, beg to offer their respectful protest against that portion of the scheme which advocates *the severance from Bengal of two of the most flourishing, cultured and progressive districts, namely, Dacca and Mymensingh, and of the Chittagong Division as a whole, and their enforced annexation to a backward province like Assam*, and to submit the following observations in support of their protest.

Before going into details and trying to meet the various arguments in favour of the scheme, the Committee beg leave to observe that the mere formulation of a proposal of the kind has been enough to startle the whole of Bengal and to create feelings of profound alarm and dismay among all classes of the people and a sense of despair at the helplessness of their situation, and the Committee therefore earnestly and respectfully pray that before arriving at a final determination of the question raised, both His Excellency the Viceroy and His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will be graciously pleased to consider the view of the various public bodies in the metropolis and in East Bengal, and to give due weight to the feelings of the various classes affected by the proposed transfer.

The principal object aimed at in proposing the transfer of an area *comprising a population of eleven millions is said to be to lighten the excessive burden now imposed upon the Government of Bengal by increase in population*, the expansion of commercial and industrial enterprise and the growing complexity of all branches of the administration. The remedy suggested is, however, in the nature of a mere makeshift; for as the *population in Bengal seems to increase by about 10 per cent., every 10 to 12 years*,

and as the resources of the country are being opened out more and more every day, and as railways are rapidly extending into the interior, it is possible, by the time the next census is taken, the contracted province in spite of the transfer will have resumed largely its numerical strength, and the commercial and industrial enterprise instead of contracting will expand all the more, with the result that all branches of the administration will become all the more complex, and the Committee apprehend that the same difficulty will have to be confronted and the Government will again have to look out for some relief for the head of the local Government to further dismember Bengal and to sever and transfer the Rajshahi division (including Malda and Gour, once the seat of the old Hindu Kings) and annex it to Assam. If relief is to be given in this way, there is no knowing how often this Presidency will have to be dismembered and where the line has to be drawn.

Adverting to the alleged difficulty of governing outlying districts, *such as Orissa, Dacca, Chittagong and Ranchi, from such a distant centre as Calcutta*, and the consequent mishaps said to have followed and as likely to follow, pointed allusion has been made in *Mr. Risley's letter to the memorable Orissa Famine of 1866*. With reference to the above the Committee beg leave to observe that the condition of things has within the last thirty-eight years been altogether changed and the so-called outlying parts, such as Cuttack, Chittagong and Dacca, have, by the establishment of railway and steamer communications, been brought into close contact with, and made easily accessible from, Calcutta, the seat of Government; *the town of Dacca being now only 14 hours' journey and the western part of the district only 6 hours' journey from it, while Chittagong and Cuttack are 24 hours and 10 hours distant respectively*. These distances are certainly not greater than the distances which separated Khulna, Jessore, Krishnagar, Murshidabad, and even Midnapore and Hooghly from Calcutta before the opening of railways; and even now such favoured districts (especially in portions unconnected by rail) as Nadia, Murshidabad, Rajshahi and Malda, are at a much greater distance than the western part of the district of Dacca.

The Committee apprehend that the difficulty and the evils complained of as due to the administration of the outlying districts like Dacca and Chittagong from Calcutta instead of being removed

will be aggravated by annexing Dacca, Mymensingh and Chittagong to Assam, the seat of Government of which during the greater portion of the year is at Shillong, for the journey from the above districts to Shillong cannot be performed under six days, involving considerable hardship and expense.

It is said that on account of the vast size of the territory under his administration the Lieutenant-Governor is unable to pay more than a single hurried visit to such important places as Dacca, Chittagong, Cuttack and Ranchi within the five years of his administration, and that he is able to visit only a portion of his vast charge. But so far as Dacca and Chittagong are concerned their respective distances having been considerably abridged by the opening of railway and steamer communications, they have been fortunate enough in receiving two or three visits from every Lieutenant-Governor.

With reference to the statements "There is reason to believe there is no portion of Bengal regrettable.

* * * * *

"It would be local administration".

With reference to the social and religious aspects of the question, the Committee beg to state that they have already shown that Bikrampur in Dacca was and is still the home of all Kulin Brahmins and Kayasthas and that every Kulin Brahmin in Bengal traces his descent to some one in Bikrampur, and that Dacca and Mymensingh have always been the principal seats of Sanskrit learning, and that there are in the Dacca and Chittagong Divisions not less than 800 indigenous Sanskrit *tois* kept and maintained by pandits without any aid from Government for teaching Philosophy, Literature, Grammar, Smritis where students are taught, boarded and lodged at the expense of the teachers. It is therefore that the pundits of East Bengal, equally with those of Nabadwip in the district of Nadia exercise a predominating influence in all matters concerning religion and society, that is, in regulating all religious rites and ceremonies and all social rites and usages. From time immemorial the various classes of the Hindus in Bengal proper have always been governed by the same customs and usages, the same rites and ceremonies, the same rules, both written and unwritten, in all social and religious matters, and there have

always been free intercourse and free intermarriages (subject to some exceptions which are being daily removed) between the several parts of Bengal proper. But though marriages are allowed among the different sections of the same caste inhabiting different parts of Bengal proper, such marriages, specially among Kulin Brahmins, must not be promiscuous, but be confined to the clans to which the parties belong, and as such Kulin Brahmins often experience great difficulty in marrying their children. Though marriages among the different sections of the same caste are allowed, such marriages should on no account be outside the respective limits of the different provinces; for instance, though there are higher classes of Brahmins, Baidyas, Kayasthas, and Nabashakhs in different provinces, such as Bengal proper, Orissa and Behar, marriages are absolutely unknown among people of the same caste inhabiting different provinces. A marriage between a Orissa or Behar Brahmin or Kayastha boy and a Bengal Brahmin or Kayastha girl can never take place. Though these Brahmins and Kayasthas now residing in different provinces trace their descent to the same ancestors respectively, on account of their residing in different provinces, social relations between people of the same caste are now out of the question; even a Bengali or Orissa Brahmin would not take food cooked by a Behari or United Provinces Brahmin. So the Committee apprehend, and it is the most serious of many evils that would follow, that in the case of the inhabitants of East Bengal being severed from their brethren in Bengal and annexed to Assam, the former would within measurable distance of time be denationalised; they would not only be looked down upon as inferior but ignored altogether, with the result that a few years hence all intercourse and marriages would be absolutely prohibited and Hindus in Eastern Bengal find insuperable difficulty in marrying their children, as the area of their selection will be very much narrowed and circumscribed. From the above it will be abundantly clear that the question of separation is not a question of sentiment alone, but it is a question that will vitally affect the Eastern districts socially.

Annexure 10

From Nawab Syed Ameer Hussain, C.I.E., Honorary Secretary, Central National Muhammadan Association, Calcutta, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, dated Calcutta, 17th February 1904.

In reply to your letter No. 437-J., Judicial Department, dated the 16th January 1904, inviting an expression of opinion from the Central National Muhammadan Association on the proposed transfer of some of the Bengal Districts to Assam, I beg, by the direction of the Committee of the Association, to state that in their opinion a readjustment of the territorial limits of Bengal, either on the smaller or the larger scale suggested in the letter, is neither necessary nor desirable.

As to the proposed transfer of Chittagong Division alone, it appears to the Committee that the main object with which the proposal is put forward will not obviously be attained by it. To take away from the Administration of Bengal a population of 4,911,056, and at the same time to give it to an accession of territory with a population of 4,469,635, would afford no real relief to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and, having regard to the strong reluctance of the people of the Chittagong Division to be placed under the Assam Administration, is not worth attempting. My Committee are of opinion that no portion of the Bengali-speaking race should be separated from Bengal without the clearest necessity for such separation, and they think, in the present case, such necessity does not exist. The principle here advocated is recognised in Mr. Risley's letter, as the proposal for the transfer of certain tracts from *Chotta Nagpur* and *Madras* to *Bengal*, is almost exclusively based on the advantage of uniting the whole of the Uriya-speaking people under one Administration. It appears to my Committee that if Bengal requires relief, that may be afforded to it by the transfer of the whole of Orissa to the Central Provinces, and as pointed out in Mr. Risley's letter, its past history, its language, its traditions, and the nature of its revenue settlement all connect it more intimately with that province. One of the arguments for not transferring Orissa from

Bengal, as stated in Mr. Risley's letter, is that *the prescription of a century is difficult to break*, and I beg to point out that it is still more difficult *to break the prescription of many centuries*. As to the difficulty to communication with the Central Provinces, it may be confidently expected that this difficulty will, in course of time, disappear.

By the severance of the whole of Orissa and a portion of Chotta Nagpur from Bengal leaving things as they are in all other respects, the latter province will obtain all the relief it is proposed to be given to it *by the combined transfers of the Chittagong Division, and the districts of Dacca and Mymensingh to Assam*. As has been pointed out by Mr. Risley in his letter, the net result of the suggestions contained therein, is to reduce the population of Bengal by 10,992,926, and almost the same result is obtained by merely severing Orissa and portions of Chota Nagpur from Bengal. Judged by the standard of education, civilization, language, habits, past traditions, nature of revenue settlement, and a hundred other matters more or less important, *the people of Dacca, Mymensingh, Tippera, Noakhali, and Chittagong have infinitely more in common with Bengal than Orissa and Chotta Nagpur*, and it appears to my Committee that if relief be indeed needed, it ought to be in directions other than those indicated in Mr. Risley's letter.

The Committee of the National Muhammadan Association, which has its branches all over Bengal, are not, however, in favour of any change in the territorial limits of that province at all. The facilities of communication that are developing year after year, are bringing the outlying portions of the province in closer touch with those charged with its administration, and it appears to us that the task of government is daily becoming more easy than difficult. If, however, it be considered necessary for efficient administration to divide the responsibility that now rests on the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal alone, my Committee are of opinion that the better course would be to turn Bengal into a Governorship with an Executive Council like that in Madras and Bombay. This will be a step forward, whereas the change proposed is undoubtedly a backward move.

The people of the Chittagong Division, of Dacca, and Mymensingh, have hitherto looked to Calcutta for inspiration and guidance. The best Colleges and the best Madrasas are in Calcutta, and students from those quarters are flowing here in daily

increasing numbers. Their connection with Calcutta has therefore been very intimate. These may be mere matters of sentiment, but in the consideration of the present question, even mere sentiment should not be ignored, but should be allowed its full legitimate weight. Besides the administration of Bengal is carried on more enlightened principles than that of Assam, the former being adapted to the higher education and civilization of the people under its care. A scheme to bring under the same laws and govern on the same lines a people who have taken the fullest advantage of the benefits of the British rule and who have reached a high level of civilization under its fostering care, and another just emerging from a state of primitive culture, is one of great difficulty and distinctly to the disadvantage of the former. That the people of Bengal should object to be placed under the Government of Assam, is most natural. A vigilant press, a strong public opinion, a local Council, for making laws, with a number of non-official members, partly elected, to represent the various interests of the province, the right of interpellation so useful in bringing about a better understanding between the rulers and the ruled, a Board of Revenue presided over by two senior members of the Civil Service thoroughly familiar with the most intricate revenue problems, are assets that no people will willingly part with. Government is fully aware of the feeling that the proposal has evoked in the affected districts, and it seems to my Committee that, even assuming the existence of certain administrative conveniences, they are far outweighed by more important considerations to the contrary. As regards the assurance that the jurisdiction of the High Court will remain unaffected, it seems to my Committee that in the natural course of things, this assurance cannot hold good for many years, and that a severance being once effected, the establishment of some Court inferior to the High Court, for the judicial administration of the larger Assam, would only be a question of time. Finally my Committee beg to suggest that should the Government be determined upon making the proposed transfer, a determination that my Committee will very much deplore, the least it can do to compensate the people for their losses, is to found a Lieutenant-Governorship for the reconstituted province of Assam, with a Council similar in constitution with that in Bengal, and a Board of Revenue charged with the Revenue Administration of the province.

Annexure 14

From Anwar Ali Khan, President of a public meeting of the people of Chittagong, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, dated Chittagong, the 3rd February 1904

I have the honour to submit herewith a copy of the memorial of the residents of Chittagong assembled at a public meeting held on the 17th day of January 1904 that has been submitted to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council, and to request that you will be pleased to lay it before His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal for His Honour's favourable and generous consideration.

Annexure 15

To His Excellency George Nathaniel Baron Curzon of Kedleston, P.C., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., Viceroy and Governor-General of India. The humble memorial of the residents of Chittagong assembled at a public meeting held on the 17th day of January 1904

Most respectfully Sheweth—

The proposal to partition Bengal and to form a new administration composed of the Chittagong Division, the districts of Dacca and Mymensingh, and the present Provinces of Assam has caused much consternation in the minds of the people. The people of Chittagong therefore most humbly approach Your Excellency in Council to submit an expression of their views and feelings on the matter of the proposed changes and to pray that Your Excellency's Government will be graciously pleased to take this representation into their generous consideration and adopt such measures as would allay the apprehensions and anxieties of the people.

The principal ground in favour of the proposed change is based upon the statement that the present charge of the Lieutenant-

Governor of Bengal is too big for one ruler to manage; and as transference of territory alone can afford a relief, Chittagong and the other districts should be separated from Bengal. The necessity of partition of Bengal is further emphasized in paragraph 23 of Mr. Risley's letter of the 3rd December last on the ground of the union of Uriya-speaking people under Bengal. Your humble memorialists without entering into a discussion as to the existence of such necessity would respectfully point out that such an object could be attained by separating the Orissa Division and annexing it either with Madras or the Central Provinces, as the people of Orissa themselves voluntarily proposed such an alternative. But the best scheme to afford relief to the over-taxed administration of Bengal would be to have an organic change in the constitution by giving to it a Governor with an Executive Council.

Your memorialists would crave leave to state that the arguments urged in Mr. Risley's letter in favour of the retention of Orissa with the Government of Bengal appear to apply with the greater force in favour of the retention of Chittagong and the other districts with Bengal proper. If it is difficult to break the prescription of a century in the case of Orissa, stronger should be the difficulty to break the prescription of a century and a half in the case of Chittagong. It is one of the three districts ceded to the East India Company on the 27th September 1760. On November 8th, 1760, Mr. Verelst was appointed Chief of Chittagong and together with a Council managed the Company's affairs on the spot and Chittagong soon settled down into a well regulated English province. Furthermore, in dealing with the claims of Orissa, Mr. Risley gives prominence to the question of race and language — considerations which are ignored in the case of Bengal districts. The possible advantages by the proposed change do not appear to be of such character and quantity as to reconcile the people to the sacrifice of their sentiments and old ties.

The port of Chittagong furnishes a chief argument for the justification of the scheme of partition. No doubt, the importance and necessity of a flourishing port would be quite a justifiable plea, if it were proved beyond question, from a statement of facts and figures, that the port of Chittagong could not become a flourishing port but for its separation from the Government of Bengal. On the other hand, with gradual completion of the Assam-Bengal

Railway line, the port of Chittagong has been gradually attracting larger amount of traffic. Owing to its natural situation and connection, it is sure to draw towards it larger business in the usual course of time, irrespective of its subordination to a particular government. It is respectfully submitted that there are other local Governments under Your Excellency's rule which maintain more than one flourishing port; and it is not unlikely that an equally powerful body of merchants and tea-planters may combine to form a Chamber of Commerce or Trades' Association at Chittagong in no distant future to counteract the influence of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. No reasons based upon facts have been assigned to trace the causes as to the hitherto undeveloped condition of the Port of Chittagong under the administration of the Bengal Government, nor it is clear why the Government of Bengal, though dominated by the interests of a great port like Calcutta, could not properly promote the advancement of the port of Chittagong. Chittagong stands a much better chance of development with all the resources of Bengal to back it than under Assam with its straitened finance.

The plea of the inability of the present Government of Bengal to devote due attention to the Chittagong port does not justify a change. The Chittagong Division is smaller than the other revenue Divisions of Bengal, and the Commissioner of Chittagong Division is therefore in a position to devote his particular attention to the improvement of the port at his head-quarters station. The financial difficulties of the Chittagong Port Trust are due not so much to the inattention of the Bengal Government, as to the existing natural conditions of the Port. The trade not having fully developed yet, owing to the incompleteness of the Assam-Bengal Railway, there has not been ere now much business at this port; consequently there was only a small income. While, on the other hand, a large outlay of expenditure was necessary to furnish the port gradually with such improvements and appliances as would be requisitioned in order to meet the demands of increased traffic of a port that has been fast growing in importance. Now that more revenue will be forthcoming with the more expanded business, the Port Trust will not be in a difficulty to furnish funds for the improvement and maintenance of the port. The Divisional Commissioner with the help of the controlling and the guiding supervision of the Government of Bengal will, it is hoped, be quite capable to manage

the affairs of the port very satisfactorily. If from its natural advantages and position, Chittagong has a brilliant future as a seaport town, the interests and valued privileges of its people, they pray, should not be sacrificed for the purpose of artificially maintaining the superiority of its powerful rival, despite the latter's natural short-comings.

Both the local administrations of Bengal and Assam through which passes the Assam-Bengal Railway line are under the control of the Government of India, and as such the local administrations may without conflict or hinderence easily manage the railway line and develop the material resources within their respective territorial limits. Here also no particulars in detail beyond an assertion have been stated so as to justify an inference that the Assam-Bengal Railway line can be successfully managed only by its being placed under one single administration and not otherwise. Other flourishing railway lines extend over the territories of more than one local administration.

The case of the alleged prosperity of Sylhet and Cachar under the Assam administration and other complacent attitude towards it do not establish the futility of the objections against the separation. It has also not been shown that but for their transfer to Assam, Sylhet and Cachar would be far worse off.

Thus the point urged in favour of the partition of Bengal on the ground of the improvement of the port and the Assam-Bengal Railway are not conclusive or convincing for the purpose of advocating the separation of Chittagong and the other districts from Bengal and their amalgamation with Assam as a case of extreme emergency to be countenanced at any sacrifice. A mere possible forecast of a flourishing port and railway line under a new province is not a very cogent plea to deprive the people of their vested rights and privileges and all the advantages of an advanced and well-regulated administration.

Your Excellency's memorialists would now crave leave to discuss the points raised against the change and their disposition by Mr. Risley.

Mr. Risley has not in his letter touched at all the most important question of education. The future progress and civilisation of a people admittedly depends upon the character of the education that they receive. Unless the education is sufficiently high and sound, no people can expect to develop their intellectual powers

and to utilise the material resources for their benefit. Calcutta was the capital of the British Empire in India as well as of Local Government, is the centre of all culture, enlightenment and healthy activity that the West has been able to pour into the East. Consequently education obtained in Calcutta cannot be at all compared with any that may be available elsewhere for its civilising and ennobling results. Moreover, the social and intellectual associations and surroundings and the high ideals of morality and intelligence obtainable in Calcutta exercise such an influence in the formation of character and habits and in the development of the intellectual faculties of the youthful generation as is to be found nowhere else in this part of India. Cut off from such opportunities and advantages, it may be easily imagined how narrow will be the education, really so called, of the youths of the new province.

Moreover, Assam with its comparatively limited financial resources will not be in a position to entertain professors and teachers on the same scale of pay as its neighbouring administration of Bengal. As a matter of course, then, the more brilliant intellects will be drawn to the Bengal Educational service, leaving only the mediocrities for the new province. Then, again, when the first grade colleges would be available within the territorial limits of the new province, the more brilliant students who happen to secure provincial scholarships will not be allowed as a rule to avail of them in Calcutta colleges to receive the sounder education and they will therefore rust and settle down into mediocrities. Even if the scholars of the new provinces are allowed to draw their scholarships while studying in a Calcutta college, there will be difficulties in the way of such scholars. Under the newly-proposed scheme of converting the first grade colleges into residential colleges, the requirements of the newly-formed Bengal Government will be met before scholars from an alien province are admitted, and thus the Assam scholars will have little chance of admission into the Government colleges of Bengal.

It has been stated in reply that there is no fear of the removal of the jurisdiction of the High Court. No doubt, it might remain unaltered as now for the present since the 'Government of India as at present advised, do not see the advantages of the appointment of a Judicial Commissioner' [vide Mr. Risley's letter, paragraph 26(ii)]. The file of the High Court of Calcutta

is already congested, and within a short time it would more likely be considered highly essential to appoint more judges to meet the increased work, or to diminish its jurisdiction. Such a contingency happening, the Government of India, in order to serve the exigencies of the administration, might find it more advantageous to give to the new province an inferior judicial tribunal in the form of the Judicial Commissionership.

As regards the continuity of the existing laws and enactments, it is submitted that the Chief Commissioner, in order to bring into harmony the practices of the administration in the light of its own particular system of policy and administrative convenience, might not unfrequently abrogate or nullify the provisions of enactments by means of Regulations. In Sylhet, the Civil Courts had, under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code Jurisdiction, to direct partition of estates among co-sharers, but have been ousted of such rights by Regulation I of 1886. Similarly, the provisions of many Acts now in force may be modified by Regulations and Notifications. Many Acts and Regulations formerly in force in Sylhet ceased to have operation after the transfer.

It is respectfully submitted that it is not quite accurate to say that Chittagong has only a "fractional interest in the Bengal Legislative Council" and therefore the privilege of electing a representative to the local Council is a very small matter that could be easily overlooked.

In the local Councils, Acts are passed after a thorough and searching discussion by the honourable members, all of whom—official and non-official—are thoroughly acquainted with the conditions and needs of the province, and the interests of the people are thus under adequate safeguards. The Assam Regulations are, on the other hand, formulated by the Chief Commissioner and passed in the Supreme Legislative Council by Members who have very little special experience of the area concerned. The people have also very little opportunities to represent their views and point out the inconveniences of the proposed regulations or measures. Regulations thus passed and enforced are not likely to be free from defects. For want of a local Council the laws now in force will be stereotyped as has happened in the case of Sylhet. Even if the new province be given the privilege of electing a representative to the Supreme Legislative Council by rotation with the Central Provinces, it will practically remain

unrepresented for the alternative period of two years. This small concession is still open to objection; much more so, as one representative against the rest of the members of the alien provinces will practically be of little appreciable benefit. The difficulties arising out of the want of a local Legislative Council will be keenly felt when an existing law such as the Bengal Tenancy Act requires to be amended to suit the circumstances of the advanced and progressive Bengal districts. Owing to the complicated system of land tenures in Bengal, the Bengal Tenancy Act had to be discussed in the Supreme Council as well as in the Local Council. The danger of such Acts being amended at the suggestions of the Chief Commissioner without the help of any members acquainted with the conditions of Bengal, is evident. Moreover, there will be the legislative difficulties of the new Government to frame different laws on the same subject to suit the different circumstances and requirements of the Bengal districts and the Assam districts. The excellence and necessity of the Board of Revenue are evident from the fact of their continuance in Bengal. The works done by expert officers of great experience who devote their time and attention solely to revenue matters will admittedly be of a superior quality of those done by the Chief Commissioner whose attention is engrossed in works of diversified nature. Transfer of local ministerial establishments and occasional consultation with the Board of Revenue of Bengal are not remedies sufficient to remove the defects in the revenue administration that will be brought into vogue in consequence of the change. The people will also be deprived of the highly qualified legal help, if the revenue matters are finally decided at a place other than Calcutta.

The proposed change, if carried into effect, will entail a dual control over the Judicial officers—one by the High Court of Bengal and the other by the Chief Commissioner. The Assam officers shall have also to be trained to master the double system of executive and revenue administration prevalent in the advanced Bengal districts as also in the backward Assam districts. If a separate service for the whole of the new province is created, the advanced Bengal districts will suffer when an officer trained in Assam districts is transferred to the former to take up a senior appointment, owing to his imperfect knowledge of the intricate systems of law and procedure prevalent in Bengal. There are many Military officers in the Assam service who could not be

suitably entrusted to take charge of the well-regulated districts. Thus there should be required either to maintain two services—one for Bengal, another for Assam, or to place the Bengal districts now and then under charge of officials of limited and imperfect qualifications. Loan of officers from the Bengal Government will, it is apprehended, not be a satisfactory solution of the difficulties in the way of efficient administration. The past experience in Sylhet has shown that officers taken on loan have to revert to Bengal after a few years when they become senior in service, and thus men of ripe experience and ability are lost and the administration has to be carried on by means of officers of comparatively inferior standard.

After a brief survey of the points used in support of the proposed change, Your Excellency's memorialists are humbly of opinion that the people of Chittagong will not be sufficiently compensated by means of the supposed improvement of the port and railway for all the loss of ancient rights and precious privileges which they have so long enjoyed in contact with the metropolis of the English Empire in the East and under the most advanced Government of India.

If the proposed changes are necessary in the interest of Assam, that object may be secured by means of an arrangement which will not affect the rights and privileges of an ancient and well-regulated, and in fact, the first British district in the province. The revenues of the transferred districts will, it is feared, be hardly sufficient to recoup the deficits in the finance of the Assam administration and to spare for the amelioration of the Assam service in general. If, however, a standard of service, similar to that of Bengal, is intended to be maintained with the aid of contribution from the Imperial funds, it is humbly suggested that a new and improved service for Assam may be created by the amalgamation of Assam with Bengal without creating a disruption in the solidarity of Bengal proper.

All parts of Bengal have been for a long time under a highly-developed and well-regulated administration and such a form of administration has not been found suitable to the backward and less advanced Assam. Now if an integral portion of Bengal is amalgamated with the backward Assam, the advanced and progressive Chittagong and the other districts will naturally gravitate towards the lower level as an inevitable result of such an unequal

combination. It will be difficult for the administrative policy of the Assam Government to keep itself ahead of the rock of its past traditions and predilections. It cannot be definitely assumed that the go-ahead Sylhet would not have made greater progress if it had continued to remain under the advanced Bengal Government. The present prosperity of Sylhet is due more to the course of natural events than to the efforts of a Government considered to be suitable to its needs and requirements.

Your memorialists pray that in consideration of the above facts and circumstances and in consideration of the alarm caused by the proposed change, Your Excellency in Council will be graciously pleased to reconsider the proposal of transferring the Chittagong Division from Bengal to Assam. And Your Excellency's memorialists, as in duty bound, shall ever pray.

Chittagong,
the 30th January 1904

I have the honour to subscribe,
Your Excellency's most obedient
and loyal servant,
ANWAR ALI KHAN
President of the Public Meeting.

Annexure 18

*To His Honour Sir Andrew Henderson Leith Fraser, K.C.S.I.,
Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal*

*The humble memorial of the inhabitants of Feni Sub-division in
the District of Noakhali*

Most respectfully sheweth—

That the news of the proposed transfer of the Chittagong Division to Assam has caused widespread consternation, anxiety and alarm to the people of this sub-division, and they are extremely pained to think that the proposed transfer, if affected, will surely bring on great misfortune to them in various ways, and they will have to sever their tender association and affectionate ties with the main body of their mother-country—Bengal. Your Honour's memorialists beg humbly to submit that they have been intimately connected with the rest of the province from the very time immemorial; they formed, and do even now form an integral and influential portion of Bengal proper, but by the proposed transfer they are unfortunately to be incorporated with a class of people with whom they have nothing in common, and in fact, between whom there is a wide gulf of difference in respect of race, religion, social custom and traditions. They therefore venture to lay before Your Honour this humble representation as a strong but respectful protest against the proposed measure, in earnest hope that Your Honour will be most graciously pleased to sympathise with their aggrieved feeling, and represent to the Government of India their serious discontent, anxiety and alarm at the news of the proposed transfer.

That Your Honour's memorialists most humbly crave leave to submit that they have been enjoying, under one of the most advanced administrations of the Empire, several valued rights and privileges which they have obtained after years of effort, but which they are now likely to lose, and therefore they consider the proposed transfer as a retrograde and revolutionary measure and detrimental to their best interests.

That Your Honour's humble memorialists beg leave to say that if the proposed measure be adopted, they will, no doubt, lose the benefits of a local Legislature, representation in its Council, a progressive system of high education, and a Board of Revenue—a serious and complete loss of which will be a national grievance to them. On the other hand, they do not reasonably expect any material advantage from the proposed annexation of their rich and advanced districts to a poor and exceedingly backward province.

That Your Honour's memorialists will no more have the advantage of the great metropolis of the Indian Empire as their own provincial capital, which also they think a serious loss to them in respect of their gradual progress towards civilization.

That Your Honour's memorialists respectfully venture to point out that by the opening of the railway their district is nearer to Calcutta than Shillong, and any inconvenience which Your Honour's Government might have experienced in the past, has been removed.

That amongst many of the various great disadvantages which will accrue to your memorialists, they beg to point out the inconvenience which will ensue to the people of this district, from being placed under two separate jurisdictions—one with regard to revenue and executive matters which will be vested in the Assam Government and the other with regard to judicial business which will remain in the High Court of Calcutta—this arrangement will evidently bring in its wake all the inconveniences, expense and troubles of having to transact business in two different and widely distant places of two different provinces. Moreover, Your Honour's memorialists with all reasonable probabilities apprehend that they will no longer equally and conveniently share the services of the judicial branch, which will remain under the different authorities of different provinces, and that in view of the proposed transfer, the newly-organised province will not, the humble memorialists apprehend, have the Judicial or Executive Service staffs of its own, and hence the people of the new province will not have the services of good officers as then the new Government shall have to borrow the services of such officers from the Bengal Government—this will also be a loss to Your Honour's memorialists, which will affect their interests severely.

Under the circumstances, Your Honour's memorialists, most humbly pray that their grievances, as submitted in this humble memorial, will meet with Your Honour's favourable consideration and approval.

And Your Honour's humble memorialists, as in duty bound, shall ever pray.

Feni,
the 30th January 1904

We have the honour to subscribe
Your Honour's most obedient
and loyal servants,
ABDUL MAJID and others

Enclosure 14 in No. 2

Letter from Raja Peary Mohun Mookerjee, C.S.I., Chairman of the Public Meeting held at Calcutta on the 18th March 1904, British India Association, Calcutta, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, dated the 27th April 1904

I have the honour to forward herewith copy of the Resolutions passed at a public meeting held in Calcutta on the 18th March 1904 regarding the proposed partition of Bengal, and to request that you may be pleased to submit the same for the favourable consideration and orders of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council.

Annexure RESOLUTIONS

1. That this meeting desires to record its respectful but firm protest against the proposals of Government for the partition of Bengal, on the following among other grounds:

(a) that these proposals are viewed with grave and wide-spread alarm by the people of this province and have given rise to an agitation unparalleled in its history. An opposition, strong and so universal, should not be ignored;

(b) that the division of the Bengali nation into two separate units and the disruption of its historical, social and linguistic ties would seriously interfere with the intellectual, social and material progress of the people, which it has always been a part of the traditional policy of the British Government in India to foster and to stimulate;

(c) that the districts proposed to be separated from Bengal proper would lose several constitutional, educational and other privileges which they have so long enjoyed.

2. That this meeting is of opinion that the wider scheme of partition referred to by His Excellency the Viceroy, does not commend itself to public opinion, and is viewed by the people

of this province with great concern and anxiety for the reason among others that its cost, initial and permanent, would seriously add to the heavy burdens already imposed on the people. Instead of allaying the anxiety and alarm which Mr. Risley's proposals had caused, it has intensified them.

3. That this meeting is of opinion that no case has been made out for the proposed measure, but that if in the opinion of the Government of India the relief of the Bengal Government is necessary, the remedy lies not in a redistribution of the territorial jurisdiction but in organic changes in the form of Government, such as the conversion of the Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal into a Governorship with an Executive Council like that of Bombay and Madras and this meeting prays that the Government may be pleased to withdraw the proposed measure, or adopt the remedy above suggested.

4. That a copy of the foregoing Resolutions under the signature of the Chairman of this meeting be submitted to the Government of India and that the following gentlemen do form themselves into a Committee to settle the draft memorial submitted to the meeting, watch the progress of this question and take such measures from time to time as they may deem fit, with a view to carry out the objects and intentions of this meeting:

Maharaja Sir Rameswar Singh, K.C.I.E. of Darbhanga
Maharaja Bahadur Sir Jateendra Mohan Tagore,
D.C.S.I.

Maharaja Suryya Kanta Acharyya Bahadur of
Mymensingh

Maharaja Jagadindra Nath Ray Bahadur of Natore

Maharaja Manindra Chandra Nandy Bahadur

Maharaja Girija Nath Ray Bahadur

Raja Mohima Ranjan Ray Chowdhury

Raja Pramath Bhusan Deb Ray

Raja Asutosh Nath Ray

Raja Peary Mohan Mookerjee, C.S.I.

Raja Pramada Nath Ray

Nawab Syed Amir Hoscin, C.I.E.

Nawab Syed Abdus Sobhan

Raja Bahadur Shashi Sekharreswar Ray

Raja Srinath Ray

Kumar Manmatha Nath Ray Chowdhuri
Kumar Pramatha Nath Ray Chowdhuri
Kumar Manmatha Nath Mitra
Kumar Upendra Chandra Choudhuri
Babu Dharani Kanta Lahiri Chaudhuri
Jagat Kisor Acharja Chaudhuri
Babu Gopal Das Chaudhuri
Babu Kisor Lal Goswami
Mr. N. N. Ghose
Mr. A. Chaudhuri
Mr. B. L. Chaudhuri
Mr. J. Ghosal
Mr. Satyendra Nath Tagore
Mr. A. M. Bose
Rai Bahadur Sitanath Ray
Babu Muralidhar Ray
Babu Ambika Charan Majumdar (Faridpur)
Babu Charu Chandra Mullick
Babu Dwarkanath Chakravarti
Babu Surendra Nath Banerjee
Babu Narendra Nath Sen
Babu Mati Lal Ghose
Babu Giridhari Lal Ray
Seth Dooly Chand
Hon'ble Babu Bhupendra Nath Bose
Ray Bahadur Rajkumar Sarvadhikari
Rai Parbati Sankar Chaudhuri
Raya Jatindra Nath Chaudhuri
Babu Harendra Lal Ray
Babu Ananda Chandra Ray (Dacca)
Babu Basanta Kumar Bose
Moulvi Mahammed Yusoff Khan Bahadur
Babu Pasupathi Nath Bose
Babu Manik Lal Seal
Moulvi Shamsul Huda
Babu Janaki Nath Ray
Mr. Lal Mohan Ghose
Babu Nalin Behari Sarkar, C.I.E.
Babu Jogendra Chandra Ghose
Kumar Dakhineswar Malia

Rai Hari Ram Goenka Bahadur

Babu Radha Charan Pal

Babu Anath Bundhu Guha (Mymensingh)

Babu Raghu Nath Das

Babu Baikunta Nath Sen

Babu Hirendra Nath Datta

Maharaj-Kumar Prodyot Coomar Tagore, Member and Secretary

1906 July B, 228/231
Pub.

7th August, 1905

Partition of Bengal

Office of the Birbhum Anjuman-i-Islamia
Birbhum, Bengal.

From: Moulvi Syed Erfan Ali,
Secretary, Birbhum Anjuman-i-Islamia.

To: The Private Secretary to His Excellency
The Viceroy & Governor General of India.

Sir,

....It is true that this far reaching and wise policy has been received by the Hindus with a considerable amount of discontent. The Mahomedan community have however recognised the sagacity and wisdom of H.E. — They recognize the enormous benefit which is likely to be derived by a fusion of races in Bengal, both on Ethnological and Geographical grounds they recognise that the partition is calculated ultimately to bring about the largest amount of benefit to a conglomeration of races at present thrown together in confusion. They recognise the statesmanlike wisdom of H.E. and propose to hold a mass meeting to give effect to their loyal views and their complete acquiescence with H.E.'s great and benevolent intentions for the achievement of India.

Under these circumstances I on behalf of my influential association beg with all possible submission and respect to congratulate H.E. on the fruition of his gracious and noble plans.

SYED ERFAN ALI,
Secretary

The Kankinara Mahomedan Association
Bhatpara, P. O., 24-Parganas
8th August 1905

From: Moulvi Zahir Uddin Ahmed,
President, Kankinara Mahomedan Association,
Bhatpara.

To: The Private Secretary to His Excellency
The Viceroy & Governor General of India,
Simla.

Sir,

Re: The Town Hall meeting on the Partition of Bengal

I have the honour to bring to your kind notice that the meeting held yesterday to protest against the partition of Bengal is a total failure.

There was practically no East and North Bengal men, a few that was there, were not more than what generally gather to accompany a . . .

The Mussalmans, who form the major portion (about 2/3) of the population of the new province, kept themselves aloof and a few Hindoo Zaminders who joined it as East Bengal men, are really residents of Calcutta, though their ancestors were once East Bengal men; but they themselves are scattered residents of Calcutta, only visiting East Bengal occasionally once in every two or three years for a fortnight or so. These men when asked by the people of East Bengal for help for any improvement in that part, flatly deny on the pretext that they are no longer East Bengal men, but again become East Bengal men when approached by Calcutta men for similar help. The fact they play the part of bat—sometimes animals and sometimes birds but not recognised by either.

* * * * *

Another noticeable feature of the whole farce was that among the names of the delegate Zamindars only there can be found who have recently come to property, none of the oldest houses, even among the Hindus, has joined in it, nor allowed their names to be

mixed with it. The money lending classes who acquired landed interests by lending money to oldest houses of zamindars are really the ring leaders of whole movement. I think I shall be within my bound to say that had not the British come to this country the existence of these so-called leaders would not have been noticeable, and for them to attack the Government so unjustly is nothing short of "Nemokharami" of the worst type. . . .

The object in writing this is that H.E. might not be misled by the agitation who has been solely and wholly engineered by the men of Calcutta, who are jealous like a lady who finds that her maid-servant is going to have a husband of the same rank and position as her own.

I may be permitted to mention here that it would be a cruelty to the men of East and North Bengal if their separate Existence from which they expect much is differed for no reason whatever except it does not suit the interests of the men of Calcutta.

ZAHIR UDDIN AHMED,
President,
Kankinara Mahomedan
Association

CHAPTER 3

Histories of the Non-Co-operation and Khilafat Movements

by

P. C. BAMFORD

THE ADVENT OF MAHATMA GANDHI

(2) After a stormy career as an agitator in S. Africa, Gandhi returned to India in January 1915. He spent some time after his arrival in studying the political situation and in religious observances and it was not until 1916 that he began to take an active part in propaganda. He soon obtained great influence among the masses by his reputation for sanctity and by taking up the cause of the tenants in Bihar in their quarrel with the Planters in 1917. It was about this time that he was given the title of 'Mahatma'. In 1918 he organised a passive resistance movement in the Kaira Dist., in the presidency of Bombay and advised the ryots not to pay land revenue on account of the poorness of their crops. This may be regarded as one of the first indications in India of his inclination towards the policy of non-co-operation.

Before proceeding further it is necessary to review very briefly the effect which the general unrest caused by the war had on India, and the political machinery available to Gandhi. The machinery was the Indian National Congress which had been initiated at a time when such articulate public opinion as existed in India was moderate in tone. At Surat in 1907, however, Tilak caused a schism as the leader of an extremist section which established a strong footing and ultimately asserted, at Lucknow in 1916.

P. 18. (16) Gandhi captures the All-India Home Rule League—Having captured the Congress, at any rate for the time being Gandhi then set himself to win over the All-India Home Rule League, of which he was the **PRESIDENT**. He was advised by many not to add to the complexity of the situation by unnecessary alienating several of the leading members of the league, but he paid no attention to this and forced his views on the meeting of

that body held in Bombay on October 3rd, and the league was re-named the *Swaraj Sabha*, when ART. No. 1 commencing with the object of the *Swaraj Sabha* is to secure complete *Swaraj* for India according to the wishes of the people of India came up for discussion, several of the members, headed by Mr. Jinnah demurred. The chief objection of Mr. Jinnah was that the new constitution omitted the mention of the British connection and that it was permissive of 'unconstitutional and illegal activities'. In reply Mr. Gandhi said:

"I want my country to have *Swaraj* with or without the British connection. I am not opposed to that connection by itself but I do not wish to make a fetish of it. By clause 3 we have limited our ambition in order that we may carry the Congress with us and be thus enabled to remain affiliated to that body. As regards the words 'unconstitutional and illegal' they are highly technical terms. An ex-Adv-Gen. of Madras considers non-co-operation to be unconstitutional. I think Mr. Jinnah considers it to be perfectly constitutional. The President of the Special Congress gave it as his considered ruling that my resolution was not unconstitutional. It is difficult for me to conceive an illustration under the British constitution of unconstitutional activity, except violence; and violence has been specifically eschewed from the *Sabha's* constitution. Similarly, about the word 'illegal' jurists have differed in its interpretation. It is a most dangerous thing for a country fighting for its very life, its honour and its religion, to tie itself down in a knot of indefinable expressions. I personally hate unconstitutionalism and illegalities, but I refuse to make a fetish of these as I refuse to make a fetish of the British connection."

Not approving of this change in the constitution of the *Sabha*, Mr. Jinnah and several others tendered resignation of their membership.

CHAPTER 5

Appendix A

Home Political File No. 150/34 1934

MUSLIM PARTIES IN INDIA INCLUDING THE MUSLIM MEMBERS ELECTED TO THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

Statement—I

Confid.

Names of Muslims elected from Muslim Constituencies to the Assembly with the name of the Party to whom they belong.

Congress

Mr. T. A. R. Sheswani.

Mr. Mohd. Ahmed Karmi (also nominated by Unity Board).

Unity Board

Maulana Shaukat Ali (also Khilafat & Jamiat-ul-Ulema).

Mr. Azhar Ali (also nominated by Oudh National Agriculturists) (also Congress).

Red Shirt

Dr. Khan Sahib.

Ahrar

Mr. K. L. Ganba.

League Conference

Mr. M. A. Jinnah.

Mr. Ibrahim Jaffar.

Bengal

Mr. A. H. Ghaznavi.

Mr. A. K. Fazlul Huq.

Mr. Anwar-ul-Azim

Sir Abdulla Suhrawardy.

Mr. Abdulynel Baqi (also nominated by the Congress).

Bihar and Orissa

Maulvi Shafi Daoodi.

Maulvi Badiurzaman.

Maulvi Md. Noman.

Sind

Seth Haji Abdulla Haroon.

Mr. Bhutto.

Punjab

Syed Ghulam Bhik Nairang.
 Makhdum Sayed Rajan Buksh.
 Nawab Sir Mehr Shah.
 Hafiz Mohammad Abdullah.
 Sheikh Fazti Haq Pirvacha.

Madras

Umar Ali Shah.

Central Provinces

Khan Sahib Siddique
 Ali Khan.

United Provinces

Maulvi Sir Md. Yakub.
 Dr. Zia Uddin Ahmad

Assam

Abdul Matin Choudhuri.

Independents**Madras**

Maulvi Murtaz Sahib (also supported by League Conf.)
 Haji Abdul Sattar (also supported by League Conf.)
 Umar Ali Shah (also supported by League Conf.)

Assam

Abdul Matin Chaudhri (also supported by League Conf.)

Central Provinces

Muslim elected from other Constituencies.

From General Constituency

- (1) Sind—Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah (League Conf.)
- (2) Punjab—Md. Ghiasuddin.

Muslim Organisations in India

| Sr. No. | Name of Organisation | When established | Constitution | Aims & Objects | Remarks |
|---------|--------------------------------|------------------|---|--|---|
| 1. | All India Muslim League, Delhi | 1906 | <p>President: M. A. Jinnah</p> <p>Secretary: Hafiz Hidayat Hussain</p> <p>Jt. Secretaries: 1. K. B. S. M. Abdulla, 2. Mr. Anwar-ul-Azim, M.L.A., 3. Shah Masood Ahmed, M.L.A.</p> | To protect the religious and political rights of the Mussalmans in India | This is the oldest of all the prominent Muslim Organisations in India. The scope of the activities of the league is limited and unlike the C. Khilafat Committee it seldom dabbles in affairs relating to foreign countries. About 1928-29 the League was split into two rival sections, one led by M. A. Jinnah and the other by the Late Sir Mohd. Shafi. Both of these groups continued to work separately till the beginning of the year when they were amalgamated under the presidentship of M. A. Jinnah |

| Sr. No. | Name of Organisation | When established | Constitution | Aims & Objects | Remarks |
|---------|-------------------------------|------------------|--|--|--|
| 1. | | | | | through the efforts of H. H. the Aga Khan. The League is now working hand in hand with the AIMC. |
| 2. | Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, Delhi | 1919 | President: M. Kifayatullah Secretary: Ahmad Said Treasurer: Haji Abdul Ghaffar | Original: (1) To safeguard Khilafat, (2) To preach Islam. Subsequent to the efforts of M. Kifayatullah and M. Ahmed Said of Delhi. fat: (1) To work for the restoration of the agitation and after the abolition of the Khilafat turned its attention towards the Hedjar and Present Aims & Objects: (1) To Preach freedom of these countries from Islam, (2) To prepare the Muslims for after the Congress creed. There- interest in the Rifian struggle and when the latter was over | |

| Sr. No. | Name of Organisation | When established | Constitution | Aims & Objects | Remarks |
|---------|------------------------|------------------|--|--|--|
| 2. | | | | | it devoted itself entirely to preaching unity among Muhammadans and protecting Islam. In 1929 the Jamiat was split into two sections viz, Delhi and Cawnpore, the former led by Mr. Kifayatullah and the latter by the Ali Brothers. The Delhi section took an active part in the Civil Disobedience Movement in 1930 in support of the Congress by which it was well supplied with funds. |
| 3. | Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind | 1929 | President: Shah Mohd. Suleman of Phulwari Vice-President: Abdul Qadir of Budaon | As regards the propagation of Islam are identical with those of the Delhi Jamiat but it is opposed to Congress Creed | Was founded in 1929 by the Ali Brothers with the main object of widening the narrow circle of the Ulema by including those who though ignorant of Arabic were well informed of |

| Sr. No. | Name of Organisation | When established | Constitution | Aims & Objects | Remarks |
|---------|----------------------|------------------|---|----------------|--|
| 3. | | | <p>Working Secretary: M. Mazharuddin of Delhi</p> <p>Financial Secretary: Kh. Ghulam-us-Sibtani, B.A.</p> | | <p>the Muslim religion and further to include the definition of religious Ulema, all Ulema and Mujtahids of all sects. This Jamiat was backed by the Ulema of Firangi Mahel, Badaon and M. Marharuddin of Delhi. When M. Shaukat Ali and his party consisting of M. Inayatulla of Firangi Mahel went over to the Delhi Jamiat the Cawnpore Jamiat issued a disclaimer severing its connection with them. The latter body is in full agreement with the A.I.M.C. and the A.I.M. League.</p> |

| Sr. No. | Name of Organisation | When established | Constitution | Aims & Objects | Remarks |
|---------|---|------------------|---|---|---------|
| 4. | All-India Central Khilafat Committee Bombay | 1919 | <p>President: Abdul Majid Sindhi, M.L.A.</p> <p>Vice-Presidents: (1) Haji Abdulla Haroon. (2) Maulvi Shafi Dandi</p> <p>Secretaries: (1) Shaukat Ali, (2) Allah Buksh Yasafi, (3) H. S. Suhrawardy, (4) Mohiuddin of Ahmere, (5) Mohd. Irpan, (6) Ghulam Rasul 'Mehr'</p> <p>Hony. Treasurer: Umarbhai Chaudhimbhai</p> | <p>1. To secure the solution of the Khilafat question strictly in accordance with the guard the Khilafat and to watch over the safety and integrity of the Holy Places of Islam put since the disclaimer of Mustafa Kamal Pasha and the termination of the Khilafat of the aims and objects of the organisation are now confined to only (2) and (3) mentioned in previous column. Is a political body with anti-British aims and propaganda. It is now anti-Congress and wields influence over those Mussalmans who have communal tendencies. The Central Khilafat Committee has its headquarters at</p> | |

| Sr. No. | Name of Organisation | When established | Constitution | Aims & Objects | Remarks |
|---------|--|------------------|--|---|---|
| 4. | | | | | Bombay and affiliated to it are the Provincial and District Committees in all parts of India. |
| 5. | All India Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam, Punjab, Amritsar | May, 1931 | President: M. Habibur Rahman Vice-President: Chaudhuri Afzal Haq, M.L.C. Secretaries: M. Daud Ghaznavi, Mazhar Ali Achar Treasurer: Dr. Abdul Qadir | (1) To work for the War started by the Pro-Cong-economic, educational and social uplift of the Muslims in the Muslim League (2) To awaken political consciousness and infuse the spirit of settlement of Communal question among Muslims (3) To strive for the freedom of the country by peaceful methods | The Majlis carried on an intense propaganda in the form of a press campaign, meetings. |

| Sr. No. | Name of Organisation | When established | Constitution | Aims & Objects | Remarks |
|---------|----------------------|------------------|--------------|----------------|---|
| 5. | | | | | <p>processions of Kashmiri labourers and the celebration of a 'Kashmir Day', against the State. It also sent Jathas of volunteers to Kashmir in defiance of the orders passed by the State authorities forbidding their entry in Kashmir. The arrest of prominent leaders and lack of funds and volunteers owing to great distrust of the leaders served to decrease the enthusiasm for the Kashmir agitation and as a result the Majlis was forced to change their programme and turn their attention towards the alleged Government excesses in the N.W.F.P. but the agitation was short-lived. The agitation</p> |

| Sr. No. | Name of Organisation | When established | Constitution | Aims & Objects | Remarks |
|---------|-----------------------------|------------------|--|--|--|
| 5. | | | | | <p>in Kapurthala and Jind States evoked considerable interest among the Ahrars who contemplated to stir the Muslim masses in the same way as was done in the case of Kashmir but fortunately the movement died a natural death. Of late the Ahrar Party in order to enlist fresh support has been carrying on a tirade against the Ahmadiya Community. The Majlis still wields a considerable influence in the Punjab.</p> |
| 6. | Anjuman-i-Khaksaran, Lahore | 1931 | Ex: Committee: (1) Inayatullah Khan Mashriqi, (2) Mufti Sahib, Mozang, Lahore, (3) Masud Ahmed Khan, B.Sc., dia. | Social service and political advancement. To unite all Islamic powers and to achieve independence for India. | The founder of the Anjuman is Inayatullah Khan, Mashriqi of the "Tazkira" fame who was employed in the N.W.F.P. Educational Service. He is reported to be eccentric and an ardent |

| Sr. No. | Name of Organisation | When established | Constitution | Aims & Objects | Remarks |
|---------|---|------------------|---|--|--|
| 6. | | | of Lahore, (4) M. A. Majid of Lahore, (5) Hakim Moham-mad Din of Lahore | | pan-Islamist. The Anjuman has branches in various cities in the Punjab and one in Peshawar. In July 1933 the Lahore Anjuman despatched, by way of advertisement, a Jatha of 9 volunteers for pilgrimage to Mecca. The movement has made no further progress as Inayatullah has incurred the hostility of the Ahrars. |
| 7. | Red Shirts (Khudai Khidmatgars or Afgan Jirga Utmanuzai-Charsada) | 1929 | | To propagate the Congress creed and over the rural populace in the to carry on the Civil District through the medium of Disobedience Move-Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. ment. | It commanded great influence and over the rural populace in the to carry on the Civil District through the medium of Disobedience Move-Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Has been declared unlawful since 1931. Some unimportant persons are now carrying on the organization secretly. |

| Sr. No. | Name of Organisation | When established | Constitution | Aims & Objects | Remarks |
|---------|-----------------------------|------------------|---|---|---------|
| 8. | All-India Muslim Conference | 1919 | <p>President: Nawab Ahmed Said Khan of Chhatari</p> <p>Vice-Presidents: Sir Mohd. Iqbal, Dr. Shafat Ahmed Khan, Shafi Daudi</p> <p>Secretary: Seth Abdulla Haroon</p> <p>Working Secretary: Khan Bahadur Haji Rahim Baksh</p> <p>Jt. Secretaries: K. B. Syed Abdul Haz Hussain Imam, A. H. Ghaznavi, Mohd. Moazzam, and Zahur Ahmed</p> | <p>(1) To safeguard and promote the rights and interests of the Indian Mussalmans at all stages of constitutional advance to-wards full responsible Government of India. Conference firmly stood by (2) To organise the Indian Mussalmans rate electorates) during the Civil and to co-ordinate the existing Muslim which it remained quite aloof. organisations having After the C. D. Movement dis-sensions crept in with the re-ter for the purpose of sult that the Constitution of giving expression to the Conference was reshaped Muslim opinion on early in 1934 through the questions affecting the efforts of its promoter, viz. Indian Muslims with- H. H. the Agha Khan. In con-out interfering with junction with the A.I.M.L. the</p> | |

| Sr. No. | Name of Organisation | When established | Constitution | Aims & Objects | Remarks |
|---------|--|------------------|--|---|--|
| 8. | | | | the special features of which distinguish such organisations. | Conference decided in August 1934 to form a Parliamentary Majlis with a view to contest seats in the Assembly in direct opposition to the efforts made by the Unit Board formed by the rival organisation, viz. the A.P.M.C. to send their own candidates to the Assembly. |
| 9. | All-Parties Muslim Conference, Lucknow | 1930 | Constitution of the Unity Board: President: Nawab Mohd. Ismail Khan Working Committee consisting of 21 members | (1) To create a sense of duty and love for Islam. (2) To organise all Muslims in order to enable them to take their proper share in the struggle for freedom. (3) To unite the various sects of Muslims | This Conference was organised at Lucknow at the close of 1933 by Muslims of a nationalist turn of mind who were anxious to save their reputation among the Muslim ranks. It is composed of members belonging to the nationalist school of thought, of the Delhi group of |

| Sr. No. | Name of Organisation | When established | Constitution | Aims & Objects | Remarks |
|---------|----------------------|------------------|--------------|---|---------|
| 9. | | | | <p>lims and to strive for the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, a section unity with other com- of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, munities.</p> <p>(4) To improve the old CKC and the A.T.M.L., condition of peasants the Shia Community and more and zamindars and to particularly by Shaikat Ali and fight against unem- his coterie, formerly enthusias- ployment.</p> <p>tic workers of the A.I.M.C. The Conference formed a Unity Board consisting of 21 members with the object of contesting seats in the assembly elections in opposition to the efforts of the Parliamentary Majlis formed by the rival organisation, viz. the A.I.M.C. At its meeting held at Lucknow in May 1934 the Muslim Unity Majlis endorsed the Congress programme regarding the revival</p> | |

| Sr. No. | Name of Organisation | When established | Constitution | Aims & Objects | Remarks |
|---------|----------------------|------------------|--------------|----------------|--|
| 9. | | | | | <p>of the Swaraj Party and deprecated all agitation to get the Communal Award modified by the British Government in the absence of an agreed settlement among the various communities. The results of the election clearly show that the Unity Board has attained a position of influence and importance slightly better than that held by its rival organisation, viz., the A.I.M.C. Judging by the results of the elections the influence of the A.I.M.C. appears to be declining.</p> |

| Sr. No. | Name of Organisation | When established | Constitution | Aims & Objects | Remarks |
|---------|------------------------------------|------------------|---|--|---|
| 10. | All India Shia Conference, Lucknow | 1940 | President: Prince Md. Akram of Calcutta General Secretary: Mojer Hussain (of Amroali) | To safeguard the religious and political rights of the Shia Majlis about the middle of 1934. The latter is in favour of the institution of separate electorates. | The Conference was affiliated to the All-India Muslim Unity |
| 11. | Jamiat Shabban-ul-Muslimin, Delhi | 1929 | President: Mohd. Usman Azad Vice-President: Shah Abdul Zabbar Secretary: Dr. Noor Ahmed Joint Secretary: Mohd. Ibrahim Treasurer: Sufi Noor Elahi | Aims and Objects are similar to those of enlisting support of the Muslim the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, Delhi of Ulema of Delhi and to induce which it is a branch, them to take part in the C.D.M. | Was founded with the object of |

Appendix 'B'

GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL

Publicity Department

*Bengal Ministry
and the Hindus of Bengal*

PART I

Published by
The Director of Public Information, Bengal,
February 1940

Superintendent, Government Printing
Bengal Government Press, Alipore, Bengal

Gratis

TABLE 'A'
 Appointments made through the Public Service Commission, through competitive examinations

| | 1937-38 | | | 1938-39 | | |
|---|-----------------|---------|---------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------|
| | Caste Hindus | Muslims | Scheduled Castes | Minority Commun- ity | Caste Hindus | Muslims |
| Secretariat Clerkship Examination | 65 | 36 | 2 | — | 30 | 24 |
| Special Clerkship Exam- ination | | | | | | 3 |
| Typists' Examination | | | | | | |
| Stenographer's Examina- tion | | | | | | |
| Bengal Civil Service Examination, 1937 | | | | | | |
| Viva Voce test | 20 | 19 | 2 | 1 | — | — |
| Bengal Civil Service Examination, 1938 | — | — | — | — | 38 | 35 |
| Bengal Civil Service Examination, 1939 | — | — | — | — | Appointment not yet made* | |
| Total | 85 | 55 | 4 | 1 | 68 | 59 |
| | | | | | 5 | 1 |

* In connection with the B.C.S. Examination, 1939, Dr. Shyama Prosad Mukherji while supporting the resolution condemning the Bengal Ministry at the session of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha in Calcutta is reported to have said, "as a result of the examination only 14 Mahomedan candidates had passed." This is not correct. The real position will be explained after the appointments have been made.

TABLE 'B'

Appointments made through the Public Service Commission by Selection.

(In the following cases recommendations of the Public Service Commission were fully accepted).

| | 1937-38 | | | |
|--|-----------------|---------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | Caste Hindus | Muslims | Sche- duled Castes | Minor- ity Com- munity |
| Inspector of Factories | 1 | — | — | — |
| Electrical Asst: | | | | |
| Engineer | 1 | — | — | — |
| Bengal Lower Agricul- tural Service | 1 | 1 | — | — |
| Bengal Medical Service (Upper) | 4 | 6 | 1 | — |
| Temporary Additional Assistant Quinologist | 1 | — | — | — |
| Inspector in the Bengal Smoke Nuisance Service | 1 | — | — | — |
| Professor of Teachers' Training College (Muslim) | — | 1 | — | — |
| District Inspector of School (Muslim) | — | 1 | — | — |
| Professor of Mechanical Engineering of the Bengal Engineering College | — | — | — | 1 |
| Headmaster of Govern- ment High English Schools (Muslim) | — | 3 | — | — |

TABLE 'B' (Contd.)

| | 1937-38 | | | |
|---|-----------------|---------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | Caste Hindus | Muslims | Sche- duled Castes | Minor- ity Com- munity |
| Manual and Art | | | | |
| Teacher, Victoria School, Kurseong (European & Anglo- Indian) | — | — | — | 1 |
| Lecturer in Civil Engi- neering at the Bengal Engineering College (Muslim) | — | 1 | — | — |
| Second Temporary Additional Assistant Quinologist | 1 | — | — | — |
| Medical Officers for the Medical College Hospitals, Calcutta (Muslim) | — | 2 | — | — |
| Two candidates for training for the Bengal Forest Service | 1 | 1 | — | — |
| Temporary Assistant Government Archi- tect, Bengal | — | — | — | 1 |
| Electrical Assistant Engineer (Temporary) | 1 | — | — | — |
| Total: | 12 | 16 | 1 | 3 |

TABLE 'B' (Contd.)

| | 1938-39 | | | |
|--|-----------------|---------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | Caste Hindus | Muslims | Sche- duled Castes | Minor- ity Com- munity |
| Professor of English in the Bengal Educa- tional Service | 1 | — | — | — |
| Deputy Director, Civil Veterinary Depart- ment | — | 1 | — | — |
| Two non-service posts of Demonstrators of Anatomy in the Medical College, Calcutta | 1 | 1 | — | — |
| Three Registrars in the Medical College Hos- pitals, Calcutta (2 reserved for Muslims) | 1 | 2 | — | — |
| One Assistant Director, Civil Veterinary Department | 1 | — | — | — |
| Four temporary Assist- ant Engineers (Irrigation) | 3 | 1 | — | — |
| Temporary Clerk in the office of the Director of Public Health, Bengal | 1 | — | — | — |
| Professor of English in the Bengal Senior Educational Service | — | 1 | — | — |
| A Surveyor and a Drafts- man in the Revenue Secretary's Office | 1 | 1 | — | — |

TABLE 'B' (Contd.)

| | 1938-39 | | | |
|--|--------------|---------|------------------|--------------------|
| | Caste Hindus | Muslims | Scheduled Castes | Minority Community |
| Temporary Lecturer in Civil Engineering in Bengal Educational Service | 1 | — | — | — |
| Senior Bengali Mistress. Dow Hill Girls' School, Kurseong | — | — | — | 1 |
| Inspector in the Bengal Boilers Service | 1 | — | — | — |
| Executive Engineer for the Electrical Branch of the Department of Communications and Works ((Communications and Buildings) | — | — | — | 1 |
| Professor of Botany in the Women's Branch of the Bengal Educational Service | — | — | — | 1 |
| Statistical Clerk in the office of the Director of Public Health, Bengal | 1 | — | — | — |
| Inspector of Factories in the Bengal Factories Service | — | — | 1 | — |
| Assistant Engineer for a rural water supply sub-division | 1 | — | — | — |
| Medical Officer of Health for a Model Health Unit | 1 | — | — | — |

TABLE 'B' (Contd.)

| | 1938-39 | | | |
|--|-----------------|---------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | Caste Hindus | Muslims | Sche- duled Castes | Minor- ity Com- munity |
| Female Medical Officer of Health for a Model Health Unit | 1 | — | — | — |
| Editor of Debates for the Bengal Legisla- tive Council . | 1 | — | — | — |
| Assistant Inspectress of Schools for Muhammadan Edu- cation | — | 1 | — | — |
| Secretary, Assistant Secretary, and Regis- trar, Bengal Legis- lative Council | 2 | 1 | — | — |
| Temporary appoint- ment of Principal, Ahsanulla School of Engineering | — | 1 | — | — |
| Second Mistress, Eden High School for Girls', Dacca | — | — | — | 1 |
| Principal, Dacca In- termediate College (Reserved for Muslims) | — | 1 | — | — |
| Legal Assistant in the Legislative Depart- ment, (Reserved for Muslims) | — | 1 | — | — |
| Municipal Magistrate, Calcutta | 1 | — | — | — |
| Total | 19 | 12 | 1 | 4 |

TABLE 'C'

Showing the distribution of officers by communities in the Secretariat and as Head of Departments

| Secretariat (including Bengal Legislative Council and Assembly Departments) | Hindus | Muslims | Others |
|--|--------|---------|--------|
| Secretaries | 2 | 1 | 8 |
| Additional Secretary | — | — | 1 |
| Joint Secretaries | — | 1 | 2 |
| Deputy Secretaries | 4 | — | 2 |
| Under Secretaries | — | 1 | 2 |
| Assistant Secretaries | 9 | 8 | — |
| Special Officers | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Director of Public Information | — | 1 | — |
| Assistant Director of Public Information | 1 | 1 | — |
| Registrars | 2 | 2 | — |
| Legal Assistant, Legislative Department | — | 1 | — |
| Total | 21 | 18 | 16 |

Heads of Departments and attached offices

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservators of Forests | — | — | 2 |
| Commissioner of Excise | — | — | 1 |
| Director of Surveys | 1 | — | — |
| Inspector-General of Prisons, Bengal | 1 | — | — |
| Inspector-General of Registra- tion, Bengal* | — | 1 | — |
| Inspector-General of Police, Bengal | — | — | 1 |

* According to the policy of Government this post is held alternatively by a Muslim and a Hindu.

TABLE 'C' (Contd.)

| | Hindus | Muslims | Others |
|---|--------|---------|--------|
| Commissioner of Police, Calcutta | — | — | 1 |
| Director of Public Instruction | — | — | 1 |
| Surgeon-General with the Government of Bengal | — | — | 1 |
| Director of Public Health, Bengal | 1 | — | — |
| Chief Engineer, Irrigation | 1 | — | — |
| Chief Engineer, Communications and Buildings | — | — | 1 |
| Director of Agriculture, Bengal | — | — | 1 |
| Veterinary Adviser to the Government of Bengal | — | — | 1 |
| Director, Civil Veterinary Department | — | 1 | — |
| Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bengal | — | 1 | — |
| Superintendent, Royal Botanic Garden | 1 | — | — |
| Director of Industries | 1 | — | — |
| Chief Inspector of Factories | — | — | 4 |
| Electrical Adviser and Chief Electrical Inspector | — | — | 1 |
| Chief Inspector of Boilers | — | — | 1 |
| Chief Inspector, Smoke Nuisances | — | — | 1 |
| Translator to Government | 1 | — | — |
| Superintendent, Government Printing, Bengal | — | — | 1 |
| Director of Rural Reconstruction | — | 1 | — |
| Employment Adviser | 1 | — | — |
| Total | 8 | 4 | 15 |

TABLE 'D' (Pp. 7-11)

Setting forth the distribution of officers holding Executive, Judicial and Police Posts in the various districts, by communities. (N.B. Figures are correct up to 5 February 1940, as far as they were available in the records of the Departments concerned.)

PRESIDENCY DIVISION

| Districts | 24-Parganas | | Nadia | | Murshidabad | | Jessore | | Khulna | | Total by Class of posts | |
|---|-------------|-----|-------|----|-------------|----|---------|----|--------|----|-------------------------|-----|
| Community | H. | M. | O. | H. | M. | O. | H. | M. | O. | H. | M. | O. |
| District Magistrate | .. | — | — | 1 | 1 | — | 1 | — | 1 | — | 4 | — |
| Addl. Dist. Magistrate | .. | 1 | — | — | 1 | — | — | — | 1 | — | 3 | 4 |
| Assistant Magistrate and Joint Magistrate | .. | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Sub-divisional Officer | .. | 2 | — | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | — | 12 | 7 | 1 |
| Deputy Magistrate | .. | 11 | 2 | — | 2 | — | 2 | 3 | 1 | — | 21 | 6 |
| Sub-Deputy Magistrate | .. | 20 | 5 | — | 13 | 5 | 8 | 14 | 7 | — | 64 | 29 |
| District Judge | .. | — | — | 1 | 1 | — | 1 | — | 1 | — | 4 | — |
| Additional and Assistant Sessions Judge | .. | 3 | — | 1 | — | — | — | 1 | — | — | 5 | — |
| Superintendent of Police | .. | — | — | 1 | 1 | — | — | 1 | — | — | 1 | 3 |
| Additional and Assistant Superintendent of Police | .. | 1 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1 |
| Dy. Supdt. of Police | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 | — | — | 1 | — | 1 | — | 4 | 2 |
| Inspector of Police | .. | 7 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 2 | — | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 18 |
| Thana Officer-in-Charge | .. | 77 | 33 | — | 31 | 19 | — | 25 | 26 | — | 181 | 127 |
| Total by Districts | .. | 123 | 44 | 11 | 57 | 29 | 1 | 37 | 38 | 2 | 52 | 40 |
| | | | | | | | | | | — | 49 | 32 |
| | | | | | | | | | | 2 | 318 | 183 |
| | | | | | | | | | | 16 | | |

H. = Hindus M. = Muslims O. = Others.

TABLE 'D' (Contd.)
BURDWAN DIVISION

| Districts | APPENDICES | | | | | | | | | | Total by Class of Posts |
|--|------------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------------------|
| | Burdwan | Birbhum | Bankura | Midnapore | Hooghly | Howrah | H. M. O. | H. M. O. | H. M. O. | H. M. O. | |
| Community | H. M. O. | H. M. O. | H. M. O. | H. M. O. | H. M. O. | H. M. O. | H. M. O. | H. M. O. | H. M. O. | H. M. O. | O. |
| District Magistrate | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 |
| Addl. Dist. Magistrate | .. | .. | 1 | 4 | 2 | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 7 |
| Assistant Magistrate and Joint Magistrate | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Sub-divisional Officer | 1 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | .. | 14 |
| Deputy Magistrate | 5 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | .. | 19 |
| Sub-Deputy Magistrate | 16 | 3 | 5 | 22 | 6 | 12 | 1 | 4 | 3 | .. | 70 |
| District Judge | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | .. | 4 |
| Additional and Assistant Sessions Judge | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Superintendent of Police | .. | 1 | 1 | .. | 1 | 1 | .. | .. | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| Additional and Assistant Superintendent of Police | .. | .. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2 | .. |
| Dy. Supdt. of Police | 1 | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 | .. | 1 | .. | 1 | 4 |
| Inspector of Police | 3 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 6 | 27 |
| Thana Officer-in-Charge | 35 | 15 | 17 | 22 | 6 | 38 | 36 | 39 | 14 | 34 | 195 |
| Total by Districts | 62 | 23 | 4 | 32 | 16 | 43 | 11 | 97 | 47 | 3 | 65 |
| | 18 | 4 | 52 | 25 | 4 | 351 | 140 | 15 | | | |

TABLE 'E' (pp. 12-13)

Promotions from one service to another, confirmations etc.

| | Caste Hindus | Muslims | Sche- duled Castes | Minority Communi- ty |
|--|-----------------|---------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1937-38 | | | | |
| 1. Professor of Eng- lish, Chittagong Madrasah | — | 1 | — | — |
| 2. Professor of Sans- krit and Pali in the Bengal Educa- tional Service | 1 | — | — | — |
| 3. Professor of Sans- krit in the Bengal Educational Service | 1 | — | — | — |
| 4. Professor of Ara- bic, Dacca Islamic Intermediate College | 1 | 1 | — | — |
| 5. Special Arabic Lec- turer at Chittagong College | — | 1 | — | — |
| 6. Registrar of As- surances, Calcutta | — | 1 | — | — |
| 7. Inspector of Regis- tration Offices, Bengal | — | 1 | — | — |
| 8. Demonstrator in Chemistry in the Bengal Educational Service | 1 | — | — | — |
| 9. District Inspector of Schools in the Bengal Educational Service | — | 1 | — | — |
| 10. Professor of Ma- thematics in the Bengal Educational Service | 1 | — | — | — |

TABLE 'E' (Contd.)

| | Caste Hindus | Muslims | Sche- duled Castes | Minority Commu- nity |
|--|-----------------|---------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| 11. Promotion from the Subordinate rank to the Bengal Junior Civil Service | 3 | 2 | — | — |
| 12. Confirmation in the Bengal Police Service | 1 | — | — | — |
| Do | 1 | — | — | — |
| Do | 1 | — | — | — |
| Do | 1 | — | — | — |
| Do | — | 1 | — | — |
| Do | 2 | — | — | — |
| 13. Promotion to the Bengal Lower Agricultural Service | 1 | 1 | — | — |
| 14. Promotion from the Subordinate ranks to the Bengal Junior Civil Service, Settlement Department | 11 | 6 | 1 | — |
| 15. District Kanangos Cooperative Department | — | 1 | — | — |
| Registration Department | 2 | 2 | — | — |
| | 3 | 5 | — | — |
| 16. Promotion to post of Executive Engineer | 1 | — | — | — |
| 17. Confirmation in the Bengal Police Service | 2 | 2 | — | — |
| Total | 34 | 26 | 1 | — |

TABLE 'E' (Contd.)

| | Caste Hindus | Muslims | Sche- duled Castes | Minority Communi- ty |
|---|-----------------|---------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1938-39 | | | | |
| 1. Professor of Physics in the Bengal Educational Service | 1 | — | — | — |
| 2. Lecturer, Bengal Veterinary College, in the Bengal Lower Veterinary Service | 1 | — | — | — |
| 3. Professor of Chemistry in the Bengal Educational Service | 1 | — | — | — |
| 4. Superintendent of Excise and Salt in the Bengal Excise Service | — | — | — | 1 |
| 5. Inspectress of Schools, Dacca Circle, in the Bengal Senior Educational Service | 1 | — | — | — |
| 6. 7 Head Masters of Government High and Normal Schools in the Bengal Educational Service | 4 | 3 | — | — |
| 7. Assistant Secretary, Finance (Budget) Department | 1 | — | — | — |
| 8. Registrar, Finance Department | — | 1 | — | — |

TABLE 'E' (Contd.)

| | Caste Hindus | Muslims | Sche- duled Castes | Minority Commu- nity |
|---|-----------------|---------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| | 1938-39 | | | |
| 9. Additional Maulvi, Arabic Department, Calcutta Madrasah, in the Bengal Edu- cational Service | — | 1 | — | — |
| 10. Stenographer to the Director of Public Health, Bengal | 1 | — | — | — |
| 11. Assistant Director, Civil Veterinary Department | 1 | — | — | — |
| 12. Assistant Engineer (Irrigation) in the Bengal Engineer- ing Service | — | — | 1 | — |
| 13. 2 Professors of English in the Ben- gal Educational Service | 2 | — | — | — |
| 14. Confirmation in the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police, Calcutta | 1 | — | — | 1 |
| 15. Confirmation in the rank of Dy. Super- intendent of Police | 1 | — | — | — |
| 16. Confirmation to the rank of Superinten- dents of Police in the Finger Print Bureau | 1 | — | — | — |
| Total | 16 | 5 | 1 | 2 |

In addition to these some more figures of promotions covering the period ending 31 December 1939, are given below:

TABLE 'E' (Contd.)

| Department | Which service to which service | No. of non-Muslims Promoted | No. of Muslims Promoted | Remarks |
|-----------------|--|-----------------------------|-------------------------|---------|
| Home Department | Promotions to Bengal Junior Civil Service from other services | 9 | 1 | — |
| Do | Promotions from Bengal Junior Civil Service to Bengal Civil Service | 6 | 4 | 1 |
| Do | Promotions from Inspector of Police to Deputy Superintendent of Police | 1 | 2 | — |
| Total | | 16 | 7 | 1 |

Note: Only in one case, namely No. 9 of Table 'E' above (1937-38) the first preference of the Public Service Commission was not accepted.

TABLE 'F' (p. 14)

| District | Percentage of Muslim Population | Percentage of Muslim Officers | Percentage of Hindu Population | Percentage of Hindu Officers | Percentage of other Officers |
|------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Noakhali | 77.54 | 57.62 | 22.37 | 40.67 | 1.71 |
| Chittagong | 73.98 | 38.38 | 21.83 | 52.63 | 8.43 |

TABLE 'F' (Contd.)

| | | | | | |
|-----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|
| Pabna | 76.9 | 46.06 | 22.99 | 53.94 | — |
| Malda | 54.27 | 38.00 | 42.17 | 60.00 | 2.00 |
| Burdwan | 18.56 | 25.84 | 78.63 | 69.66 | 4.50 |
| Midnapore | 7.59 | 31.97 | 89.05 | 65.98 | 2.05 |
| Khulna | 49.49 | 38.55 | 50.21 | 59.03 | 2.42 |
| Jessore | 61.95 | 43.48 | 37.93 | 56.52 | — |
| Dacca | 66.81 | 44.87 | 32.77 | 48.71 | 6.42 |
| Faridpur | 63.8 | 44.12 | 35.85 | 53.92 | 1.96 |

TABLE 'G' (Pp. 15-16)

Position of Muslim Officers as it stood on 18 January 1940 in the Education Services

| Class of Posts | Total No. of posts in the cadre | No. of appoint- ments held by Muslims | Percentage of appoint- ments held by Muslims |
|--|--|---|--|
| I. Bengal Senior Educational Service (Men's Branch). | | | |
| 1. Principals of Arts Colleges | 6 | 1 | 16.7 |
| 2. Principals of Madrasahs | 3 | 3 | 100.0 |
| 3. Principal of Training College | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 4. Principal of Govt School of Art | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 5. Professors of Arts Colleges | 16 | 4 | 25.0 |
| 6. Professors of Bengal Engineering College | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| 7. Divisional and Second Inspectors | 9 | 5 | 55.5 |
| 8. Assistant Directors of Public Instruction | 2 | 2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 41 | 15 | 36.6 |

TABLE 'G' (Contd.)

| Class of Posts | Total No. of posts in the cadre | No. of appoint- ments held by Muslims | Percentage of appoint- ments held by Muslims |
|---|---|---|--|
| II. Bengal Senior Educational Service (Women's Branch). | | | |
| 1. Principals | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| 2. Inspectresses | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| III. Bengal Educational Service (Men's Branch). | | | |
| 1. Professors | 109 | 31 | 28.4 |
| 2. Madrasah Teachers (Arabic) | 5 | 5 | 100.0 |
| 3. Headmasters | 45 | 20 | 44.4 |
| 4. Inspectors | 35 | 23 | 65.7 |
| 5. Librarian & Secretary, Text Book Committee | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 196 | 76 | 40.3 |
| IV. Bengal Educational Service (Women's Branch) | | | |
| 1. Professors | 15 | 2 | 13.3 |
| 2. Assistant Inspectresses | 12 | 1 | 8.3 |
| 3. Head Mistress | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 32 | 3 | 9.4 |

TABLE 'G' (Contd.)

| Class of Posts | Total No. of posts in the cadre | No. of appoint- ments held by Muslims | Percentage of appoint- ments held by Muslims |
|---|---|---|--|
| V. Subordinate Educational Service (Lecturer's Grade) | | | |
| 1. Lecturer in general subjects | 79 | 34 | 43.0 |
| 2. Lecturers in oriental subjects:— | | | |
| (i) Arabic and Persian | 19 | 19 | 100.0 |
| (ii) Sanskrit & Pali | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| 3. Lecturers in Bengali | 11 | 3 | 27.3 |
| Lecturers in Urdu | 3 | 3 | 100.0 |
| 4. Lecturers of Girls' Colleges (including Eden High School for Girls, Dacca) | 12 | 0 | 0 |
| 5. Lecturers of Training College | 2 | 2 | 100.0 |
| 6. Lecturers in Engineering subjects | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| 7. Lecturers in Commercial subjects | 7 | 0 | 0 |
| 8. Head Assistant Teacher, Government School of Art | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 9. Lecturer at the College of Physical Education | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 10. Pandits in Tol Departments of Sanskrit College | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| 11. Maulvis in Arabic Department of Calcutta Madrasah | 7 | 7 | 100.0 |
| Total | 162 | 68 | 42.0 |

TABLE 'H' (P 17)

Statement showing the number and percentage of Muslims in the various services and classes of appointments on 1 July 1939.
(Education Department is excluded)

| Class of Officers or name of Service | Total strength | No. of Muslims | Percentage of Muslims |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Gazetted Officers employed as Managers, Sub or Assis- tant Managers, or Tehsil- dars of Government Estates | 17 | 5 | 29.4 |
| 2. Deputy Magistrates & De- puty Collectors | 249 | 87 | 34.9 |
| 3. Munsifs employed in cri- minal training (Ty) | 12 | 4 | 33.3 |
| 4. Sub-Deputy Magistrates and Sub-Deputy Collectors | 469 | 166 | 35.3 |
| 5. Extra Assistant Conserva- tors of Forest | 12 | 2 | 16.6 |
| 6. Deputy Commissioners of Excise and Superintendents of Excise & Salt | 17 | 8 | 47.0 |
| 7. Inspectors of Excise, in- cluding temporary or offi- ciating Inspectors | 72 | 26 | 36.0 |
| 8. Law Officers of Govern- ment | 15 | 2 | 13.3 |
| 9. Subordinate Judges (Permanent) | 40 | 2 | 5.0 |
| Subordinate Judges (Officiating) | 20 | 1 | 5.0 |
| 10. Munsiffs | 260 | 64 | 24.6 |
| 11. Superintendants of District Jails | 19 | 1 | 5.3 |
| 12. Dy. Superintendents of Central Jails | 4 | 0 | 0 |

TABLE 'H' (Contd.)

| Class of Officers or name of Service | Total strength | No. of Muslims | Percentage of Muslims |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| 13. Jailors (Permanent) | 24 | 5 | 20.8 |
| Jailors (Officiating) | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| 14. District Sub-Registrars | 25 | 10 | 40.0 |
| 15. Sub-Registrars | 404 | 189 | 46.8 |
| 16. Deputy Superintendent of Police (Permanent) | 21 | 7 | 18.1 |
| (Officiating) | 22 | 1 | |
| 17. Inspector of Police (Bengal Police) | 272 | 64 | 23.5 |
| 18. Assistant Commissioners of Police (Calcutta Police) | 13 | 3 | 23.0 |
| 19. Inspectors of Police (Calcutta Police) | 63 | 9 | 14.3 |
| 20. Bengal General Service (Indians) | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| 21. Officers in the Medical College, Calcutta above the rank of Assistant Surgeons (Indians) | 14 | 3 | 21.4 |
| Officers in the Medical College, Calcutta, above the rank of Assistant Surgeons | 40 | 14 | 35.0 |
| Officers in the Medical College, Calcutta, above the rank other than Asst. Surgeons | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| 22. Officers in the six Medical Schools in the Province (Indians) | 37 | 5 | 13.5 |
| 23. Assistant Surgeons in the Bengal Medical Service acting as Civil Surgeons | 18 | 0 | 0 |

TABLE 'H' (Contd.)

| Class of Officers or name of Service | Total strength | No. of Muslims | Percentage of Muslims |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| 24. Officers in the cadre of the Bengal Medical Service as a whole including probationers and temporary incumbents | 149 | 31 | 20.8 |
| 25. Officers of the Public Health Department including Engineering Branch | 43 | 9 | 20.9 |
| 26. Assistant Engineers, Irrigation Branch (including temporary) | 22 | 5 | 22.7 |
| 27. Assistant Executive Engineers (Communications and Buildings Branch) | 34 | 5 | 14.7 |
| 28. Bengal Higher and Lower Agricultural Service | 16 | 6 | 37.5 |
| 29. Bengal Higher & Lower Veterinary Service | 16 | 3 | 18.7 |
| 30. Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies (Indians) | 16 | 7 | 43.7 |
| 31. Bengal Gardeners Service (Indians) | 3 | 1 | 33.3 |
| 32. Administrative and Technical Posts in the Department of Industries | 10 | 1 | 10.0 |
| 33. Posts under the Commerce & Labour Deptt. | 7 | 1 | 14.3 |
| 34. Bengal Factories Service (Indians) | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| 35. Bengal Boilers Service (Indians) | 2 | 0 | 0 |

TABLE 'I' (P. 18)

| | In services in the Civil List | In services outside the Civil List | Total annual salaries drawn by each | Percent- age of total salaries drawn by each % |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|---|--|
| | Rs. | Rs. | Rs. | |
| Hindus | 1,22,00,000 | 3,36,00,000 | 4,58,00,000 | 73 |
| Muslims | 24,00,000 | 64,00,000 | 88,00,000 | 14 |
| Europeans and others | 82,00,000 | Nil | 82,00,000 | 13 |

TABLE 'J' (P. 18)

A statement of qualifications of the Hindu and Muslim officers
of the Subordinate Educational Service

(Corrected upto May 1939)

| Hindus | |
|---------------|----|
| First Class | 48 |
| Second Class | 39 |
| Third Class | 4 |
| Undergraduate | 1 |

That is to say 48 per cent. of their own strength are Second and Third Class M.A.s and M.Sc.s.

| Muslims | |
|--|----|
| First Class | 28 |
| Second Class | 15 |
| Third Class | 2 |
| (one being a graduate of London University) | |

That is to say 38 per cent. of their own strength are Second and Third Class M.A.s and M.Sc.s

TABLE 'K' (p. 20)

Amount sanctioned for scholarships and stipends and number of scholarships and stipends reserved for Caste Hindus, Scheduled and Backward Classes and Minority Communities

| Nature of Scholarships and Stipends | 1936-37 and 1937-38 | | | | 1938-39 | | | | 1939-40 | | | |
|---|---------------------|--------|----------------------|-------------------|---------|--------|----------------------|-------------------|---------|--------|----------------------|-------------------|
| | Num-ber | Va-lue | Period of tenability | Amount sanctioned | Num-ber | Va-lue | Period of tenability | Amount sanctioned | Num-ber | Va-lue | Period of tenability | Amount sanctioned |
| | | Rs. | Years | Rs. | | Rs. | Years | Rs. | | Rs. | Years | Rs. |
| Primary Preliminary Scholarships for Backward boys | 36 | 2 | 2 | 1,728 | 36 | 2 | 2 | 1,728 | 36 | 2 | 2 | 1,728 |
| Primary Preliminary Scholarships for Scheduled Caste boys | - | - | - | - | 18 | 2 | 2 | 864 | 18 | 2 | 2 | 864 |
| Primary Preliminary Scholarships for Scheduled Caste girls | - | - | - | - | 28 | 2 | 2 | 1,344 | 28 | 2 | 2 | 1,344 |
| Primary Final Scholarships | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| For Backward Class boys | 66 | 3 | 2 | 4,752 | 66 | 3 | 2 | 4,752 | 66 | 3 | 2 | 4,752 |
| " Scheduled Caste boys | - | - | - | - | 16 | 3 | 2 | 1,152 | 16 | 3 | 2 | 1,152 |
| " Scheduled Caste girls | - | - | - | - | 28 | 3 | 2 | 2,016 | 28 | 3 | 2 | 2,016 |
| Middle Scholarships | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| For Backward Class boys | 40 | 4 | 4 | 7,680 | 40 | 4 | 4 | 7,680 | 40 | 4 | 4 | 7,680 |
| " Scheduled Caste boys | - | - | - | - | 10 | 4 | 4 | 1,920 | 10 | 4 | 4 | 1,920 |
| " Scheduled Caste girls | - | - | - | - | 20 | 4 | 4 | 3,840 | 20 | 4 | 4 | 3,840 |

TABLE 'K' (Contd.)

| Nature of Scholarships and Stipends | 1936-37 and 1937-38 | | | | 1938-39 | | | | 1939-40 | | | |
|--|---------------------|--------|----------------------|--------------------|---------|--------|----------------------|--------------------|---------|--------|----------------------|--------------------|
| | Num-ber | Va-lue | Period of tenability | Amount sanc-tioned | Num-ber | Va-lue | Period of tenability | Amount sanc-tioned | Num-ber | Va-lue | Period of tenability | Amount sanc-tioned |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | Rs. | Years | Rs. | | Rs. | Years | Rs. | | Rs. | Years | Rs. |
| <i>Junior Scholarships</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| For Backward Class boys | 6 | 10 | 2 | 1,440 | 6 | 10 | 2 | 1,440 | - | - | - | - |
| " Scheduled Caste boys | - | - | - | - | 6 | 10 | 2 | 1,440 | 8 | 16 | 2 | 3,072 |
| " Scheduled Caste girls | - | - | - | - | 3 | 15 | 2 | 1,080 | 10 | 10 | 2 | 9,600 |
| " Non-Muslims other than Scheduled Caste for boys | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2 | 16 | 2 | 768 |
| " Non-Muslims other than Scheduled Caste for girls | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2 | 10 | 2 | 480 |
| Minority and Backward Classes | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 30 | 10 | 2 | 7,200 |
| <i>Senior Scholarships (p. 21)</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| For Backward Classes | 6 | 15 | 2 | 2,160 | 5 | 15 | 2 | 2,160 | - | - | - | - |
| " Scheduled Caste boys | - | - | - | - | 6 | 15 | 2 | 2,160 | 3 | 20 | 2 | 1,440 |
| | | | | | | | | | 1 | 20 | 3 | 720 |
| | | | | | | | | | 2 | 15 | 3 | 1,080 |
| | | | | | | | | | 18 | 15 | 2 | 6,480 |

TABLE 'K' (Contd.)

| Nature of Scholarships and Stipends | 1936-37 and 1937-38 | | | | 1938-39 | | | | 1939-40 | | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------------|--------|----------------------|--------------------|---------|---------|--------|----------------------|--------------------|-----|---------|--------|----------------------|--------------------|-----|-----|-----|
| | Num-ber | Va-lue | Period of tenability | Amount sanc-tioned | Rs. | Num-ber | Va-lue | Period of tenability | Amount sanc-tioned | Rs. | Num-ber | Va-lue | Period of tenability | Amount sanc-tioned | Rs. | | |
| For Scheduled Caste girls | - | - | - | - | - | 3 | 20 | 2 | 1,440 | - | 2 | 20 | 2 | 960 | - | | |
| “ Non-Muslims other than Scheduled Caste for boys | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 20 | 15 | 2 | 7,200 | - | | |
| “ Non-Muslims other than Scheduled Caste for girls | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 6 | 15 | 2 | 2,160 | - | | |
| Minority and Backward Classes | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 20 | 2 | 480 | - | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | 15 | 2 | 1,080 | - | | |
| <i>Graduate Scholarships Sanskrit College</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| For Backward Classes | { 1 | 30 | 2 | 720 | 1 | 30 | 2 | 720 | 1 | 30 | 2 | 720 | 1 | 30 | 2 | 720 | |
| | { 1 | 30 | 2 | 720 | 1 | 30 | 2 | 720 | 1 | 30 | 2 | 720 | 1 | 30 | 2 | 720 | |
| | { 2 | 30 | 1 | 720 | 2 | 30 | 1 | 720 | 2 | 30 | 1 | 720 | 2 | 30 | 1 | 720 | |
| “ Scheduled Caste boys | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 30 | 2 | 720 | 1 | 30 | 2 | 720 | 1 | 30 | 2 | 720 |
| “ Scheduled Caste girls | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 30 | 2 | 720 | 1 | 30 | 2 | 720 | 1 | 30 | 2 | 720 |
| | | | | | | 1 | 30 | 1 | 360 | 1 | 30 | 1 | 360 | 1 | 30 | 1 | 360 |
| Law Scholarships for Backward Classes | 1 | 10 | 2 | 240 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 240 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 240 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 240 | - |

TABLE 'K' (Contd.)

| Nature of Scholarships and Stipends | 1936-37 and 1937-38 | | | | 1938-39 | | | | 1939-40 | | | |
|--|---------------------|--------|----------------------|--------------------|---------|-----------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------|-----------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| | Num-ber | Va-lue | Period of tenability | Amount sanc-tioned | Num-ber | Va-lue | Period of tenability | Amount sanc-tioned | Num-ber | Va-lue | Period of tenability | Amount sanc-tioned |
| | | Rs. | Years | Rs. | | Rs. | Years | Rs. | | Rs. | Years | Rs. |
| Scholarships attached to Jagannath Hall | 2 | 8 | 1 | 192 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 192 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 192 |
| Sanskrit College Local Scholarships | 1 | 20 | 1 | 240 | 1 | 20 | 1 | 240 | 1 | 20 | 1 | 240 |
| | 2 | 16 | 1 | 384 | 2 | 16 | 1 | 384 | 2 | 16 | 1 | 384 |
| | 6 | 10 | 1 | 720 | 6 | 10 | 1 | 720 | 6 | 10 | 1 | 720 |
| | 8 | 8 | 1 | 768 | 8 | 8 | 1 | 768 | 8 | 8 | 1 | 768 |
| Special Stipends for Girls of the Educationally backward classes | - | - | - | - | 1 | 20 | 2 | 480 | - | - | - | - |
| | - | - | - | - | 1 | 15 | 2 | 360 | - | - | - | - |
| | - | - | - | - | 5 | 8 | 4 | 1,920 | 5 | 8 | 4 | 1,920 |
| | - | - | - | - | 15 | 5 | 2 | 1,800 | 15 | 5 | 2 | 1,800 |
| State Scholarships for Scheduled Caste (p. 22) | - | - | - | - | 1 | £.335 per annum | 3 | 11,522 | 1 | £.335 per annum | 3 | 11,522 |
| State Scholarships for Non-Muslim Teachers | - | - | - | - | 1 | £.216 per annum | 2 | 5,760 | 1 | £.216 per annum | 2 | 5,760 |

TABLE 'K' (Contd.)

| Nature of Scholarships and Stipends | 1936-37 and 1937-38 | | | | 1938-39 | | | | 1939-40 | | | |
|--|---------------------|------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------------|------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------------|------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| | Num- ber | Va- lue | Period of tenability | Amount sanc- tioned | Num- ber | Va- lue | Period of tenability | Amount sanc- tioned | Num- ber | Va- lue | Period of tenability | Amount sanc- tioned |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | Rs. | | | | Rs. | | | | Rs. |
| <i>Special Stipends</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Non-Muslim Students | - | - | - | 9,500 | - | - | - | 9,800 | - | - | - | 9,800 |
| In overnment and aided | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Colleges | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 10,000 |
| For Scheduled Castes | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 10,104* | - | - | - | 10,104* |
| -Do- | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 20,000** | - | - | - | 20,000** |

* Including Rs. 3,000 for hostel stipends.

** Out of 5 lakhs grant.

N. B. An analysis of these figures will show that the present Ministry created in 1938-39, 138 new scholarships of all grades for Hindu students over and above the number in existence at the time of their assumption of office. In 1939-40 the Ministry increased the number of such Scholarships to 216. The value of some of these scholarships was also increased in 1939-40. Besides, the Ministry created one State Scholarship for Scheduled Caste Hindus in 1938-39 which was repeated in 1939-40. They also created one State Scholarship in 1938-39 for non-Muslim teachers which was repeated in 1939-40. Furthermore a sum of Rs. 20,000 was provided in the budgets of both 1938-39 and 1939-40 for special stipends for Scheduled Caste Hindus and a further sum of Rs. 10,000 was provided in the budget for 1939-40 for special stipends for non-Muslims other than the Scheduled Castes.

TABLE 'L' (p. 23)

(This does not include expenditure on European and Anglo-Indian educational except in general institutions.)

| Nature of Education | Total amount spent from Provincial Revenues | Amount spent on Hindus | Amount spent on Muslims |
|---|--|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| | Rs. | Rs. | Rs. |
| Collegiate Education for men (all Arts Colleges) | 13,36,600 | 10,64,211 | 2,20,623 |
| Government Colleges for men | 11,18,615 | 7,03,277 | 3,63,526 |
| Medical Colleges and Schools | 8,64,413 | 7,82,006 | 44,897 |
| Veterinary Education | 1,61,078 | 84,040 | 49,023 |
| Engineering Education:— | | | |
| Collegiate | 2,69,676 | 2,17,509 | 33,599 |
| School | 1,01,647 | 70,157 | 30,334 |
| Collegiate Education for Women in Government and aided Institutions | 77,688 | 58,733 | 4,405* |

N.B. To obtain figures for others than Hindus and Muslims take total of columns 3 and 4 and subtract from figure in column 2.

* The Lady Brabourne College for girls has since been started mainly for the benefit of Muslims but (1) that college is also open to non-Muslims and (2) even if the recurring cost of running that College is included, the expenditure on Hindus under this head will remain much larger.

TABLE 'M' (p. 23)

Statement showing the number of Muslims and Hindus respectively nominated to local bodies during the period from April 1937 to December 1939.

| Names of local bodies | Nominated Muslims | Nominated Hindus |
|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| District Boards | | |
| 1. Bankura | 1 | 7 |
| 2. 24-Parganas | 3 | 5 |
| 3. Mymensingh | 4 | 2 |
| 4. Dinajpur | 4 | 3 |
| 5. Jalpaiguri | 2 | 4 |
| 6. Pabna | 4 | 2 |
| 7. Bogra | 4 | 1 |
| 8. Bakarganj | 2 | 3 |
| 9. Jessore | 4 | 2 |
| Total | 28 | 29 |

Local Boards (p. 24)

| | | |
|------------------------|----|----|
| 1. Vishnupur (Bankura) | 1 | 3 |
| 2. Boalia (Rajshahi) | 6 | - |
| 3. Nator (Rajshahi) | 4 | 1 |
| 4. Naogaon (Rajshahi) | 5 | - |
| 5. Dinajpur Sadar | 3 | 3 |
| 6. Thakurgaon | 2 | 3 |
| 7. Balurghat | 2 | 2 |
| 8. Pabna-Sadar | 3 | 2 |
| 9. Sirajganj | 4 | 1 |
| Total | 30 | 15 |

TABLE 'M' (Contd.)

| Names of the local bodies | Nominated Muslims | Nominated Hindus |
|---------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Municipalities | | |
| 1. Khirpai | - | 2 |
| 2. Pabna | 3 | 1 |
| 3. Gaibandha | 1 | 2 |
| 4. Tamluk | 1 | 2 |
| 5. Cox's Bazar | 1 | 2 (Bud- dhists) |
| 6. Ramjibanpur | - | 2 |
| 7. Nalchiti | - | 1 |
| 8. Serajganj | 2 | 1 |
| 9. Old Malda | 1 | 2 |
| 10. English Bazar | 3 | 1 |
| 11. South Dum Dum | 1 | 1 |
| 12. Vishnupur | 1 | 2 |
| 13. Faridpur | 1 | 2 |
| 14. Halisahar | 1 | - |
| 15. Nawabganj | 2 | 1 |
| 16. Kharda | 1 | 1 |
| 17. Nator | 2 | 2 |
| 18. Rajbari | 1 | 1 |
| 19. Kushtia | 1 | 2 |
| 20. Arambagh | 1 | 1 |
| 21. Uttarpara | - | 3 |
| 22. Sherpur (Bogra) | 1 | 2 |
| 23. Naihati | 1 | 2 |
| 24. Chakda | 2 | 1 |
| 25. Meherpur | 1 | 1 |
| 26. Kumarkhali | 1 | 2 |
| 27. Ranaghat | 1 | 2 |
| 28. Kishoreganj | 3 | - |
| 29. Krishnagar | 2 | 2 |
| 30. Birnagar | - | 3 |
| 31. Patuakhali | 1 | 1 |

TABLE 'M' (Contd.)

| Name of local bodies | Nominated Muslims | Nominated Hindus |
|--------------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Municipalities (Contd.) | | |
| 32. Dum Dum | 1 | 1 |
| 33. Asansol | 1 | 1 |
| 34. Khulna | 1 | 1 |
| 35. Muktagacha | 1 | 1 |
| 36. Burdwan | 1 | 1 |
| 37. Kalna | 1 | 1 |
| 38. Kotchandpur | 1 | 1 |
| 39. Kamarhati • | 1 | 2 |
| 40. Howrah | 2 | 2 |
| (p. 24.) | | |
| 41. Ghatal | - | 3 |
| 42. Gouripur | 1 | 1 |
| 43. Dacca | 1 | 1 |
| 44. Tollyganj | 1 | 1 |
| 45. Sherpur (Mymensingh) | 3 | - |
| 46. Bhola | 1 | 2 |
| 47. Kharan | - | 3 |
| 48. Midnapore | 1 | 3 |
| 49. Raniganj | 1 | 1 |
| 50. Dainhat | 1 | 2 |
| 51. Chandpur | 1 | 1 |
| 52. Katwa | 1 | 2 |
| 53. North Barrackpore | 1 | 3 |
| 54. Narayanganj | - | 1 |
| 55. Panihati | 1 | 1 |
| 56. Suri | 1 | 2 |
| 57. Brahmanbaria | 1 | 1 |
| 58. Madaripur | 2 | 2 |
| 59. Bhatpara | 1 | 1 |
| 60. Barasat | 2 | 2 |
| 61. Garulia | 1 | 1 |
| 62. Barrackpore | 1 | 1 |

TABLE 'M' (Contd.)

| Names of local bodies | | Nominated Muslims | Nominated Hindus |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Municipalities (Contd.) | | | |
| 63. | Budge Budge | 2 | - |
| 64. | Kanchrapara | 1 | 1 |
| 65. | Chandrakona | 1 | 2 |
| 66. | Bally | 1 | 1 |
| 67. | Jhalakati | 2 | 1 |
| 68. | Noakhali | 1 | 1 |
| 69. | Berhampur | 3 | 2 |
| 70. | Comilla | 3 | 1 |
| 71. | Hooghly-Chinsurah | 2 | 2 |
| 72. | Serampore | 2 | 2 |
| 73. | Baranagore | 1 | 1 |
| 74. | Dhulian | 1 | 1 |
| 75. | Kandi | 1 | 1 |
| 76. | Rishra-Konnagore | 1 | 1 |
| 77. | Kotrung | 2 | — |
| 78. | Netrokona | 1 | 2 |
| 79. | Santipur | 2 | 3 |
| 80. | Basirhat | 2 | 2 |
| 81. | Moheshpur | 1 | 1 |
| 82. | North Dum Dum | 1 | 1 |
| 83. | Jangipur | 4 | — |
| 84. | Dinaipur | 2 | 1 |
| | (p. 26) | | |
| 85. | Bankura | 1 | 2 |
| 86. | Baidyabati | 1 | 2 |
| 87. | Murshidabad | 1 | 1 |
| 88. | Jiaganj-Azimganj | 1 | 2 |
| 89. | Rajpur | 1 | 3 |
| 90. | Taki | 1 | 2 |
| 91. | Tangail | 2 | 1 |
| 92. | Bansberia | 1 | 1 |
| 93. | Baruipur | 1 | 1 |

TABLE 'M' (Contd.)

| Names of local bodies | Nominated Muslims | Nominated Hindus |
|-------------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Municipalities (Contd.) | | |
| 94. Rangpur | 1 | 3 |
| 95. Satkhira | 1 | 2 |
| 96. Jessore | 2 | 1 |
| 97. Jalpaiguri | 2 | 1 |
| 98. Mymensingh | 1 | 2 |
| 99. Jamalpur | 1 | 2 |
| 100. Bajitpur | 2 | - |
| 101. Rajshahi | 2 | 2 |
| Total | 129 | 149 |

TABLE 'N' (p-27)

| Year | Total No. of Committees constituted | Number of Muslims | Number of Hindus | Total |
|----------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------|
| In 1937 from | | | | |
| 1st April 1937 | 97 | 296 | 833 | 1,129 |
| In 1938 | 135 | 439 | 1,169 | 1,608 |
| Total | 232 | 735 | 2,002 | 2,737 |

TABLE 'O' (p. 28)

Statement showing details of grants-in-aid to technical and industrial schools, distribution of stipends and scholarships tenable at these schools, grants of loans to the ex-students of weaving schools, and grants of industrial loans under State-Aid to Industries Act, 1939.

| Nature of Grants or Loans | Total amounts granted | To Muslims | To Hindus |
|---|-----------------------------|---------------|--------------|
| | Rs. | Rs. | Rs. |
| Grants-in-aid to technical and industrial schools (1937-39) | 4,15,120 | 46,935 | 3,68,185 |
| Stipends and scholarships tenable at technical and industrial schools (1937-39) | 76,522 | 33,281 | 43,241 |
| Loans to ex-students of weaving schools (from 1 April 1937 to 31 December 1939) | 6,988 | 2,775 | 4,213 |
| Industrial loans (from 1 April 1937 to 31 December 1939) | 38,315 | 4,600 | 33,715 |

TABLE 'P' (p. 29)

Statement showing the number of Muslims, Hindus and others in the approved list of contractors under the Communications and Works (Communications and Buildings) Department for roads and buildings

| Class and value of Contract Communities | Presidency Circle | | Central Circle | | Northern Circle | | Eastern Circle | | | | | |
|--|-------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|--------|----|----|---|
| | Hin- dus | Mus- lims | Hin- dus | Mus- lims | Hin- dus | Mus- lims | Hin- dus | Mus- lims | Others | | | |
| Class I Rs. 50,000 to 1,00,000 | 11 | 0 | 4 | 11 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 14 | 0 |
| Class II Rs. 10,000 to 50,000 | 14 | 4 | 1 | 38 | 7 | 0 | 41 | 2 | 0 | 62 | 23 | 0 |
| Class III Rs. 5,000 to 10,000 | 40 | 9 | 0 | 34 | 7 | 0 | 72 | 12 | 0 | 82 | 56 | 1 |
| Class IV Rs. 5,000 | 128 | 22 | 0 | 153 | 32 | 0 | 123 | 23 | 0 | 11 | 92 | 4 |
| Probationary contractors for re- quisition works only upto Rs. 5,000 | 66 | 17 | 2 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |

N. B. An analysis of these figures shows that there are altogether 1,026 Hindus, 321 Muslims and 14 others in the approved list of Government contractors. This works out at 75.3 per cent for Hindus and only 23.5 per cent for Muslims

TABLE 'Q' (p. 30)

Statement showing the number of excise licences granted to Hindus, Muslims and others

| | Hindus | Muslims | Other communities |
|--|--------|---------|----------------------|
| Total number of licensees belonging to different communities before April 1937 | 3,392 | 472 | 131 |
| Total number of licenses (vacancies including new shops) granted to mem- bers of different com- munities during the period April 1937 to December 1939 | 307 | 96 | 14 |

It is important to note in this connection that text books in the various subjects and for various classes are prescribed on the recommendation of the Text-Book Committee. The composition of the Text-Book Committee is, at present, as follows:

| | |
|---------|----|
| Hindus | 10 |
| Muslims | 13 |
| Others | 3 |

Co-opted members

| | |
|---------|----|
| Hindus | 14 |
| Muslims | 16 |
| Others | 1 |

It is also necessary to state that by far the majority of the text books prescribed for non-denominational institutions are written by Hindu authors. Table 'R' sets forth the relevant details.

TABLE 'R' (p. 31)

| Subject | Class or Classes | No. of books by Hindu authors | No. of books by Muslim authors | No. of books by European authors | Total No. of books approved | Class of school |
|--|---------------------|--|---|---|--------------------------------------|--------------------|
| 1937 | | | | | | |
| English Translation and Composition | V & VI | 43 | 7 | Nil | 50 | Secondary |
| Do | VII & VIII | 28 | 1 | Nil | 29 | Do |
| Bengali Grammar | V & VI | 40 | 5 | Nil | 45 | Do |
| Bengali Composition | VII & VIII | 13 | 1 | Nil | 14 | Do |
| Sanskrit Grammar & Composition | VII & VIII | 19 | Nil | Nil | 19 | Do |
| Arabic Grammar and Composition | VII & VIII | Nil | 19 | Nil | 19 | Do |
| Persian Grammar & Composition | VII & VIII | Nil | 11 | Nil | 11 | Do |
| Persian Reader | VIII | Nil | 4 | Nil | 4 | Do |
| Urdu Reader | VII | Nil | 2 | Nil | 2 | Do |
| Do | VIII | Nil | 3 | Nil | 3 | Do |
| English Copy Book | V | 4 | Nil | 3 | 7 | Do |
| Do | VI | 3 | Nil | 4 | 7 | Do |

TABLE 'R' (Contd.)

| Subject | Class or Classes | No. of books by Hindu authors | No. of books by Muslim authors | No. of books by European authors | Total No. of books approved | Class of schools |
|------------|---------------------|--|---|---|--------------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1938 | | | | | | |
| Arithmetic | III & IV | 41 | 12 | Nil | 53 | Secondary |
| Do. | V & VI | 31 | 12 | Nil | 43 | Do |
| Do. | VII & VIII | 17 | Nil | Nil | 17 | Do |
| Geometry | VI | 24 | 4 | 1 | 29 | Do |
| Do. | VII & VIII | 20 | Nil | 2 | 22 | Do |
| Algebra | VII & VIII | 8 | 1 | Nil | 9 | Do |
| History | III | 26 | 16 | Nil | 42 | Do |
| Do. | IV | 34 | 11 | Nil | 45 | Do |
| Do. | V & VI | 32 | 9 | Nil | 41 | Do |
| Do. | VII & VIII | 11 | 2 | Nil | 13 | Do |
| Geography | III & IV | 40 | 12 | Nil | 52 | Do |
| Do. | V & VI | 25 | 6 | Nil | 31 | Do |
| Do. | VII & VIII | 15 | 2 | 1 | 18 | Do |
| Hygiene | III & IV | 39 | 7 | Nil | 46 | Do |
| Do. | V & VI | 32 | 2 | Nil | 34 | Do |
| Do. | VII & VIII | 13 | Nil | Nil | 13 | Do |

TABLE 'R' (Contd.)

| Subject | Class or Classes | No. of books by Hindu authors | No. of books by Muslim authors | No. of books by European authors | Total No. of books approved | Class of Schools |
|------------------|---------------------|--|---|---|--------------------------------------|---------------------|
| | | 1938 (Contd.) | | | | |
| Drawing | III & IV | 23 | 2 | Nil | 25 | Secondary |
| Do. | V & VI | 24 | 2 | Nil | 26 | Do |
| Sanskrit Reader | VII | 32 | Nil | Nil | 32 | Do |
| Do. | VIII | 24 | Nil | Nil | 32 | Do |
| Arabic Reader | VII | Nil | 15 | Nil | 15 | Do |
| Do. | VIII | Nil | 16 | Nil | 16 | Do |
| Persian Reader | VII | Nil | 8 | Nil | 8. | Do |
| Arabic Copy Book | VII | Nil | 3 | Nil | 3 | Do |
| Do. | VII | Nil | 2 | Nil | 2 | Do |
| Science | IV | 27 | 3 | Nil | 30 | Do |
| Do. | V & VI | 26 | 3 | Nil | 29 | Do |
| Do. | VII & VIII | 13 | 2 | Nil | 15 | Do |
| 1939 | | | | | | |
| English Primer | III | 26 | 11 | 10 | 47 | Do |
| English Reader | IV | 24 | 10 | 16 | 50 | Do |

TABLE 'R' (Contd.)

| Subject | Class or Classes | No. of books by Hindu authors | No. of books by Muslim authors | No. of books by European authors | Total No. of books approved | Class of Schools |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|--|---|---|--------------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1939 (Contd.) | | | | | | |
| English Reader | V | 19 | 9 | 22 | 50 | Secondary |
| Do. | VI | 22 | 12 | 11 | 45 | Do |
| Do. | VII | 21 | 4 | 13 | 38 | Do |
| Do. | VIII | 12 | 1 | 12 | 25 | Do |
| English Copy Book | III | 9 | 3 | 1 | 13 | Do |
| Do. | IV | 9 | 3 | 1 | 13 | Do |
| English Grammar & Composition | V & VI | 43 | 7 | Nil | 50 | Do |
| English Grammar | VII & VIII | 17 | 2 | 6 | 25 | Do |
| Do. | IX & X | 2 | Nil | 8 | 10 | Do |
| English Composition | VII & VIII | (p. 32) | | | | |
| Bengali Reader | III | 7 | 1 | 10 | 18 | Do |
| Do. | IV | 42 | 8 | Nil | 50 | Do |
| Do. | V | 30 | 20 | Nil | 50 | Do. |
| Do. | VI | 37 | 13 | Nil | 50 | Do |
| Do. | VII | 35 | 15 | Nil | 50 | Do |
| Do. | VIII | 19 | 3 | Nil | 22 | Do |
| Do. | | 13 | 3 | Nil | 16 | Do |

TABLE 'R' (Contd.)

| Subject | Class or Classes | No. of books by Hindu authors | No. of books by Muslim authors | No. of books by European authors | Total No. of books approved | Class of Schools |
|---------------------|---------------------|--|---|---|--------------------------------------|------------------------|
| | | | | | | |
| 1939 (Contd.) | | | | | | |
| Bengali Grammar | IV | 32 | 5 | Nil | 37 | Secondary |
| Do. | VII & VIII | 14 | 2 | Nil | 16 | Do |
| Bengali Composition | V & VI | 24 | 6 | Nil | 30 | Do |
| Bengali Copy Book | III | 6 | 2 | 1 | 9 | Do |
| | | (p. 33) | | | | |
| Do. | IV | 6 | 1 | 1 | 8 | Do |
| Bengali Primer | I | 32 | 43 (including 17 for maktabas) | Nil | 75 | Primary School |
| Bengali Reader | II | 27 | 32 (including 10 for maktabas) | Nil | 59 | Do |

TABLE 'R' (Contd.)

| Subject | Class or Classes | No. of books by Hindu authors | No. of books by Muslim authors | No. of books by European authors | Total No. of books approved | Class of schools |
|-------------------|---------------------|--|---|---|--------------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1939 (Contd.) | | | | | | |
| Bengali Reader | III | 19 | 24 (including 10 for maktabas) | Nil | 43 | Do |
| Do. | IV | 32 | 28 (including 8 for maktabas) | Nil | 60 | Do |
| Bengali Copy Book | I | 17 | 12 | Nil | 29 | Do |
| Do. | II | 18 | 10 | Nil | 28 | Do |
| Do. | III | 5 | 6 | Nil | 11 | Do |
| Do. | IV | 4 | 4 | Nil | 8 | Do |
| Arithmetic | I | 41 | 26 | Nil | 67 | Do |
| Do. | II | 34 | 20 | Nil | 54 | Do |
| Do. | III & IV | 23 | 20 | Nil | 43 | Do |

TABLE 'R' (Contd.)

| Subject | Class or Classes | 1939 (contd.) | | | | Total No. of books approved | Class of school |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|--|---|---|----|--------------------------------------|--------------------|
| | | No. of books by Hindu authors | No. of books by Muslim authors | No. of books by European authors | | | |
| 1939 (contd.) | | | | | | | |
| Geography and Rural Civics | III & IV | 28 | 12 | Nil | 40 | Primary School | |
| Do. | II | 17 | 7 | Nil | 24 | Do | |
| Elements of Science | III & IV | 36 | 16 | Nil | 52 | Do | |
| English Primer | III | 24 | 14 | 5 | 43 | Do | |
| English Reader | IV | 21 | 12 | 2 | 35 | Do | |
| English Copy Book | III | 7 | 4 | 1 | 12 | Do | |
| Do. | IV | 7 | 4 | 1 | 12 | Do | |

N.B. Text-books for classes IX and X are prescribed by Calcutta University and the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Dacca.